As we ordinarily think of theoretical inquiry - for example, inquiry in the natural sciences - we think of it as aiming to uncover such objective features. Thus, we seek to form theoretical beliefs that reflect features of our shared world, rather than attitudes that reflect our own local idiosyncrasies. In light of this, we expect successful theoretical inquiry to terminate in attitudes that are intra- and inter-personally consistent. The questions that these papers address concern the extent to which similar views about moral inquiry and moral attitudes are warranted. Does moral inquiry, and the consequent formation of moral attitudes, aim to reflect objective values and directives? if if does, can it succeed? Should we expect fully successful moral inquiry to terminate in moral consistency or consensus? Should we, therefore, treat residual differences or disagreements as signs of failure and, so, as an impetus to further inquiry? Or should we, instead, allow that fully successful moral inquiry might terminate in moral attitudes that are in conflict with one another and with other, similarly successful, non-moral attitudes?

Contributors include:

W.B. Gallie - Essentially Contested Concepts

B.A.O. Williams - Consistency and Realism

Aurel Kolnai - Moral Consensus

A.W. Price - Varieties of Objectivity and Values

Onora O'Neill - Constructivisms in Ethics

David Wiggins - Moral Cognitivism, Moral Relativism and Motivating Moral Beliefs

Susan Wolf - Meaning and Morality