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EC220: Mathematical Economics 1A

  • Christian Soegaard

    Module Lecturer
12/15 CATS - Department of Economics

Principal Aims

Mathematical Economics 1a, “Introduction to Game Theory”, aims to provide a basic understanding of pure game theory and also introduce the student to a number of applications of game theory to economic problems of resource allocation.

Principal Learning Outcomes

12 CATS - By the end of the module the student should be able to acquire a sense of the importance of strategic considerations in economic problem solving and the normative significance of competitive markets in obtaining Pareto optimal allocations via appropriate extensions of the commodity space. Learn that a few simple, intuitive principles, formulated precisely, can go a long way in understanding the fundamental aspects of many economic problems.
15 CATS - By the end of the module the student should be able to understand the importance of strategic considerations in economic problem solving and the normative significance of competitive markets in obtaining Pareto optimal allocations via appropriate extensions of the commodity space. Learn that a few simple, intuitive principles, formulated precisely, can go a long way in understanding the fundamental aspects of many economic problems.

Syllabus

12 CATS - The module will typically cover the following topics:

Games in strategic form: Nash equilibrium and its applications to voting games, oligopoly, provision of public goods.

Games in extensive form: sub game perfect equilibrium and its applications to voting games, repeated games.

Static games with incomplete information: Bayesian equilibrium and its applications to auctions, contracts and mechanism design.

Dynamic games of incomplete information: Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, Sequential equilibrium and its application to signalling games.

Bargaining theory: Nash bargaining, non-cooperative bargaining with alternating offers and applications to economic markets.

Evolutionary Game Theory

Evolutionary game theory.
15 CATS - The module will typically cover the following topics:

Games in strategic form: Nash equilibrium and its applications to voting games, oligopoly, provision of public goods.

Games in extensive form: sub game perfect equilibrium and its applications to voting games, repeated games.

Static games with incomplete information: Bayesian equilibrium and its applications to auctions, contracts and mechanism design.

Dynamic games of incomplete information: Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, Sequential equilibrium and its application to signalling games.

Bargaining theory: Nash bargaining, non-cooperative bargaining with alternating offers and applications to economic markets.

Evolutionary Game Theory

Context

Pre or Co-requisites
EC120 or EC107 for GL11 students
Pre-requisite for
EC301, EC341
Restrictions
MORSE students must take 12 CAT version.
Part-year Availability for Visiting Students
12 CATS - Not available on a part-year basis
15 CATS - Available in the Autumn term only (1 x test – 12 CATS)

Assessment

Assessment Method
12 CATS - 2 hour exam (100%)
15 CATS - Coursework (20%) + 2 hour exam (80%)
Coursework Details
One 50 minute test (20%)
Exam Timing
May/June

Exam Rubric

Time Allowed: 2 hours.

Answer TWO questions ONLY. All questions carry equal weight (50 marks each). Answer each question in a separate booklet.

Approved pocket calculators are allowed.

Read carefully the instructions on the answer book provided and make sure that the particulars required are entered on each answer book. If you answer more questions than are required and do not indicate which answers should be ignored, we will mark the requisite number of answers in the order in which they appear in the answer book(s): answers beyond that number will not be considered.

Previous exam papers can be found in the University’s past papers archive. Please note that previous exam papers may not have operated under the same exam rubric or assessment weightings as those for the current academic year. The content of past papers may also be different.

Reading Lists