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If any member of staff or student wishes to post an event, please contact Gemma Basterfield at Gemma dot Basterfield at warwick dot ac dot uk.
Thursday, June 10, 2021
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Online Workshop: From the Individual to the Public: Reasons and DemocracyBy ZoomRuns from Thursday, June 10 to Friday, June 11. The aim of the workshop is to explore the role of reasons in democratic legitimacy, focusing in particular on the question of how democratic legitimacy is possible if democratic processes are based on subjective reasons.
PROGRAMME (BST / British Summer Time) Thursday, 10th of June 2:00 – 2:15 Introduction 2:15 – 3:30 “Political Deference” 3:30 – 3:40 Break 3:40 – 4:55 “Autonomy as Non-Alienation, Autonomy as Sovereignty, and Politics” 4:55 – 5:05 Break 5:05 – 6:20 “Principled Disobedience and the Limits of Democratic Authority” Friday, 11th of June 2:00 – 3:15 “Individual Freedom & the Standards of Public Reason” 3:15 – 3:25 Break 3:25 – 4:40 “The Problem of Ersatz Justice: Toward an Epistemic Political Liberalism” 4:40 – 4:50 Break 4:50 – 6:05 “Must we Reason with our Political Enemies?” 6:05 – 6:15 Closing Remarks
We welcome anyone who is interested in attending the workshop. Registration is required and must be completed via the following link:
https://forms.gle/J6suxvetFzwBiFmVA
We will provide the Zoom link and password to those who have registered at a later stage.
For any inquiries, please contact us at: fipworkshop.warwick@gmail.com
Conference organizers: Diogo Carneiro (d.carneiro@warwick.ac.uk) and Michele Giavazzi (m.giavazzi@warwick.ac.uk).
Sponsored by: Aristotelian Society, AHRC project ‘Norms for the New Public Sphere’, Centre for Ethics, Law & Public Affairs, The Mind Association, The Society for Applied Philosophy. |
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Postgraduate Work in Progress SeminarMS TeamsThis session will focus on Will Gildea's paper "The Moral Status of Humans and Animals: Towards a New View". Abstract All views of the moral status of humans and animals face serious objections. They are either insufficiently egalitarian, insufficiently hierarchical, or insufficiently theoretically robust. I propose the seed of a new view of moral status, called the Engagement View, which is well-placed to avoid these key problems. On this view, moral status is grounded primarily by sentience and certain emotional capacities as they figure in engagement with the world. The Engagement View enables us to account for the equal moral status of humans with severe cognitive impairments. It also supports a form of hierarchy in the moral status of beings, but is highly revisionary about which beings may occupy the upper reaches of moral status.
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See also:
Centre for Research in Philosophy, Literature & The Arts Events
Warwick Mind and Action Research Centre (WMA)
Arts Faculty Events