Incredible beliefs: Understanding clear-eyed believing against the evidence
Project Abstract
Existing work in philosophy and psychology tends to assume that if a person believes something against the evidence, then this person fails to properly evaluate the relevant evidence. This assumption, however, overlooks a distinctive form of irrationality, where subjects obstinately hold onto their beliefs, despite acknowledging that the evidence points to the contrary. My project investigates this uncharted territory in human irrationality by exploring the enigma across a spectrum of irrational beliefs and developing a plausible explanation for it. According to this explanation, irrational beliefs are sometimes explained by subjects’ compelling experiences, rather than failures to properly evaluate evidence.
Project Workshop 1.
Date: Wednesday, 22 January 2025
Location: S0.19Link opens in a new window (Click to open an interactive map)
Title: WMA Mini-workshop––Experience and Rationality
Schedule:
14:00 - 15:30 Alexander Greenberg (Southampton/Oxford): Consciousness and Cognitive Mens Rea
15:30 - 15:45 Coffee Break
15:45 - 17:15 Guy Longworth (Warwick): TBC
17:15 - 17:30 Coffee Break
17:30 - 19:00 Janset Özün Çetinkaya (Nottingham): Akrasia and Self-Deception in Aristotle
Contact: Chenwei Nie
Funded by a Leverhulme Trust Early Career Fellowship (10.2024-09.2027).