Events
Wednesday, January 17, 2024
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SYMPOSIUM: Financial Crime Across Disciplines: Perspectives from the Global SouthUniversity of Warwick (TBC)Runs from Wednesday, January 17 to Thursday, January 18. A two-day symposium to discuss financial and economic crimes in the Global South, exploring multi-disciplinary research to enhance understanding and foster effective responses. |
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EconBites Lecture with Professor Andrew Oswald and Professor Sonia BhalotraMS.01 Zeeman BuildingWednesday 17th January at 11am in MS.01 Zeeman BuildingThese are short sessions to introduce you to the brilliant research done by our academics and will be followed by a Q&A session.
*PDM credits will be awarded to Year 1 students. REGISTER NOW
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Law School Lunchtime Research Seminar - Wednesday 17 January 2024S2.09 / S2.12Guest Speaker: Dr Basak Ertur, Goldsmiths University of London Title of Talk: Spectacles and Specters: A Performative History of Political Trials Starting with lunch at 12:30pm in Room S2.09, followed by the Seminar at 1:00pm in Room S2.12. |
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Department meeting |
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Philosophy Department Staff Meeting |
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Philosophy CafeS0.28Open to all MA and MPhil students. Meet your peers, discuss modules, generate essay ideas, discover Warwick University's offering, distribute academic resources and more! For any questions, email: Amrita.Tewari@warwick.ac.uk |
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Education Studies Research Seminar - JanOnline Via MS Teams |
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Philosophy Department Colloquium - James Stazicker (KCL)S0.18Dear Colleagues,
You are warmly invited to the first Departmental Colloquium of Term 2, which will take place at 4pm, Wednesday 17 January, Room S0.18.
Speaker: James Staziker (KCL)
False measures in the science and philosophy of consciousness
According to a widespread contemporary view of the mind, consciousness plays less of a role than was traditionally assumed: much of perception, decision and action occurs independently of our conscious experiences. I will criticise one central line of scientific support for this view, which measures consciousness by a subject’s capacity to identify and discriminate their experiences and actions. This style of measurement underestimates consciousness, and is not justified even if we grant that, necessarily, subjects are aware of their own conscious experiences. In search of a better measure, I look to philosophical accounts of the first-order, demonstrative thoughts most immediately related to conscious perception and action. But here we find the same problem: our best philosophical account individuates these thoughts by subjects’ capacity to discriminate their experiences. I trace the problem to broadly Fregean criteria for individuating thoughts, propose a related solution, and discuss implications for the science of consciousness.
Their next colloquium will take place on 28 February with Kate Kirkpatrick on ’The Myth of Recognition in The Second Sex’.
I hope to see you on Wednesday!
Best,
Andrew |