Abstract

All of Aristotle’s ethical writings allocate a central place to theoretical philosophical thinking (theōria). Noting the differences both in detail and in spirit, scholars have speculated about the treatises’ relative composition and Aristotle’s philosophical development more generally. However, any kind of judgement about the relationship between these texts requires an account of the place and role of theōria in each text taken on its own.

Setting aside the well-known account of the Nicomachean Ethics, I provide such an account for the Protrepticus, the Eudemian Ethics, and the Magna Moralia by considering two questions: 1) What is theōria? And 2) What role does theōria play in the ethical theory of each of these treatises? I argue that the treatises agree broadly on what theōria is. It belongs to theoretical philosophy and has to do with knowledge of causes, nature, and truth. The EE and the MM do not say much about the nature of theōria; the Protrepticus proves to be more informative because it aims at putting the contemplative way of life on the map — in contrast to a more practical approach, associated with Isocrates.

Of the three texts, the Protrepticus has most to say about the nature of theōria. It presents theōria as the contemplation of nature and truth, understood as knowledge of causes. I shall argue that this knowledge is purely theoretical, despite the argument in ch. 10 that theōria provides the greatest benefit for human beings. The other two treatises, operating with a similar conception of theōria, also maintain a firm distinction between practical and theoretical knowledge. However, both argue, in different ways, that we cannot fully understand practical virtue without considering theōria because the former is for the sake of the latter. In the course of explaining how each of the treatises subordinates practical to theoretical wisdom, I shall argue that the EE widens the remit of theoretical thinking to include some aspects of politics, whereas the MM operates with a less developed account that does not stress the importance of knowledge of causes.

Dear Colleagues,

You are warmly invited to the first Departmental Colloquium of Term 2, which will take place at 4pm, Wednesday 17 January, Room S0.18.

Speaker: James Staziker (KCL)

False measures in the science and philosophy of consciousness

According to a widespread contemporary view of the mind, consciousness plays less of a role than was traditionally assumed: much of perception, decision and action occurs independently of our conscious experiences. I will criticise one central line of scientific support for this view, which measures consciousness by a subject’s capacity to identify and discriminate their experiences and actions. This style of measurement underestimates consciousness, and is not justified even if we grant that, necessarily, subjects are aware of their own conscious experiences. In search of a better measure, I look to philosophical accounts of the first-order, demonstrative thoughts most immediately related to conscious perception and action. But here we find the same problem: our best philosophical account individuates these thoughts by subjects’ capacity to discriminate their experiences. I trace the problem to broadly Fregean criteria for individuating thoughts, propose a related solution, and discuss implications for the science of consciousness.

Their next colloquium will take place on 28 February with Kate Kirkpatrick on ’The Myth of Recognition in The Second Sex’.

I hope to see you on Wednesday!

Best,

Andrew

Andrew Huddleston will present a paper on Nietzsche with the title: ‘What is This Thing Amor Fati?’.