Research Seminar in Post-Kantian European Philosophy, 2019/2020
Unless otherwise stated, Post-Kantian European Philosophy Research Group seminars take place on Tuesdays, 5:30–7:30pm in Room S0.11 (ground floor of Social Studies). All welcome. For further information, please contact tbc
Thu 18 Feb, '21- |
Temporal Representation workshopA mini workshop with Julian Bacharach (Humboldt, Berlin) and Christoph Hoerl (Warwick). (online) |
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Thu 1 Jul, '21- |
WMA mini-workshop on memoryZoomTwo talks on memory by James Openshaw (Warwick) and Thomas Crowther (Warwick) |
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Fri 25 Feb, '22- |
Evolutionary Pragmatics Forum: Federico Rossano (San Diego)This internet forum is organised by Bart Geurts (Nijmegen) and Richard Moore (Warwick), and takes place every last Friday of the month from 15:00 to 16:30 (CET) / 2pm to 3:30 pm (UK). If you would like to attend, contact Richard Moore or contact both organisers at evoprag@gmail.com. Note: exceptionally, this talk is from 17:00 to 18:30 (CET) |
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Fri 9 Dec, '22- |
Philosophy and Literature Society End of Term CelebrationS2.73Second Annual Secret Santa Book Exchange: The Philosophy & Literature Society book exchange and end-of-term celebration. |
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Thu 2 Mar, '23- |
PG Work in Progress SeminarS2.77/MS TeamsThis week's PG WiP Seminar will be led by Chris Hall (MA)
Title: "Debunker or Global Skeptic: Considering the Distinctiveness of Evolutionary Debunking Arguments " Thursday March 2nd 2023 5pm in S2.77 and on TeamsLink opens in a new window.
Everyone welcome!
Abstract: For the moral realist, both evolutionary debunking arguments and global skepticism present a challenge to the possibility of moral knowledge. Debunkers typically see their challenge as distinct from broader forms of skepticism, the thought being that they target moral knowledge specifically and depend on a particular empirical claim about the evolutionary origins of our moral beliefs. The importance of this distinctiveness is illustrated by the fact that a common response to the debunker is to suggest that the argument leads to global skepticism. In this paper, I examine the relationship between evolutionary debunking arguments and global skepticism. I argue that it is essential to the debunker’s project to avoid committing to a broader skepticism, and consider various ways in which this commitment can occur. I claim that avoiding this requires formulating the debunking argument in a specific way. A number of evolutionary debunking arguments fall short on this front. To illustrate the problem, I consider a recent paper from Isserow (2019) which presents an evolutionary debunking argument based on our apparent ignorance of how evolution shaped our moral beliefs. On my account, Isserow’s argument leads to global skepticism. Moreover, Isserow’s argument is instructive when considering both whether other debunking arguments do the same and how the problem can be avoided. Teams link:
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