Title: The Legal Origins of Financial Development: Evidence from the Shanghai Concessions

This seminar is joint with Bristol University and Warwick will be hosting today's event.

Title to be advised.

This AYEW Workshop on Firms will be a 1.5 hour event, with three 30-minute presentations.

Here are the details:

1. Daniel Morrison (Princeton): “Disentangling the motivations for campaign contributions: Corruption or policy alignment”
2. Xiangyu Shi (Yale): “Hometown favoritism and intercity investment networks in China”
3. Jian Xie (Warwick): “The cultural origins of family firms” (joint with Song Yuan)

Title: A Cooperative Theory of Market Segmentation by Consumers

Abstract: We consider a market that may be segmented and is served by a single seller. The surplus of each consumer in a segment depends on the price that the seller optimally charges, and this optimal price depends on the set of consumers in that segment. This gives rise to a novel cooperative game between consumers that determines market segmentation. We study several solution concepts. The most demanding solution concept, the core, requires that there is no objection to the segmentation by a coalition of consumers who benefit by forming a new segment. We show that the core is empty except for trivial cases. We then introduce a new solution concept, stability. A segmentation is stable if for each possible objection by a coalition, there is a counter-objection by a coalition in the original segmentation. We characterize stable segmentations as ones that are efficient and ``saturated,'' which means that the segments are maximal in some sense. We use this characterization to constructively show that stable segmentations exist. Even though stable segmentations are efficient, they need not maximize average consumer surplus, and segmentations that maximize average consumer surplus need not be stable. Our weakest solution concept, fragmentation-proofness, rules out objections by coalitions that include consumers from more than one segment. We show that a segmentation is fragmentation-proof if and only if it is efficient.

This is joint work with Ron Siegel.

We will be taking the annual postgraduate photograph and hosting a social gathering later in the day.

Photos

Wednesday 25 May 2022 at 12:30
Location: WBS Steps

We will meet at the WBS Steps for our annual class photographs but if it rains heavily we will have to move to R0.21 in Ramphal. The dress code is casual and you will receive digital complimentary group photos once they are ready. We will automatically add this to your Tabula timetable.

Social

Wednesday 25 May 2022 at 7pm
Location: The Slate

Come and join us and your fellow classmates for food, drink and music. Further details are to be confirmed soon. We look forward to seeing you there.

Registration

Please complete the following form with your details as registration is mandatory. Only register if you are going to attend.

Please note: Photography will be taking place at this event, which may be used for marketing purposes (e.g. promotional materials). By registering and attending this event we assume that you are giving your consent to be photographed, however if you do not wish to be photographed, please inform the photographer or a member of Economics staff on the day.

page-type: formsbuilder

Title of Nathan’s talk is Political Parties as Drivers of U.S. Polarization: 1927-2018 (with Chad Kendall and Francesco Trebbi) .

This visit is hosted by Andreas Stegmann.

Title: Contracting with Unconscious Biases

Abstract: A principal and an agent have non-common priors on uncertainty in optimal contracting with moral hazard. I introduce an outside observer's belief considered as accurate to conduct objective welfare analysis. Without incentive provision, the two players' biases exhibit asymmetric effects on welfare. An overconfident (underconfident) agent is better-off if the principal is more overconfident (underconfident) than him. However, a biased principal not only benefits if the agent is more biased than him in the same direction, but also could be better-off if the agent biases towards a different direction. With incentive provision, only the agent's bias affects welfare. It costs a biased principal less as long as the agent is overconfident, while only an underconfident agent benefits.

Shining a Light on The Other-Nothing Blind Spot: How Asymmetric Considerations of Opportunity Costs Hinder Generosity

This is an opportunity for our PhD student to practice job talk seminar.

Gianni will be presenting paper: When Nation Building Goes South: Draft Evasion, Government Repression, And The Origins Of The Sicilian Mafia

Fields: Economic History, Political Economy

Supervisors: James Fenske, Sharun Mukand

Title: Tax Audits Under Weak Fiscal Capacity: Experimental Evidence from Senegal, joint work with Pierre Bachas, Alipio Ferreira, and Bassirou Sarr.

Abstract: Developing economies are characterized by limited compliance with government regulations, such as taxation. Resources for enforcement are scarce and audit cases are often selected in a discretionary manner. We study whether the increasing availability of digitized data helps improve audit targeting. In a field experiment at scale in Senegal, we compare tax audits selected by inspectors to audits selected by a risk-scoring algorithm. We find that inspector-selected audits are more likely to be conducted and uncover similar amounts of evasion as algorithm-selected audits. However, algorithm-selected audits require less manpower, are faster and may generate less corruption. In ongoing work, we attempt to unpack the algorithm’s (dis)functioning and its interaction with human capital.

Seminar organisers: Manuel Bagues & Ludovica Gazze

This is an opportunity for our PhD student to practice job talk seminar.

Cora will present paper: Unemployment, Migration, And Right-Wing Voting: Evidence From Germany

Fields: Economic History, Political Economy, Gender Economics

Supervisors: James Fenske, Manuel Bagues

Title: The Value of Data Records (with Simone Galperti & Aleksandr Levkun)

Abstract: Many online platforms intermediate trade between sellers and buyers using data records of the buyers' personal characteristics. How much value do such intermediaries derive from each record? Is this value higher for specific buyers? What are its properties? We find that an important component of the value of a data record is a novel externality that arises when a platform pools records to withhold information from the sellers. Ignoring this externality can significantly bias our understanding of the value of data records. We then characterize a platform's willingness to pay for more data, thereby establishing a series of basic properties of the demand side of data markets. Our analysis combines modern information design with classic duality methods and applies to a large class of principal-agent problems.

This seminar is joint with Bristol University and will be hosting today's event.

Joint with WBS

Title:

This is a 2-day conference.

Organiser: Alperen Tosun (PGR)

Our two-day conference organised by Warwick Economics PhD students will bring together international PhD research from across the globe. The 10th annual Warwick Economics PhD Conference will be held in person at the premises of the University, and it will be live-streamed to enable remote participation.

Date:8-9 June 2022
Location: University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom

This is a student-led conference organised annually by PhD students at the Warwick Economics Department, supported and attended by the Warwick Economics Department and members of the faculty.

About the PhD Conference

Find out more about how the PhD conference first began.

Previous Years

Learn more about previous conferences.

Application

Find out more about the application form and details about the application process.

---

 

Contact

Our Campus is in Coventry, a city that lies at the very heart of England and is easy to get to by road, rail and air.

related:https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/events/phd-conferences

Title to be advised.

This workshop is taking place in Scarman House

Organiser: Bhaskar Dutta

page-type: formsbuilder

This is an opportunity for our PhD student to practice job talk seminar.

Giulia will present paper: Worker Sorting And The Gender Wage Gap

Fields: Labour

Supervisors: Manuel Bagues, Roland Rathelot

This is an opportunity for our PhD student to practice job talk seminar.

Shantanu will present paper: Learning By Outsourcing

Fields: tba

Supervisors: Mirko Draca, Robert Akerlof

This is an opportunity for our PhD student to practice job talk seminar

Eleonora will present paper: Bad Science

Fields: Political

Supervisors: Thiemo Fetzer, Sascha Becker, Andreas Stegmann

Chat directly with staff and students from the Department of Economics to get your questions answered. Please check our Frequently Asked Questions before joining.

Register

Chat directly with staff and students from the Department of Economics to get your questions answered. Please check our Frequently Asked Questions before joining.

Register