Abstract: The paper tackles a fundamental puzzle about our moral understanding. On the one hand, we take it as a requirement of our moral understanding that its content be generalisable. On the other hand, we give moral significance to particular relationships we enjoy only with a select few. The puzzle has been widely discussed in debates between impartialists and partialists, in particular regarding the status of special obligations. Although I tackle the puzzle of moral understanding by remaining within a framework familiar to the debate between impartialists and partialists, I focus on a less discussed topic: moral individuality and the irreplaceability of the individual. To this effect, I set up a debate between Bernard Williams, David Velleman and Raimond Gaita. I argue that both Williams and Velleman fail to give an account of the irreplaceability of the individual. I then argue that Gaita’s work allows us to diagnose both Williams’ and Velleman’s failure. I also argue that it provides us with an understanding of the irreplaceability of the individual and of moral individuality that explains both why we give special moral significance to our particular relationships and that at the same time is generalisable, thus furthering our understanding of the puzzle.

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