These free sessions will help you think about where you want to be in a year’s time; start planning your actions; and develop key skills for your academic, personal and/or professional life. We offer parallel sessions, so you can tailor the day to your needs. You will need to book your sessions in advance.

The aim of the workshop is to explore the role of reasons in democratic legitimacy, focusing in particular on the question of how democratic legitimacy is possible if democratic processes are based on subjective reasons.

PROGRAMME (BST / British Summer Time)

Thursday, 10^th of June

2:00 – 2:15 Introduction

2:15 – 3:30 “Political Deference”
Fabienne Peter (University of Warwick)

3:30 – 3:40 Break

3:40 – 4:55 “Autonomy as Non-Alienation, Autonomy as Sovereignty, and Politics”
David Enoch (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

4:55 – 5:05 Break

5:05 – 6:20 “Principled Disobedience and the Limits of Democratic Authority”
Sameer Bajaj (University of Warwick)

Friday, 11^th of June

2:00 – 3:15 “Individual Freedom & the Standards of Public Reason”
Maria Paola Ferretti (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt)

3:15 – 3:25 Break

3:25 – 4:40 “The Problem of Ersatz Justice: Toward an Epistemic Political Liberalism”
David Estlund (Brown University)

4:40 – 4:50 Break

4:50 – 6:05 “Must we Reason with our Political Enemies?”
Robert Talisse (Vanderbilt University)

6:05 – 6:15 Closing Remarks

We welcome anyone who is interested in attending the workshop. Registration is required and must be completed via the following link:

https://forms.gle/J6suxvetFzwBiFmVA

We will provide the Zoom link and password to those who have registered at a later stage.

For any inquiries, please contact us at: fipworkshop.warwick@gmail.com

Conference organizers: Diogo Carneiro (d.carneiro@warwick.ac.uk) and Michele Giavazzi (m.giavazzi@warwick.ac.uk).

Sponsored by: Aristotelian Society, AHRC project ‘Norms for the New Public Sphere’, Centre for Ethics, Law & Public Affairs, The Mind Association, The Society for Applied Philosophy.

The aim of these writing bootcamps are to provide a dedicated space for you to focus exclusively on writing chunks of your LLM dissertation. You will be asked to attend with clear writing goals for your dissertation and targets for writing (for example, finishing off a chapter of your dissertation).

This session will be via Microsoft Teams.

Chat directly with staff and students from the Department of Economics to get your questions answers. Please check our Frequently Asked Questions before joining.

Offer Holders will be sent an email invitation 48 hours before the Live Chat is due to commence.

The SQE is on the horizon, but firms are still open for training contracts and vac schemes. In this webinar, we’re talking all about becoming a solicitor – however you wish to qualify – and offering tips and tricks on how to make your applications stand out. Firms attending are: Weil; Clyde & Co; Slaughter & May; Norton Rose.

This two-part seminar will mark the tenth anniversary of the Bribery Act coming into force in July 2021. It has been convened jointly by the Centre for Financial Law, Regulation and Compliance (IALS) and the Centre for the Study of Corruption (Sussex). The seminar will be by Zoom, and the same link will be used for each part.

This session will focus on Will Gildea's paper "The Moral Status of Humans and Animals: Towards a New View".

Abstract

All views of the moral status of humans and animals face serious objections. They are either insufficiently egalitarian, insufficiently hierarchical, or insufficiently theoretically robust. I propose the seed of a new view of moral status, called the Engagement View, which is well-placed to avoid these key problems. On this view, moral status is grounded primarily by sentience and certain emotional capacities as they figure in engagement with the world. The Engagement View enables us to account for the equal moral status of humans with severe cognitive impairments. It also supports a form of hierarchy in the moral status of beings, but is highly revisionary about which beings may occupy the upper reaches of moral status.