Members' Voting Power in the Governance of the International Monetary Fund
Ben Lockwood
CSGR Working Paper No. 86/01
June 2001
Abstract:
This note shows that in the Sodrow-Miesowski-Wilson model, the Nash equilibrium in capital taxes depends on whether these taxes are unit (as assumed in the literature) or ad valorem (as in reality). In a symmetric version of the model with cobb-Douglas technology, public good provision is higher, and residents in both countries are better off, when countries compete in unit taxes.
Keywords: tax competition, unit tax, ad valorem tax
Jel Classification: H20, H25
Address for correspondence:
Professor Ben Lockwood
Department of Economics and CSGR
University of Warwick
Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK
Email: b.lockwood@warwick.ac.uk
