Contact details

Email: Xueying dot Zhao at warwick dot ac dot uk

Office: S0.78

Personal Website: xueyingzhao8.github.io

Here is my C.V.

Xueying Zhao

Research Interests

Microeconomic Theory, Information Economics, Industrial Organization

Job Market Paper

Tailoring Data for Profit

A data buyer, uncertain about a payoff-relevant state, has private information—a signal modeled as a finite partition of an expanded state space—that is only partially informative. A data seller, capable of generating arbitrarily correlated signals, aims to maximize revenue by selling an optimal menu of signals. We characterize the properties of this revenue-maximizing mechanism and demonstrate that, despite information asymmetry, the first-best outcomes can still be achieved. Specifically, the seller can offer a supplemental signal tailored to each buyer type, priced at the buyer's willingness to pay, ensuring socially efficient full surplus extraction.

Working Papers

Contracting with Heterogeneous Beliefs

We analyze the optimal design of incentive contracts in the presence of belief heterogeneity between a principal and an agent.

When to Go Negative in Political Campaigns? (joint with Sinem Hidir)

We explore whether and when it is optimal for a privately informed incumbent politician to engage in negative campaigning by disclosing a scandal about the challenger's corruption to persuade voters.

Teaching Experience

Statistical Techniques B (Spring 2021, Spring 2022)

Mathematical Techniques B (Fall 2020, Fall 2021)