University of Warwick/ Online l0am-lpm, 5 June & 2-Spm, 11, June, 17 June, 20 June.

International Conference at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law, Hamburg.

We are delighted to invite you to attend a 1 hour feedback session over free pizza and drinks. We are looking for Law students to share their ideas on what employer events and career support would be most helpful next year, and discover more about your experience of them this year. Please email the Senior Careers Consultant for Law if you would like to attend at sam.brown@warwick.ac.uk.

Thursday June 6, 2–4pm: Chapter 6: Valuing Persons

Seminars will take place in R3.25. All colleagues, including undergraduate and postgraduate students, are very welcome.

“Love often seems uncontrollable and irrational, but we just as frequently appear to have reasons for loving the people we do. In Love’s Vision, Troy Jollimore offers a new way of understanding love that accommodates both of these facts, arguing that love is guided by reason even as it resists and sometimes eludes rationality. At the same time, he reconsiders love’s moral status, acknowledging its moral dangers while arguing that it is, at heart, a moral phenomenon—an emotion that demands empathy and calls us away from excessive self-concern. Love is revealed as neither wholly moral nor deeply immoral, neither purely rational nor profoundly irrational. Rather, as Diotima says in Plato’s Symposium, love is “something in between.””

Chat directly with staff and students from the Department of Economics to get your questions answered. Please check our Frequently Asked Questions before joining.

Register for Live Chat

The next postgraduate Work in Progress (WiP) seminar is taking place this Thursday 6 June from 5-6:15 PM in S2.77 and on Teams. Davide Versari will present 'Against Political Cognitivism as a Ground of Legitimacy'. Everyone welcome!

Abstract:

Political cognitivism is the commitment to the idea that there exists a standard of correctness for political decisions, and that such a standard can be reached. So-called belief-based approaches to political legitimacy take this to be the ground of legitimacy of a political decision or, more generally, of a political decision-making procedure. My aim is to counter this claim. To do that, I will argue that the epistemic circumstances of politics have some structural problems, linked to the concept of reasonable disagreement, such that the case in favour of cognitivism is not strong enough to justify its use as a ground of legitimacy.

Teams link:

https://teams.microsoft.com/l/meetup-join/19%3aa49e6af9675349fda02fee164134326a%40thread.tacv2/1717420412814?context=%7b%22Tid%22%3a%2209bacfbd-47ef-4465-9265-3546f2eaf6bc%22%2c%22Oid%22%3a%22f669e777-47fc-445f-9b8f-f1c85c474050%22%7d