Research Seminar in Post-Kantian European Philosophy, 2019/2020
Unless otherwise stated, Post-Kantian European Philosophy Research Group seminars take place on Tuesdays, 5:30–7:30pm in Room S0.11 (ground floor of Social Studies). All welcome. For further information, please contact tbc
Wed 24 Jun, '20- |
MAP SeminarBy ZoomGuest Speaker: Dr Irene Dal Poz (Warwick) Title: 'Women in Philosophy in a Time of Crisis' Please contact Giulia Lorenzo for details on how to join. |
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Thu 25 Jun, '20- |
Knowledge and Understanding SeminarBy ZoomSpeaker: Ellisif Wasmuth (Essex) Title: "What the many know and teach: Plato on the knowledge of language users" Abstract. "Plato is known for his low opinion of the epistemic achievements of the many. He usually grants knowledge (epistēmē or technē) only to the expert or master dialectician, but in the First Alcibiades Socrates seems to agree with Alcibiades that even the many have some knowledge – they know Greek (111c3). In this paper I ask what, if anything, the many actually know in knowing Greek. What kind of grasp of reality must they have, according to Plato, in order to be competent users of language, and can knowledge of language be had independently of knowledge of the world? |
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Fri 26 Jun, '20- |
Truth and Truthfulness Webinar: Chapter 9: Truthfulness, Liberalism and CritiqueBy ZoomText: 'Truth and Truthfulness' by Bernard Williams (2002) |
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Tue 30 Jun, '20- |
MAP Summer Online Short Story Reading Group: 'Race and Fiction'By ZoomPlease contact Giulia Lorenzi for further information |
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Fri 3 Jul, '20- |
Truth and Truthfulness Webinar: Chapter 10: Making Sense and Endnote: The Vocabulary of Truth - An ExampleBy ZoomText: 'Truth and Truthfulness' by Bernard Williams (2002) |
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Tue 7 Jul, '20- |
MAP Summer Online Short Story Reading Group: 'Race and Fiction'By ZoomPlease contact Giulia Lorenzi for further information |
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Thu 9 Jul, '20- |
'Enquiry' Seminar SeriesBy ZoomGuest Speaker: David Jenkins (Tel Aviv) Title: 'Reasoning and Its Limits' Reasoning and its limits It is often argued that the extent to which it is not up to us how our reasoning unfolds undermines the natural idea that reasoning is a kind of action. I argue that the extent to which it is not up to us how our reasoning unfolds in fact fails to cast doubt on the idea that reasoning is a kind of action and instead reflects the kind of agential exercise which reasoning is. The limits to the extent to which it is up to us how our reasoning unfolds can in fact be explained via appeal to reasoning’s status as a kind of aim-directed action. This in turn paves the way for an explanation of how reasoning is a way for us to be active with respect to our attitudes. |
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Tue 14 Jul, '20- |
MAP Summer Online Short Story Reading Group: 'Race and Fiction'By ZoomPlease contact Giulia Lorenzi for further information |
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Thu 16 Jul, '20- |
'Enquiry' Seminar SeriesBy ZoomGuest Speaker: Nishi Shah (Amherst College) Title: 'John Stuart Mill's Neglected Argument for Free Speech' |
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Thu 30 Jul, '20- |
'Enquiry' Seminar SeriesBy ZoomGuest Speaker: David Horst (Porto Alegre) Title: Virtue, Skill and Epistemic Competence' Abstract: Many virtue epistemologists conceive of epistemic competence on the model of skill—such as archery, playing baseball or chess. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake: epistemic competences and skills are crucially and relevantly different kinds of capacities. This, I suggest, undermines the popular attempt to understand epistemic normativity as a mere special case of the sort of normativity familiar from skillful action. In fact, as I argue further, epistemic competences resemble virtues, rather than skills—a claim that is based on an important, but largely overlooked, distinction between virtue and skill, one that Aristotle highlights in the Nicomachean Ethics. The upshot is that virtue epistemology should indeed be based on virtue, not on skill. |