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Graduate Work in Progress Seminar

The Departmental Graduate Seminar is a student-organised seminar providing an opportunity for all Warwick philosophy graduate students, and occasionally students from other universities, to present their work to a general philosophy audience. It’s also a great chance to meet and socialise with fellow graduate students, and discuss each other’s research.

Talks take place every other Wednesday from 4:00pm to 6:00pm in room S0.17 (Term 2) in the Social Sciences Building, and are normally followed by a short (i.e. 5–10 minute) response from another student, questions and discussion chaired by a PhD student or member of the faculty, and drinks at The Dirty Duck from around 6pm. All PhD, MPhil and MA students are encouraged to attend, and faculty members and visitors are very welcome.

Notes for Presenters

Talks should be between 30 to 45 minutes long and may be circulated in advance, in which case the paper should be forwarded to the seminar organiser or chair no later than 9am the preceding Monday. Alternatively, speakers may wish to chair a discussion on a philosophical topic or reading of interest, or some other format suitable for group presentation.

A list of seminars for the current academic term is listed below. To reserve a slot, please e-mail Giulia Luvisotto and Chris Noonan with your preferred date(s) and a provisional title or topic for your talk.

Suggestions for the audience

 
 

2018/2019 Seminars

 
Wed 17 Oct, '18
-
Postgraduate Work in Progress Seminar: Chenwei Nie
OC1.07

Title: 'When is a Person/Cognitive System Immune to Delusions?'

Discussion will be followed by Q+A at The Dirty Duck.

Wed 31 Oct, '18
-
Postgraduate Work in Progress Seminar: Chenwei Nie
OC1.07

Title: 'When is a Person/Cognitive System Immune to Delusions?'

Discussion will be followed by Q+A at The Dirty Duck.

Wed 21 Nov, '18
-
Postgraduate Work in Progress Seminar
OC1.07
Wed 5 Dec, '18
-
Postgraduate Work in Progress Seminar
OC1.07
Wed 23 Jan, '19
-
Philosophy Department Post-Graduate Work in Progress Seminar: Simon Wimmer - 'Knowledge as a Factual Attitude'
Room S0.28, Social Sciences Building

Simon Wimmer will present his paper on 'Knowledge as a Factual Attitude',

Abstract:

This paper introduces a puzzle concerning knowledge and belief and argues that to resolve the puzzle we should reject the orthodox claim that knowledge is a propositional attitude. To bolster the case for my response to the puzzle, I argue that the most prominent alternative proposal, due to Jeff King and Wataru Uegaki, fails to resolve the puzzle because it relies on a false conception of the relationship between acquaintance and so-called 'propositional' knowledge. I close by suggesting that my response to the puzzle has important consequences for epistemology and philosophy of Mind; it undermines the widespread project of understanding the nature of knowledge in terms of belief and casts doubt on a recent response to Jackson's knowledge argument by Tim Crane.

Wed 6 Feb, '19
-
Postgraduate Work in Progress Seminar: Sydney Harvey
Room S.028, Social Sciences Building

Title: 'Angst and the Ticking Bomb Under the Table'

Wed 20 Feb, '19
-
Philosophy Department Postgraduate Work in Progress Seminar: Mert Yirmibes: 'Hegel's Treatment of Modality as Against the Modal Sceptical Approaches'
Room S.028, Social Sciences Building

Abstract:

In this talk Mert will examine two interpretations of Hegel in relation to the contemporary modal metaphysics. Firstly, Robert Brandom puts forward modal expressivism and modal realism in order to overcome modal scepticism. He places Hegelian term determinateness in the centre of his theories, as a non-modal explanatory tool, which makes explicit the implicit modal connotations in the empirical vocabulary. Brandom suggests considering Hegel on the same line with Lewis and Stalnaker whose approaches to modality require non-modal explanatory tools to define modal concepts, such as possible worlds for Lewis and propositions for Stalnaker. Secondly, Paul Redding proposes that since Hegel defines actuality as consisting possibility within itself, Hegel's position in modal metaphysics may be well taken similar to Stalnaker's vision of modal actualism, which defines possibilities as sets of consistent propositions contained within actuality. Mert argues that these two interpretations, reconciling Hegel with Lewis and Stalnaker, miss to illuminate Hegel's distinctive approach to modality, namely, the immanent derivation of modal concepts. By examining the formal elements of Hegel's treatment of modality, Mert demonstrates that Hegel's immanent critique of modality is capable of overcoming sceptical worries by deriving modal concepts from one to another without a need of modally unexplainable tools.

Wed 27 Feb, '19
-
Postgraduate Work in Progress Seminar: Simon Gansinger
Room S.028, Social Sciences Building

Title: 'Reasoning with Leviathan: On the Political Ontology of Human Rights'

Response: Emily Bassett

Wed 13 Mar, '19
-
Postgraduate Work in Progress Seminar: Maria Giovanna Corrado

Title: 'A Puzzle About the Nature of Auditory Perceptual Experience'

ABSTRACT:

We commonsensically take it that one of the functions of perception is to enable one to enter in cognitive contact with a variety of elements populating one’s environment, including events in which ordinary material objects participate. The case of auditory perception poses a unique challenge to accommodate this function. A set of phenomenological considerations, which seem to suggest that we undergo acousmatic experiences of sounds divorced from the material events that might count as their sources, raises the question as to how awareness of sounds enables cognitive contact with ordinary material objects in the world. One approach to addressing this question, found in the literature, is to define the ontological relation between sounds and events in which ordinary material objects participate and, consequently, to derive an account of the content of auditory perceptual experience. In this talk, I will put forward a different reading of the question which is not satisfied by this approach. I will argue that there is a puzzle about the nature of auditory perceptual experience which purports to show that sounds sufficiently determine the auditory perceptual experiences we undergo and exclude events in which objects participate from playing a role. After providing some motivation for the puzzle and addressing some worries, I will conclude by pointing to the direction of my solution to the puzzle.

 

Wed 8 May, '19
-
PG Work in Progress Seminar
Room S2.77 (Cowling Room)

Speaker: Chris Noonan

Wed 22 May, '19
-
PG Work in Progress Seminar
Room S2.77, Cowling Room

Speaker: Brigid Evans

Wed 29 May, '19
-
PG Work in Progress Seminar
Room S2.77, Cowling Room

Speaker: Michele Giavazzi

Wed 19 Jun, '19
-
PG Work in Progress Seminar
Room S2.77, Cowling Room

Speaker: Ahilleas Rokni

Wed 26 Jun, '19
-
PG Work in Progress Seminar
Room S2.77, Cowling Room

Speaker: Matt Chennells