Incredible beliefs: Understanding clear-eyed believing against the evidence

Project Abstract

Existing work in philosophy and psychology tends to assume that if a person believes something against the evidence, then this person must have failed to properly evaluate the relevant evidence. This assumption, however, overlooks a distinctive form of irrationality, where subjects obstinately hold onto their beliefs, despite acknowledging that the evidence points to the contrary. My project investigates this uncharted territory in human irrationality by exploring the enigma across a spectrum of irrational beliefs and developing a plausible explanation of it. According to this explanation, irrational beliefs are sometimes explained by subjects’ compelling experiences, rather than failures to properly evaluate evidence.

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Related Publications

(forth.). Why rational people obstinately hold onto irrational beliefs: A new approach. In E. Schmidt & M. Grajner (Eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas and Epistemic Normativity. Routledge.

(2025). Akratic beliefs and seemings. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 1-17

(2025) One-factor versus two-factor theory of delusion: Replies to Sullivan-Bissett and Noordhof. Neuroethics, 18, article 4, 1-5.

(2024). The dark side of clarity. Southern Journal of Philosophy. 1-15

Blog post

(2025) Rational people's irrational beliefs. Imperfect Cognitions.

Project Seminar 3.

Date: Wednesday, 22 October 2025

Location: Social Sciences Building, S0.11

Schedule:

14:05-14:55

Speaker: Michelle Liu (Monash)

Title: Mental Imagery and Harmful Language*

14:55-15:05

Coffee Break

15:05-15:50

Q&A

*Abstract:

Research on pernicious language tends to focus on harmful beliefs and associations transmitted by such language. In this paper, I explore the idea that pernicious language often transmits harmful mental imagery. Empirical studies suggest that mental imagery is a pervasive feature of language processing. Furthermore, mental imagery prompted by language can influence our memories and judgements in an insidious way. Focusing on language containing misinformation about witnessed events, as well as generics and metaphors about social groups, this paper argues for the importance of mental imagery for theorising harmful language and suggests ways to combat the imagistic harm.

Past events:

Project Workshop 1.

Date: Wednesday, 22 January 2025

Location: S0.19Link opens in a new window (Click to open an interactive map)

Theme: Experience and Rationality

Schedule:

14:00 - 15:30

Speaker: Alexander Greenberg (Southampton/Oxford)

Title:Consciousness and Cognitive Mens Rea

Chair: Lucy Campbell

15:30 - 15:45

Coffee Break

15:45 - 17:15

Speaker: Guy Longworth (Warwick)

Title:Perception's Authority

Chair: Eve Poirier

17:15 - 17:30

Coffee Break

17:30 - 19:00

Speaker: Janset Özün Çetinkaya (Nottingham)

Title: Akrasia and Self-Deception in Aristotle

Chair: Eve Poirier

Project Workshop 2.

Date:Wednesday, 25 June 2025

Location:S0.19Link opens in a new window(Click to open an interactive map)

Theme:Incredible delusions

Schedule:

16:00 - 17:25

Speaker: Matthew Parrott (Oxford)

Title:Dynamic delusions

Chair: Oli Needham

17:25 - 17:35

Coffee Break

17:35 - 19:00

Speaker: Johannes Roessler (Warwick)

Title:Parnas on empirical and bizarre delusions

Chair: Emma Clinton