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Thursday, November 23, 2023
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Tri-Grid ChallengeRuns from Monday, November 13 to Sunday, November 26. Tri-Grid challenge is a two-week fitness activity where individuals and teams earn points for walking, running, cycling, or swimming. It's open to everyone, regardless of ability or fitness level and this term it's taking place from Monday 13 November to Sunday 26 November 2023. Tri-grid challenge is a great way to get more active and motivate each other. We are organising a Law School Team we both students and staff can take part. Email law.se@warwick.ac.uk if you'd like to join! |
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WiP SeminarS2.77Our next postgraduate Work in Progress (WiP) seminar is taking place this Thursday 23rd November from 5-6:15 PM in S2.77 and on Teams. Fridolin Neumann will present 'Heidegger on Kant and Ontological Intuition'. Everyone welcome!
Abstract: In the 1920s and 1930s, Heidegger intensively engaged with Kant’s philosophy in a way that he himself acknowledges as “violent” since it always attempts to capture the unsaid in the written word. My talk revolves around a crucial claim Heidegger makes about Kant’s theory of cognition, evoking discomfort in every loyal Kantian: “knowing is primarily intuiting [Erkennen ist primär Anschauen].” I argue that in order to understand what is at stake here this claim must be interpreted along the lines of Heidegger’s distinction between ontic and ontological cognition (that is, cognition of entities on the one hand and cognition of being transcendentally determining our encounter with entities on the other hand). As I propose, the supposed primacy of intuition mainly refers to ontological cognition and hereby offers an account of human responsiveness to ontological norms which determine our ontic experience of entities in the first place. In Heidegger’s account, this (ontological) responsiveness is cashed out in terms of intuition which is structurally similar to (ontic) intuition involved in sensible perception. I proceed by first elaborating on the distinction between ontic and ontological cognition to then argue why Heidegger’s thesis about intuition should be understood as referring to the latter. After that, I sketch what it means to understand ontological cognition in terms of intuition. |