Incredible beliefs: Understanding clear-eyed believing against the evidence
Incredible beliefs:
Understanding clear-eyed believing against the evidence
Project Abstract
Existing work in philosophy and psychology tends to assume that if a person believes something against the evidence, then this person must have failed to properly evaluate the relevant evidence. This assumption, however, overlooks a distinctive form of irrationality, where subjects obstinately hold onto their beliefs, despite acknowledging that the evidence points to the contrary. My project investigates this uncharted territory in human irrationality by exploring the enigma across a spectrum of irrational beliefs and developing a plausible explanation of it. According to this explanation, irrational beliefs are sometimes explained by subjects’ compelling experiences, rather than failures to properly evaluate evidence.
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Related Publications
(forth.). Why rational people obstinately hold onto irrational beliefs: A new approach. In E. Schmidt & M. Grajner (Eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas and Epistemic Normativity. Routledge.
(2025). Akratic beliefs and seemings. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 1-17
(2025) One-factorversustwo-factor theory of delusion: Replies to Sullivan-Bissett and Noordhof. Neuroethics, 18, article 4, 1-5.
(2025). The dark side of clarity. Southern Journal of Philosophy. 63(3): 429-443
Blog post
(2025) Rational people's irrational beliefs. Imperfect Cognitions.
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Contact: Chenwei Nie
Warwick Mind and Action Research Centre (WMA).
Funded by a Leverhulme Trust Early Career Fellowship (10.2024-09.2027).
Forthcoming events
4. Project Conference
Dates: 12-13 March 2026
Theme: Self-Awareness and Intersubjectivity
(Co-organised with Johannes Roessler)
Stay tuned for more information!
5. Project Workshop
Date: Wednesday, 25 March 2026
Theme: When knowledge isn't power!
Location:MB0.08, Mathematical Sciences Building
Intro: Chenwei Nie (Warwick)
Speakers: Heather Widdows (Warwick), Fiona MacCallum (Psychology, Warwick),
Kate Kirkpatrick (Oxford), and Kathleen Murphy-Hollies (Birmingham).
Concluding reflections: Quassim Cassam (Warwick).
(Co-organised with Heather Widdows; part of the British Philosophy Fortnight at Warwick.)
Stay tuned for more information!
Past events
1. Project Workshop
Date:Wednesday, 22 January 2025
Location:S0.19Link opens in a new window(Click to open an interactive map)
Theme:Experience and Rationality
Schedule:
14:00 - 15:30
Speaker: Alexander Greenberg (Southampton/Oxford)
Title:Consciousness and CognitiveMens Rea
Chair: Lucy Campbell
15:30 - 15:45
Coffee Break
15:45 - 17:15
Speaker: Guy Longworth (Warwick)
Title:Perception's Authority
Chair: Eve Poirier
17:15 - 17:30
Coffee Break
17:30 - 19:00
Speaker: Janset Özün Çetinkaya (Nottingham)
Title:Akrasia and Self-Deception in Aristotle
Chair: Eve Poirier
2. Project Workshop
Date:Wednesday, 25 June 2025
Location:S0.19Link opens in a new window(Click to open an interactive map)
Theme:Incredible delusions
Schedule:
16:00 - 17:25
Speaker: Matthew Parrott (Oxford)
Title:Dynamic delusions
Chair: Oli Needham
17:25 - 17:35
Coffee Break
17:35 - 19:00
Speaker: Johannes Roessler (Warwick)
Title:Parnas on empirical and bizarre delusions
Chair: Emma Clinton
3. Project Seminar
Date:Wednesday, 22 October 2025
Location:S0.11,Social Sciences Building
Chair: Melina Macfadyen
Schedule:
14:05-14:55
Speaker: Michelle Liu (Monash)
Title:Mental Imagery and Harmful Language*
14:55-15:05
Coffee Break
15:05-15:50
Q&A
