Themes from the work of Mark Eli Kalderon

University of Warwick, July 2-3

Mark Eli Kalderon is professor of philosophy at UCL and former editor of the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. While his most recent research has been focused on the metaphysics of sense and sensibilia, it draws upon – and has implications for – a breadth of philosophical approaches and topics, not least due to, for example, Prof Kalderon’s own interest in ancient and scholastic theories of perception. His books include Sympathy in Perception, Form without Matter: Empedocles and Aristotle on Color Perception, and Moral Fictionalism.

In Prof Kalderon’s Sympathy in Perception, insights from ancient, phenomenological, analytic, and empirical sources are woven together into a rich and ambitious elaboration and defence of a naïve realist theory of perception. Kalderon develops the view by revisiting and transforming explanatory concepts from the pre-modern era, aiming to ‘contribute to, if not indeed effect, a Kuhnian revolution’ in philosophy of perception.

We will be holding an in-person conference at the University of Warwick, investigating themes from Prof Kalderon's work. If you would like to attend, we ask that you email the organisers – Guy Longworth and Jack Shardlow – at wma.philosophy.events@gmail.com to register (note that places are limited).

Saturday July 2 

9.30am Welcome

10am–11.30am ‘On the Homeric Roots of Intentionality’, Mark Kalderon (UCL)

11.30am–12noon Coffee

12noon–1.30pm ‘Partiality and perception’, Giulia Martina (Turin)

1.30pm–2.30pm Lunch

2.30pm–4pm ‘Aristotle on having reason strictly speaking’, Elena Cagnoli Fiecconi (UCL)

4pm–4.30pm Coffee

4.30pm–6pm Title TBC, Charles Travis (Porto)

 

Sunday July 3 

9.30am Welcome

10am–11.30am Title TBC, Thomas Crowther (Warwick)

11.30–12noon Coffee

12noon–1.30pm ‘Kalderon’s Puzzle Solved’, Vivian Mizrahi (Geneva)

1.30pm–2.30pm Lunch

2.30pm–4pm Title TBC, M. G. F. Martin (Oxford/Berkeley)

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Summer Seminar: Mark Eli Kalderon, Sympathy in Perception

Online

Contact: Guy Longworth, Tom Crowther

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Workshop on Testimony and Other Minds

In person

Contact: Lucy Campbell, Jack Shardlow, at wma.philosophy.events@gmail.com

Wed 30th March

10.15–10.30: Welcome and coffee

10.30–12.00: Guy Longworth (Warwick)– title TBC

12.15 – 13.45: Speaker TBC

13.45–14.45: Lunch + coffee

14.45–16.15: Matt Parrott (Oxford), with commentary from Anil Gomes (Oxford) – title TBC

16.15–16.30: Coffee etc.

16.30–18.00: Beri Marušić (Edinburgh), with commentary from Jane Heal (Cambridge) – “Interpersonal Reasoning”

18.00–19.00: Drinks

19.00: Dinner

Thurs 31st March

9.30–10.00: Coffee etc.

10.00–11.30: Lucy Campbell – “Non-Linguistic Meaning, and Knowledge of Other Minds”

11.45–13.15: Anita Avramides “Exploring a Duality in the Problem of Other Minds”

13.15: Closing remarks

Location: Wolfson RE, rooms 1, 2, 3

The workshop will be in-person at the University of Warwick. Please email wma.philosophy.events@gmail.com to register, including ‘TKOM attendance’ as the subject of the email

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Seminar Series: Autobiographical Memory, Value, and Moral Identity

Online

Contact: Daniel Vanello

12th January 2022 - Fabrice Teroni (Philosophy; Geneva)

26th January 2022 - Deborah Laible (Psychology; Lehigh)

2nd February 2022 - Robyn Fivush (Psychology; Emory)

16h February 2022 - Tobias Krettenauer (Psychology; Wilfrid Laurier University)

23rd February 2022 - Marya Schechtman (Philosophy; Illinois at Chicago)

9th March 2022 - Matthew Soteriou (Philosophy; King’s College)

16th March 2022 - Kristin H. Lagattuta (Psychology; UC Davis)

22nd March 2022 - Christoph Hoerl (Philosophy; Warwick)

27th April 2022 - Shaun Nichols (Philosophy; Cornell)

11th May 2022 - Monisha Pasupathi (Psychology, University of Utah)

18th May 2022 - Carl Craver (Philosophy/Psychology; St. Louis, Washington)

1st July 2022 - Naomi Eilan (Philosophy; Warwick)

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Matt Duncan and Hannah Nahas talk

Thursday 28th October 2021, 3 - 4.30pm

“Getting Acquainted with Art”

We learn from art. By viewing, hearing, touching, creating, performing, and in yet other ways interacting with art, we gain new knowledge—knowledge that we wouldn’t have had, and perhaps couldn’t have had, without encountering that art. That’s obvious. But what is less obvious is the nature, or structure, of this knowledge—what constitutes it. A standard assumption in contemporary analytic philosophy is that all knowledge is and must be propositional—that is, constituted by beliefs in propositions. However, this assumption, despite being standard, has come under attack in recent years. One front in this attack comes from aesthetics and philosophy of art, where some philosophers have claimed that some knowledge gained from art is non-propositional. In this paper we will fortify and expand this front by giving new reasons to think that some knowledge from art is indeed non-propositional and is instead “knowledge of things,” which is constituted, not by beliefs in propositions, but by awareness of properties and objects. We will also fill a gap in the contemporary literature by giving an account of this knowledge—of its nature, structure, and relation to other knowledge.