Diego Calderon’s presentation will be on the following paper:

Kozlowski, J., Veldkamp, L., & Venkateswaran, V. (2020). The Tail That Wags the Economy: Beliefs and Persistent Stagnation. Journal Of Political Economy, 128(8), 2839-2879.

Join Zoom Meeting

https://us02web.zoom.us/j/85869050241?pwd=dlZtMHlOUDVyOGN4L3d6R2NhakNlUT09

Meeting ID: 858 6905 0241

Passcode: 983859

Chen Lian will be presenting 'Determinacy without the Taylor Principle'

Join Zoom Meeting

https://us02web.zoom.us/j/85869050241?pwd=dlZtMHlOUDVyOGN4L3d6R2NhakNlUT09

Meeting ID: 858 6905 0241

Passcode: 983859

Nikolaos Kokonas will be presenting 'Equilibrium unemployment and vacancies under exponential satisficing behaviour'

Join Zoom Meeting

https://us02web.zoom.us/j/85869050241?pwd=dlZtMHlOUDVyOGN4L3d6R2NhakNlUT09

Meeting ID: 858 6905 0241

Passcode: 983859

Title: Central Bank Account for All: Efficiency and Risk-Taking (joint with Cyril Monnet and Mariana Rojas-Breu)

Abstract: “ We analyze the effect that an interest-bearing central bank digital currency (CBDC), that competes with bank deposits as a medium of exchange, has on the banking sector. Monopolistic banks issue deposits to lend to productive investment projects. We show that CBDC leads to increased remuneration on bank deposits. CBDC promotes intermediation and increases bank profits for low to moderate interest rate levels. We characterize the optimal interest rate on CBDC and demonstrate that a higher rate leads to sub-optimal investment decisions and build-up of banking sector risk. Until investment efficiency is achieved, it is optimal for the central bank to offer the same remuneration on CBDC and reserves. If the CBDC rate is set higher than the optimal level, reserves become an important policy tool to crowd out sub-optimal investment and mitigate banking sector risk. ”

Via Zoom : Meeting ID - 858 6905 0241 Passcode: 983859

George will be talking on the following paper:

Sendhil Mullainathan, A Memory-Based Model of Bounded Rationality, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 117, Issue 3, August 2002, Pages 735–774, https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302760193887

This Workshop is online via Zoom, meeting details below.

Zoom Link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/85869050241?pwd=dlZtMHlOUDVyOGN4L3d6R2NhakNlUT09Link opens in a new window

Meeting ID: 858 6905 0241 Passcode: 983859

Title - Bargaining with Moral Agents

Title - Rationality of Decisions That Avoid Predictably Regrettable Consequences (in working progress)

Abstract - A novel characterization of rationality is offered which relies on the hypothesis that under no predictable circumstances should behaviour in any finite decision tree ever lead to a consequence which, relative to the predicted feasible set F, belongs to a specified subset R(F) of regrettable consequences. The hypothesis is applied to behaviour that is defined on an unrestricted domain of finite decision trees, including continuation subtrees, with:

(i) decision nodes where the decision maker must make a move;

(ii) chance nodes at which a “roulette lottery” with exogenously specified strictly positive probabilities is resolved;

(iii) event nodes at which a “horse lottery” is resolved.

Building on earlier discussions of consequentialist behaviour, the hypothesis is shown to imply that behaviour must maximize a complete and transitive preference relation over consequence lotteries, with preferences that satisfy the independence axiom of expected utility theory, as well as a strict form of Anscombe and Aumann's extension of Savage's sure thing principle. Assuming continuity, non-trivial consequence domains, and a generalized form of state independence, the hypothesis is equivalent to a refined form of Bayesian rationality that excludes zero probabilities.

Nick Scholz presenting "A continuous time health mechanism without money ". The seminar will be online only via MS Teams.

MS Teams: Meeting scheduled in the Microeconomics Channel

Title: Belief Heterogeneity and Risk Amplication

Title: Lead Us Not Into Temptation: on the Dynamics of History Dependent Self-Control

Title: Contracting with Unconscious Biases

Abstract: A principal and an agent have non-common priors on uncertainty in optimal contracting with moral hazard. I introduce an outside observer's belief considered as accurate to conduct objective welfare analysis. Without incentive provision, the two players' biases exhibit asymmetric effects on welfare. An overconfident (underconfident) agent is better-off if the principal is more overconfident (underconfident) than him. However, a biased principal not only benefits if the agent is more biased than him in the same direction, but also could be better-off if the agent biases towards a different direction. With incentive provision, only the agent's bias affects welfare. It costs a biased principal less as long as the agent is overconfident, while only an underconfident agent benefits.

Title: A Behavioral Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian Model

Abstract: “We develop a New Keynesian model with household heterogeneity and bounded rationality in the form of cognitive discounting. The resulting behavioral heterogeneous agent New Keynesian model is consistent with recent empirical facts about the effectiveness and the transmission mechanisms of monetary and fiscal policy: monetary policy is amplified through indirect general equilibrium effects, fiscal multipliers on consumption are positive and the model delivers empirically-realistic intertemporal marginal propensities to consume. Simultaneously, and consistent with the data, the model resolves the forward guidance puzzle and remains stable at the effective lower bound as the model features equilibrium determinacy even under an interest-rate peg. The model is analytically tractable and nests a wide range of existing models as special cases, none of which can produce all the listed features within one model. We further show how the main insights from the tractable model extend to a quantitative version of the model, how the model-implied household expectations can be aligned with recent findings from survey data, and how to derive an equivalence result between heterogeneous-household models with bounded rationality and those featuring incomplete information and learning.”

This MIMA session is via Zoom, information below

Time: 31/05/2022, Tuesday 05:00 PM London

Zoom Link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/81719302554?pwd=TTFMVUhwSjRobERnK0czRXZFeEpXZz09

Meeting ID: 817 1930 2554 Passcode: MIMA

Title: Smart Contracts and the Coase Conjecture

Title to be advised.

Title: "Subcontracting Away Strategic Uncertainty" (with Costas Cavounidis)

MS Teams Link: https://teams.microsoft.com/l/meetup-join/19%3a44e76bae944e45478914cb98497b7098%40thread.tacv2/1665048380873?context=%7b%22Tid%22%3a%2209bacfbd-47ef-4465-9265-3546f2eaf6bc%22%2c%22Oid%22%3a%22aac8c148-e99c-4793-9a9e-9a8b8d83de0e%22%7dLink opens in a new window

Title: History-Dependent Self-Control and Emotional Decision-Making

MS Teams Link: https://teams.microsoft.com/l/meetup-join/19%3a44e76bae944e45478914cb98497b7098%40thread.tacv2/1665048380873?context=%7b%22Tid%22%3a%2209bacfbd-47ef-4465-9265-3546f2eaf6bc%22%2c%22Oid%22%3a%22aac8c148-e99c-4793-9a9e-9a8b8d83de0e%22%7d

Title: Dynamic Predation and Entry Deterrence.

Title: Signaling effect of information design

Please find the program and the registration form on our websiteLink opens in a new window.

Title: Partition Dependent Expected Utility

Title: Quantum Observables as Kolmogorov Random Variables

Yating will present his paper titled 'Path-Dependent Equilibrium and Polarization in Public Responses to a Pandemic'.

Title is: Natural Language Equilibrium: Signaling Games

Abstract. We refine sequential equilibrium in signaling games by incorporating natural language in the form of meaningful cheap talk directly into the theory. Because meaning in any language can be usurped by equilibrium conventions to the contrary, the import of natural language in games must stem from how meaning is assigned to language used off the path of play. We find that a simple and intuitive convention about the players’ common understanding of language off-path has surprising power to refine sequential equilibrium in signaling games.

Title: If You’re NOT So Smart, Why Are You Rich? Robust Market Selection with General Recursive Preferences, with Jaden Yang Chen (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA)

Title: Smart Banks (with Maxi Guennewig and Yuliyan Mitkov)

Title to be advised.

Title to be advised.

Title: Community Enforcement with Endogenous Records

Abstract: I study repeated games with anonymous random matching where players can erase signals from their records. When players are sufficiently long-lived and have strictly dominant actions, they will play their dominant actions with probability close to one in all equilibria. When players' expected lifespans are intermediate, there exist purifiable equilibria with a positive level of cooperation in the submodular prisoner's dilemma but not in the supermodular prisoner's dilemma. Therefore, the maximal level of cooperation a community can sustain is not monotone with respect to players' expected lifespans and the complementarity in players' actions can undermine their abilities to sustain cooperation.