The aim of the workshop is to explore the role of reasons in democratic legitimacy, focusing in particular on the question of how democratic legitimacy is possible if democratic processes are based on subjective reasons.

PROGRAMME (BST / British Summer Time)

Thursday, 10^th of June

2:00 – 2:15 Introduction

2:15 – 3:30 “Political Deference”
Fabienne Peter (University of Warwick)

3:30 – 3:40 Break

3:40 – 4:55 “Autonomy as Non-Alienation, Autonomy as Sovereignty, and Politics”
David Enoch (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

4:55 – 5:05 Break

5:05 – 6:20 “Principled Disobedience and the Limits of Democratic Authority”
Sameer Bajaj (University of Warwick)

Friday, 11^th of June

2:00 – 3:15 “Individual Freedom & the Standards of Public Reason”
Maria Paola Ferretti (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt)

3:15 – 3:25 Break

3:25 – 4:40 “The Problem of Ersatz Justice: Toward an Epistemic Political Liberalism”
David Estlund (Brown University)

4:40 – 4:50 Break

4:50 – 6:05 “Must we Reason with our Political Enemies?”
Robert Talisse (Vanderbilt University)

6:05 – 6:15 Closing Remarks

We welcome anyone who is interested in attending the workshop. Registration is required and must be completed via the following link:

https://forms.gle/J6suxvetFzwBiFmVA

We will provide the Zoom link and password to those who have registered at a later stage.

For any inquiries, please contact us at: fipworkshop.warwick@gmail.com

Conference organizers: Diogo Carneiro (d.carneiro@warwick.ac.uk) and Michele Giavazzi (m.giavazzi@warwick.ac.uk).

Sponsored by: Aristotelian Society, AHRC project ‘Norms for the New Public Sphere’, Centre for Ethics, Law & Public Affairs, The Mind Association, The Society for Applied Philosophy.

This session will focus on Will Gildea's paper "The Moral Status of Humans and Animals: Towards a New View".

Abstract

All views of the moral status of humans and animals face serious objections. They are either insufficiently egalitarian, insufficiently hierarchical, or insufficiently theoretically robust. I propose the seed of a new view of moral status, called the Engagement View, which is well-placed to avoid these key problems. On this view, moral status is grounded primarily by sentience and certain emotional capacities as they figure in engagement with the world. The Engagement View enables us to account for the equal moral status of humans with severe cognitive impairments. It also supports a form of hierarchy in the moral status of beings, but is highly revisionary about which beings may occupy the upper reaches of moral status.