This week, Emily Bassett (PhD) will present "What do we mean by a moral emotion?: Responding to De Sousa". Everyone welcome!

 Abstract:

When it comes to morality and the emotions, we seem to be drawn to the idea that certain emotions are more salient to morality than others. Emotions such as guilt, shame and resentment appear to be more distinctly moral to us than sadness or joy. However, attempts to explain what makes some emotions more distinctly moral than others - to single out a coherent group of 'moral emotions - have largely been unsuccessful. In light of this, De Sousa has argued that our intuitions are mistaken. All emotions are equally relevant to morality. In this talk, I will argue that De Sousa's argument rests on two assumptions. First, on the assumption that emotions are on par with other intentional states such as belief in how they connect with morality. As beliefs are moral when they have moral content, emotions are moral when they have moral content. Second, on the assumption that this is the only salient connection that can be made between the emotions and morality. If we reject this second assumption, we leave open the possibility of distinguishing moral from non-moral emotions.