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LGD 2001 (2) - Tundu Lissu (2)

In Gold We Trust:
The Political Economy of Law, Human Rights
and the Environment in Tanzania's Mining Industry, Part 2
 

10.5 Social Services and Community Development

Apparently stung by accusations of exploitation, most mining companies have been working hard to portray better public image. Most are now involved in health and education projects and in the development of local infrastructure such as roads and potable water. We learn from MIGA, for instance, that KMCL's investment in Bulyanhulu:

'will contribute to the development of the country's infrastructure, as the establishment and operation of the plant will require constructing roads, and power transmission and water pipeline facilities. Communities surrounding the plant will benefit indirectly through improved access to potable water drawn from the water pipeline, availability of electrical power to local households and the development of roads' (Ibid).

Not to be outdone, the Ashanti Goldfields-AngloGold consortium that owns the Geita Gold Mine has reportedly set aside a total of two million US dollars to upgrade the 68-kilometer Geita – Bulyanhulu as well as constructed a public aerodrome to allow large aircraft to Geita. This is on top of other projects, which are being financed by the consortium in the area as schools, hospitals and water bore holes.

These efforts appear to have done little to win over the local communities and, increasingly, their elected representatives. For example, Members of Parliament from the Lake Victoria Zone are reportedly complaining against development programmes offered by mining companies which they say are:

'peanuts when compared with the environmental destruction and economic repercussions which sometimes forced residents in those areas to shift to other areas'.

The MPs also claimed mining companies were expanding their areas illegally, forcing out villagers close to their areas. They requested the government to give royalties to districts which have mineral reserves which are being exploited. They demanded that residents in the districts be paid compensation for environmental degradation arising from mining activities. They say that residents in areas with minerals were complaining that leaders in those areas were insensitive to them because they had been compromised. They claimed that investors in the mining sector were boastful and despised regional and district commissioners and MPs.

To these it can be added that even investors themselves admit that their operations have had major negative effects on economic activity, population and social development, which have been felt beyond the immediate mining areas. Their forecast of local social and economic conditions is also pretty downcast. For instance, in their analysis of environmental and economic issues for the Bulyanhulu Gold Mine, BGC and KMCL predict that:

'local households not benefiting directly or indirectly from the mining development will experience declines in relative wealth and an increase in economic vulnerability' (op. cit., 21).

To conclude on this part, it is clear that the 'medicine' of reforms in the mining sector has indeed been 'bitter'. That the reforms have been painful, as President Mkapa has himself acknowledged. However, the question as to whether this high price for the process of economic adjustment is worth paying for; whether future generations of Tanzanians will profit from the sacrifices of the present generation of communities living in mineral-rich areas; whether the bitter pill will lead to an effective cure of Tanzania's socio-economic ills, the jury is still out. For, as we have shown, the criticisms that the government has sold the country's assets too cheaply; putting in place policies that have helped drive up investment, GDP growth and exports, but which brutalize communities, damage the environment and fail to benefit the majority of the population have been well-aimed.

11. Conclusion

In his May Day speech this year (2001), President Benjamin Mkapa argued that in a world characterised by rapid technological change and major socio-economic transformations fuelled by the 'massive wave' of globalisation, Tanzania was:

'faced with a choice: Either to resist change and be swept aside by that massive wave and continue to be tossed around on the margins of global development in the 21st century; or to rapidly change our policies, administrative practices and our thinking in order to devise means and strategies to enable us to benefit from this new system of global relations and thereby defend our workers'.

The President stated that:

'all the countries in the world now realise that investment is the key to economic growth, employment creation and improvement in people's living conditions. Therefore, all countries, big and small, are competing to attract investors by creating conducive policy, administrative and legal environment … and by improving infrastructure' (Ibid).

He warned:

'If we do not change, we reduce our attraction to investors, while we do not have internal capital and expertise to produce the goods and services that will be competitive in world markets' (Ibid).

Acknowledging that the reforms have been painful, President Mkapa reminded his audience that:

'although medicine is always bitter, it often leads to cure. To do otherwise (i.e. not to take the bitter medicine) is to encourage disease and eventual death' (Ibid).

Our examination of the mining industry in Tanzania runs counter to these arguments. As we have shown, mining of precious minerals in Tanzania has historically been dominated by small-scale miners. We have seen that in sharp contrast to popular prejudice, that sees these producers as hordes of illegal squatters and encroachers engaged in economically inefficient and illegal mining activities and depriving the government of revenue, small-scale miners have – whenever given the opportunity – shown that they can make substantial contributions to both local and national economies. We have seen that small-scale mining is socially sustainable and environmentally benign as it uses simple, inexpensive technologies and employs far higher numbers of people.

We have seen, on the other hand, that large-scale corporate mining operations are high technology- dependent and therefore require huge amounts of capital, while creating far fewer jobs. They are also almost totally dependent on state subsidies in the form of generous tax breaks and guarantees on their profitability. They are also extremely costly socially and environmentally: They lead to forced dislocation of entire communities, destroying local economies and ruining the environment due to their rapacious hunger for natural resources and land.

The greatest concern over the mining boom is, therefore, in the area of human rights, social development and environmental management. There is growing perception of collusion between the state and the mining companies in a singular drive for investment, irrespective of its quality and this collusion has little sensitivity to social or environmental accountability or responsibility. The result is, as we have shown herein, the emergence of low intensity warfare between mine-owners and host communities and between large companies and small-scale miners.

The tensions arise from several factors: the eviction of whole communities and small-scale miners and their relocation to marginal areas or sites, with no or inadequate compensation and in most cases without recourse to the due process of the law; brutal treatment by state security forces of 'encroachers'; land use and ownership conflicts; socio-economic disruptions and the minimalist approach of mining companies to the provision of social services to resettled communities or neighbours. And when these conflicts arise, the public perception is that they will ultimately be resolved in the interests of the rich investors in league with the rulers and against the people.

The examination of the law relating to mining and the practice that has emerged in relation to the mining industry shows that the law can not be isolated from the existing power relations in as far as the rights of rural communities are concerned. It emerges that whatever the law provides, it is the powerful who often impose their own interpretations of that law to suit their interests. Even where, as in this case, the law grants extraordinary advantages to the powerful investors it is obvious that the demands of power are such that the powers that be find it far easier to ignore the minimal protections afforded local communities by law with impunity. This also appears to be the case with the minimalist provisions for environmental protection.

We have also seen the critical role that multilateral financial institutions, particularly the World Bank, have played in the shaping Tanzania's mining policy, law and practice. The Bank claims that wherever it has put its focus in Tanzania, 'the outcomes have improved'. That its assistance for the country:

'has improved in relevance, and in the process has helped to generate substantial institutional development' .

It seems obvious from the foregoing analysis that whatever 'improvement in outcomes' or 'relevance' the Bank has in mind, it is certainly not in the sphere of human rights and environmental responsibility of the mining sector. It does not appear to be an improvement in the country's economic 'outcomes' either, for the Bank itself admits that after almost four decades of its Tanzania strategy:

'… the best available estimates suggest that per capita income today is certainly no higher than it was four decades ago' (Ibid).

The reasons for this abysmal state of affairs may not be far to find. As CCM had ominously stated in its 1998 self-assessment:

'Experience from around the world has shown that in the early stages of the implementation of a market economy, there emerges people or companies, both genuine and dummy, whose motive is to plunder the nation's wealth and even to swindle in order to get rich quickly. Likewise, the living standards of the vast majority of the population often falls.… This situation has begun to emerge in our country. In order to protect our nation's interests and those of the people, the Government must enhance its supervisory and control capacities…'.

It is these supervisory and control capacities that appear to have been compromised. Contrary to President Mkapa's assurances that the government is taking and will continue to take all necessary care and caution in order to defend and protect our nation's interests and the interests of the people, it appears that it is only the interests of foreign investors that now take precedence in the mining sector. That contrary to his assertions that the government has not carried out reforms nor taken the steps to attract investors to merely 'follow the wind'; that the government is 'careful to see what is acceptable or unacceptable or not necessary in our efforts to attract foreign investors', it now appears that the government has undertaken these reforms without asking whether they were acceptable or unacceptable to the people in mineral-rich areas. The government has indeed 'followed the wind' in its pursuit of these reforms at the expense of human rights of local communities, local economies and the national interests.

11.1 Agenda for Reform

It seems, on the basis of the foregoing analysis, that an agenda for reform of the mining sector has to take of not only of the local and national conditions, it must also take account of the international dimensions of the industry. An agenda for reform must first deal with the disastrous social and economic impacts wrought on rural communities by corporate mining operations. This must be a call for justice for communities and individuals that have suffered gross human rights abuses and destruction of livelihoods as a result of forced relocation. As we have seen these forced relocations went unmitigated and uncompensated and even the corporate investors themselves acknowledge that the consequences have been disastrous.

An agenda for reform must also address the economics of large-scale corporate mining operations. As we have seen, the contribution of these operations to the national and local economies leaves a lot to be desired. To paraphrase President Mkapa, it is about time we asked whether the cost of foreign investment in the mining sector is economically acceptable or unacceptable or whether it is necessary. This requires a re-examination of the very basis of the economic philosophy that attaches great importance on attracting foreign interests rather developing internal capacities even when there is considerable evidence that those internal capacities are indeed able to make greater contributions to the social and economic development of the local communities and the nation as a whole when sufficiently motivated and encouraged.

An agenda for reform must also address itself to the environmental sustainability of large-scale mining operations as compared to small-scale artisanal activities. Given the vast amounts of natural resources required to run large-scale operations; given the vast waste of various kinds and varying toxicity that large-scale operations generate; given the grossly inadequate environmental and waste management plans and programmes that exist; given the growing toll on human life and the environment that these operations may be responsible for causing, it is high time the environmental impacts of corporate mining activities were addressed in a sustained manner.

An agenda for reform must finally address the political decision-making structures and processes as regards the mining sector. Structures and processes that are characterised by secrecy and subterfuges; that rely more on coercion and the use of force rather on negotiation, consensus-building and compromise, are too costly as we have seen. To address this question, another question has to be addressed, and that is the question of the ultimate ownership and control of natural resources including land and minerals. As we have seen, state control of mineral resources goes back to colonial era; that all independence did was to build on colonial foundations. It is from this root that the violence and lawlessness of the recent past can be understood. It is about time, therefore, that the issue of ownership and control of minerals was put high on the agenda for reform.

Endnotes

  1. . See M. Turner and M. Holman, 'Coming out of the shadows: Survey on Tanzania', Financial Times, Monday, July 24, 2000.

  2. . See A. Goldman, 'Raising the gold standards', Financial Times, Monday, July 24, 2000.

  3. . See M. Turner and M. Holman, 'It is time to correct the mistakes of the past', interview with President Benjamin Mkapa, Financial Times, Monday, July 24, 2000.

  4. . See A. Goldman, 'Raising the gold standards', Financial Times, Monday, July 24, 2000.

  5. . This is all the more so in the popular media where the issue is hardly ever investigated in any depth. See, for instance, Guardian Reporter, 'Tanzanian investment in gold, minerals pays off', The Guardian, Saturday, April 7, 2001.

  6. . Guardian Reporter, 'Tanzanian investment in gold, minerals pays off', op. cit.

  7. . See, for instance, M. Turner, 'Another time, another gold rush', The Financial Times, March 31, 1999. Turner quotes Mr. Mike Skead, Chairman of the Tanzania Exploration and Mining Association as stating that 'the gold rush seen in Tanzania by both artisinal (sic!) miners and modern mining companies over the past two years parallels those seen in Canada, Australia and South Africa around the turn of the century.'

  8. See R. Mihayo, 'Tanzania's mining success a 'Pyrrhic Victory'?', Business Times, Friday, May 4, 2001.

  9. . See A. Goldman, 'Raising the gold standards', Financial Times, Monday, July 24, 2000.

  10. . Mihayo, 'Tanzania's mining success a 'Pyrrhic Victory'?', op. cit.

  11. . D. Games, 'A new dawn', Business in Africa, October 2000, p. 44-47

  12. . See Guardian Reporter, 'Tanzanian investment in gold, minerals pays off', The Guardian, Saturday, April 7, 2001.

  13. . Mihayo, 'Tanzania's mining success a 'Pyrrhic Victory'?', op. cit.

  14. . Ibid. The Golden Pride mine entered production in 1999 and was joined by the Geita mine in June 2000 and Bulyanhulu in May 2001. Total gold output was forecast to reach 250,000 ounces in 2000, rising to 1m by the end of 2001 and 2m by 2003. According to the Financial Times' Antony Goldman, two dozen other projects are in the pipeline, reflecting the interest Tanzania is provoking among some of the industry's main players in South Africa, Canada and Australia after a generation of decay and decline (See 'Raising the gold standards, op. cit.)

  15. . Guardian Reporter, 'Tanzanian investment in gold, minerals pays off', op. cit.

  16. . See also I. Kyaruzi, 'Golden Pride, Geita, and Afrika Mashariki mines investment reaches USD 870 million', Business Times, Friday, April 13, 2001.

  17. . See C. Mabula, 'Investors set to spend over 400bn/- in gold exploration', Daily News, August 16, 1999.

  18. . Mihayo, 'Tanzania's mining success a 'Pyrrhic Victory'?', op. cit.

  19. . See The East African, June 21-27, 1999 and June 28-July 4, 1999. In April 1999, Barrick Gold Corporation of Toronto, Canada, acquired Sutton Resources and its Tanzanian subsidiary, Kahama Mining Corporation Ltd., thus taking over operations at the latter's Bulyanhulu mine. The Denver Gold Group –a mining investment forum – describes Barrick as 'the most profitable gold company in the world, and the most valuable, with market capitalization of US$8 billion.'

  20. . See M. Turner, 'another time, another gold rush', Financial Times (op. cit.) President Mkapa is also reported as telling a Business Seminar on Tanzania, organized by the Swedish Business Council in Stockholm in August 1999 that over US$ 600 million worth of investments are projected to be made in the mining sector in the next three years (See The Guardian, Wednesday, September 1, 1999).

  21. . Mabula, 'Investors set to spend over 400bn/- in gold exploration', op. cit.

  22. . Kyaruzi, 'Golden Pride, Geita, and Afrika Mashariki mines investment reaches USD 870 million', op. cit.

  23. . Mihayo, 'Tanzania's mining success a 'Pyrrhic Victory'?', op. cit.

  24. . Turner, 'Another time, another gold rush', op. cit.

  25. . Mihayo, 'Tanzania's mining success a 'Pyrrhic Victory'?', op. cit.

  26. . Turner, 'Another time, another gold rush', op. cit.

  27. . See Barrick Gold Corporation, 'Barrick gold reserves rise 40% at Bulyanhulu: Expanding potential seen at low-cost operation', press release dated October 4, 2000.

  28. . Mihayo, 'Tanzania's mining success a 'Pyrrhic Victory'?', op. cit.

  29. . Ibid.

  30. . Games, 'A new dawn', (op. cit.)

  31. See M. Kitururu, 'State sees new mining drive as panacea', Daily News, Tuesday, April 3, 2001; Guardian Reporter, 'Tanzanian investment in gold, minerals pays off', The Guardian, Saturday, April 7, 2001.

  32. See URT (2001) Turning Idle Mineral Wealth into a Weapon Against Poverty: Address by the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, His Excellency Benjamin William Mkapa, at the 111stAnnual General Meeting of the Chamber of Mines of South Africa, Johannesburg, 15th November, 2001, pp. 5-6.

  33. . Mihayo, 'Tanzania's mining success a 'Pyrrhic Victory'?', op. cit.

  34. . Guardian Reporter, 'Tanzanian investment in gold, minerals pays off', op. cit.

  35. . The Swahili title of the document is 'Programu ya Chama cha Mapinduzi: Mwelekeo wa Sera Katika Miaka ya Tisini', i.e. 'Chama cha Mapinduzi Programme: Policy Directions in the 1990s' – author.

  36. This does not even take into account smuggling which - according to Chachage (Ibid., 254) – continued to be a major problem, because the Bank of Tanzania was only able to purchase an average of around 3 tons a year out of the estimated 10 to 16 tons of gold that were being produced annually. About 80% of gemstones were being exported unofficially every year during that period.

  37. . 'Chama cha Mapinduzi: Tathmini ya Miaka Ishirini ya CCM (1977 – 1997)', i.e. Chama cha Mapinduzi: Assessment of Twenty Years of CCM (1977 – 1997) – author's translation.

  38. . Randall Oliphant, Barrick Gold Corporation's President and CEO, referring to Bulyanhulu's gold riches to a Barrick shareholders' meeting in Toronto, Canada, May 8, 2001 (Lissu, forthcoming).

  39. . See OED Director General's 'Memorandum to the Executive Directors and the President', dated September 13, 2000.

  40. . Sector Review #9007 published on September 19, 1990. The author was, however, unable to locate copy of this report at the World Bank Information Center (the Infoshop) in Washington DC.

  41. Preamble to the National Investment Act, 1997, No. 27 of 1997.

  42. According to the IFC review, there are five principal obstacles to private sector development: (1) slow pace of privatization, (2) delays in financial sector reform, (3) weak infrastructure and human resources, (4) social and governmental ambivalence toward private sector development, and (5) aid dependence (World Bank, 2000, op. cit.)

  43. This is precisely what happened to Indonesia recently when it postponed construction of a power plant in the wake of the Asian financial meltdown in 1998 and the political crisis that soon followed. MIGA was then compelled to pay its first ever claim to an investor: $15 million to Enron Corporation, a US-based power generation giant. Although MIGA was partly subrogated by reinsurers, it soon stopped providing political risk insurance for projects in Indonesia. This policy was ended in February 2001 when MIGA announced that the Indonesian government had agreed to reimburse them for the full $25 million. In the end Indonesia will have paid MIGA at least $25 million, with nothing tangible to show for it! (FoE et al, Ibid., 3).< http://www.miga.org/screens/projects/guarant/regions/africa.html>:

  44. See message from Patricia Veevers-Carter 'MIGA Issues Largest Guarantee Ever for African Mining Venture', undated.

  45. The Bank has, in recent years, come to increasingly view itself as a 'knowledge-based institution' whose duty is to provide 'the intellectual and moral leadership in development issues that is expected of it.' (See George and Sabelli, Ibid., Ch. IX, for an incisive critique of this role).

  46. . Act No. 19 of 1979.

  47. Tanzania is not alone in this respect. According to Abugre and Akabzaa (Ibid., 7), 'the decade of the 1990s has marked a major departure from the recent past in the African mining sector. State controls and ownership in the sector have been dismantled substantially and an investor friendly environment put in place. By the close of 1995, at least 35 African countries had radically revised their mining codes redefining the rights and obligations of investors, enhancing the incentive framework and deregulating and privatizing the sector…. As a result of these measures, exploration in West Africa … doubled between 1993-95….'

  48. No. 5 of 1998

  49. . See section 2

  50. See First Schedule, item 15.

  51. Mining Act, op. cit., s. 3.

  52. . This view is also shared by Dr. Palamagamba J. Kabudi of the Faculty of Law of the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania who has examined the union between the then Tanganyika and Zanzibar on the basis of international law principles (Kabudi, pers. Comm. 28th September, 1999).

  53. See, for instance, Shivji (1990) for a thoroughgoing examination of this subject.

  54. The Mining Act, Ibid., s. 6(1).

  55. Ibid., s. 6(3).

  56. Ibid., s. 15(2). This provision would appear to be a significant step backward to the government policy of buying gold from small-scale miners which since the early 1990s has had such success in increasing gold exports from Tanzania (See Chachage (1995).

  57. Ibid., s. 15(5).

  58. Ibid., s. 15(4).

  59. See Neumann, 1992 and Chachage, 1996 on the moral economy of rural peasant communities.

  60. Mining Act, Ibid., s. 95(1)(b)(ii).

  61. Ibid., s. 95(1)(b)(iii).

  62. Ibid., s. 95(1)(e).

  63. Ibid., s. 95(1)(f).

  64. Ibid., s. 96(1).

  65. Ibid., s. 96(3).

  66. See particularly the cover features dedicated to the mining industry in the Third World Resurgence No. 93 of 1997

  67. See Minerals Found in Tanzania, Ministry of Water, Energy and Minerals, 1996, pp. 26-27.

  68. Kahama Mining Corp. Ltd. Vrs. Maalim Kadau & Ors. Civil Case No. 12 of 1995, High Court of Tanzania, Mchome, J. (Tabora) (unreported).

  69. . See Letter Ref. MRK/LIT/HC-TB/12/95/VOL.11/816/96 from Maajar, Rwechungura and Kameja Advocates to the Registrar, Court of Appeal of Tanzania dated May 22, 1996

  70. . See Kahama Mining Corporation Ltd. vrs. Maalim Kadau and 16 Others (Miscellaneous Civil Notice No. 1 of 1996) (Court of Appeal of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Nyalali, C.J. (as he then was), dated May 23, 1996.

  71. . The East African, (date unknown but most likely June, 1996), by J. Kithama.

  72. . See 'Government orders those in Bulyanhulu mines to leave', Mtanzania, Wednesday, July 31, 1996; and M. Kitururu, 'Government orders out Bulyanhulu miners', Daily News , Wednesday, July 31, 1996.

  73. A. Mbogora, 'The day hell broke loose at Bulyanhulu', The Guardian, Monday, September 9, 1996; see A. Mbogora, 'Final days at Bulyanhulu', the Guardian, Wednesday, September 11, 1996

  74. See ruling in Kahama Mining Corporation Limited vrs. Maalim Kadau & 16 Others (Civil Case # 12 of 1995) (High Court of Tanzania at Tabora, Mchome, J.), delivered August 2, 1996.

  75. Attorney General vrs. Maalim Kadau & 16 Others [1997] TLR 69 (Court of Appeal of Tanzania, Nyalali, CJ; Mfalila, Lubuva, JJA). The ruling was delivered on February 26, 1997.

  76. A. Swilla, '23 feared buried by 'graders' in Bulyankulu' Majira, Monday, August 12, 1996.

  77. M. Islam and M. Rweyemamu, 'Uncertainty reigns over the Kahama Killings: The number of those dead in the mines feared to reach 52: Photos of the dead sent to Dodoma: They were allegedly buried by graders', Mtanzania, Tuesday, August 13, 1996.

  78. S. Thani, 'The Bulyankulu survivor names the dead: claims four colleagues died' Majira, Friday, August 30, 1996.

  79. Islam and Rweyemamu, 'Uncertainty reigns…', op. cit.

  80. Ibid. KMCL also makes the claim that in 1996, 'one day after the order was made by the Shinyanga Regional Commissioner, artisanal miners from sub-villages such as Bariadi, Namba Mbili, Namba Tatu and Mwabagikulu left.' However, its otherwise voluminous and detailed reports totally fail to explain how between 30,000 and 400,000 people KMCL concedes were in Bulyanhulu during that time could have left 'peacefully' within a day of their being ordered to leave the area! (see KMCL, 1999:21).

  81. fails to explain

  82. Ibid.

  83. Ibid.

  84. Islam and Rweyemamu, 'Uncertainty reigns…' op cit.

  85. Ibid.

  86. S. Thani, 'Exhumation of dead bodies stops in Bulyankulu', Majira , Tuesday, August 20, 1996.

  87. See 'Miners Allegedly buried in Bulyankulu' Mtanzania, Friday, September 13, 1996.

  88. S. Thani, 'Miners volunteer to exhume the Bulyankulu pits', Majira, Sunday, August 25, 1996.

  89. See 'Miners Allegedly buried in Bulyankulu', op. cit.

  90. Ibid.

  91. Ibid.

  92. S. Thani, 'No one was buried in Bulyankulu - Kiwelu', Majira, September 17, 1996.

  93. Ibid.

  94. Ibid., s, 16(4).

  95. Ibid., s. 26(2).

  96. Ibid., ss. 54(5) and 62(2).

  97. Ibid., ss. 28 and 29.

  98. Ibid., s. 33.

  99. Ibid., . s. 10(2)(a).

  100. Ibid., clause (a) of the Schedule.

  101. Ibid., s. 86(5).

  102. Ibid., s. 87(1).

  103. Ibid., s. 10(2)(b).

  104. Ibid., s. 20(4).

  105. See clause 1(1) of Schedule 1). The composition of this Committee was questioned by some Members of Parliament who demanded that its membership be broadened to include elected representatives of the people rather than leaving it to unelected bureaucrats. This matter appears to have been ignored as the provisions of the Bill in this respect have been enacted intact, in spite of vague promises by the Minister to look into MPs complaints (See Tanzania, Ibid., 34-5).

  106. Ibid ., cl. 4).

  107. Ibid., cl. 7).

  108. The Mining Act, Ibid., s. 7.

  109. See Mark Turner, 'Another time, another gold rush', in London's The Financial Times, Wednesday, 31st March, 1999.

  110. The Mining Act, Ibid., s. 8(3). This is significant given the ongoing conflict between small-scale gemstone miners and a South African company AFGEM over the Mererani gemstone concession in Arusha region (Lissu, forthcoming).

  111. Ibid ., ss. 65(7) and 68(2).

  112. Ibid., s. 45(1)(b)

  113. Ibid., s. 45(3).

  114. Ibid., s. 45(3).

  115. Ibid., s. 45(4).

  116. Ibid., ss. 47(2)(e)(i) and 51(3)(e).

  117. Ibid., ss. 47(2)(h) and 51(3)(f).

  118. Ibid., ss. 54(3)(b), 57(2)(c) and 63(c).

  119. Ibid., cl. 2.

  120. Ibid., cl. 2(2)

  121. Ibid., cl. 4.

  122. Ibid., cl. 5(2).

  123. Ibid., cl. 5(3).

  124. Ibid ., s. 110(2)(j).

  125. The Mining (Provisional Licenses) Regulations, 1999, GN 214 of 1999.

  126. The Mining (Mineral Trading) Regulations, 1999, GN 215 of 1999.

  127. The Mining (Salt Production and Iodation) Regulations, GN 216 of 1999.

  128. The Mining (Mineral Rights) Regulations, 1999, GN 217 of 1999.

  129. The Mining (Environmental Management and Protection) Regulations, 1999, GN 218 of 1999.

  130. The Mining (Safe Working and Occupational Health) Regulations, 1999, GN 219 of 1999.

  131. See regulation 3 of the Mining (Environmental Management and Protection) Regulations, 1999.

  132. Ibid., reg. 4(1).

  133. Ibid., reg. 6.

  134. Ibid., reg. 7.

  135. Ibid., reg. 8

  136. Ibid., reg. 9

  137. Ibid., reg. 10

  138. Ibid., reg. 11

  139. Ibid., reg. 12

  140. Ibid., Part IV

  141. Ibid., Part V

  142. Ibid., Part VI

  143. Second Schedule

  144. Third Schedule

  145. Fourth Schedule

  146. Sixth Schedule

  147. Ibid., s. 101(1).

  148. Ibid., s. 101(3).

  149. Ibid., s. 102(1).

  150. Ibid., s. 103(1).

  151. Ibid., s. 101(2).

  152. Ibid., s. 103(2).

  153. Ibid., cl. 5(2).

  154. Ibid., cl. 5(3).

  155. See the articles in the East African cited above.

  156. See M. Kitururu, 'State sees new mining drive as panacea', Daily News, Tuesday, April 3, 2001; Guardian Reporter, 'Tanzanian investment in gold, minerals pays off', The Guardian, Saturday, April 7, 2001.

  157. See, Advertiser's Supplement, 'President Benjamin William Mkapa to Officially Commission the Underground Bulyanhulu Gold Mine', Mtanzania, Tuesday, July 17, 2001; 'President Benjamin Mkapa to Commission the Country's Major Underground Mine, Nipashe, Tuesday, July 17, 2001; 'Celebration as His Excellency President Benjamin Mkapa officially inaugurates Tanzania's largest underground gold mine', The Guardian, Tuesday, July 17, 2001.

  158. MIGA's global average is, indeed, far higher at $1.175 million per job created, according to FoE et al. who have in fact called for its disbanding for promoting 'risky business', failing the poor and harming the environment (Ibid., 6, 19).

  159. See editorial titled 'Mining activities: What is wrong?', The Guardian, Thursday, July 19, 2001.

  160. Anthony Diallo, MP for Mwanza Rural, quoted in See L. Mwakalebela and T. Kaguo, 'MPs differ on mining taxes', Business Times, Friday 18, 2000.

  161. Kyaruzi, 'Golden Pride, Geita, and Afrika Mashariki mines investment….' op. cit.

  162. Mabula, 'Investors set to spend over 400bn/- in gold exploration', op. cit.

  163. Kyaruzi, 'Golden Pride, Geita, and Afrika Mashariki mines investment….' op. cit. See also. A. Njau, 'Investment tax incentives boost government revenue', Business Times, Friday, April 13, 2001.

  164. Preamble to the National Investment Act, 1997, No. 27 of 1997.

  165. See Goldman, 'Raising the Gold Standards', op. cit.

  166. See L. Mwakalebela and T. Kaguo, 'MPs differ on mining taxes', op. cit.

  167. Ibid.

  168. Ibid.

  169. Ibid.

  170. Turner, 'Another time, another gold rush', op. cit.

  171. See, for instance, The Guardian Reporter, 'Tanzanian investment in gold, minerals pays off', op. cit.

  172. Letter to Commissioner for Minerals in the Ministry for Minerals and Energy by Kezia Aaron, Liaison Officer for Ashanti Goldfields (Tanzania) Limited, dated July 18, 2000.The gold gifts were described as one 'hand-crafted gold bowl to be presented to His Excellency, President Mkapa (and worth) US$7,200'; a gold bracelet to be presented to the First Lady, Mama Mkapa worth US$2,000; 15 sets of 3.5 oz. gold coins emblazoned with the Tanzania Coat of Arms and the Ashanti and AngloGold logos; 50 sets of 0.25 oz. gold coins emblazoned with the Ashanti and AngloGold logos worth US$5,000; and 250 gold-plated pens emblazoned with the Geita Gold Mine logo worth US$ 7,500. The total weight in gold was 1.5kg at the total value of US$ 29,200.

  173. Letter Ref. MEM-C/C.220/46 from Gray Mwakalukwa to George Lauwo, dated July 20, 2000.

  174. See R. Kabale, 'Dishonest investors face expulsion', The Guardian, Wednesday, July 18, 2001.

  175. Ibid.

  176. See also reports quoting President Mkapa praising KMCL 'for its exemplary social and community development programmes' in villages surrounding the Bulyanhulu mine, in 'Mkapa silences mining critics', Daily News, July 19, 2001.

  177. C. Mabula, 'Ashanti Goldfields sets aside 1.6bn/- for road upgrading', Daily News, August 16, 1999

  178. E. Kavishe, 'MPs meet Minister over royalties from minerals', The Guardian, Tuesday, July 17, 2001.

  179. See, 'It is not Possible to Employ all those Looking for Jobs', May Day Speech by President Benjamin Mkapa, Mtanzania, Thursday, May 3, 2001

  180. Apparently fond of the death metaphors, President Mkapa repeated his dire warnings when he recently commissioned the Bulyanhulu Gold Mine: 'For those who hesitate, thinking it is better to leave gold undisturbed underground until we acquire the capital and technology to exploit it on our own, I only have one comment: We have two choices: Either we adopt and adapt or we perish.'' See 'Mkapa silences mining critics', The Daily News, Thursday, July19, 2001.

  181. OED's Director General's Memorandum to the Executive Directors and the President, September 13, 2000, in World Bank, 2000, Ibid.

  182. Op. cit., paragraph 184.

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