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Internal Resources 2015/16

This is not a reading list, but rather a collection of possibly relevant papers that are not otherwise easily available. Please see the module handbook for reading lists, shorter (15%) assessed essay titles, and other guidance.

Lecture slides, recordings, and handouts may be found here.

The seminar schedule may be found here.

The list of approved longer (85%) assessed essay titles may be found here.

Logical Consequence
  • Bonnay, D. (2014) 'Logical constants...'. [bonnay 2014]
  • Haack, S. (1978) Philosophy of Logics, Cambridge: CUP, chapters 2-3. Very useful introduction to issues. [haack 1978 chapters.pdf]
  • Belnap, N. D. (1961-2), 'Tonk, Plonk and Plink'. Analysis, pp. 130-134.
    [belnap_1962.pdf]
  • Etchemendy, J. (1983), 'The Doctrine of Logic as Form', Linguistics & Philosophy 6, pp.319-334.
    [etchemendy_1983.pdf]
  • Etchemendy,J. (1988), 'Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence', Journal of Symbolic Logic 53, pp. 51-79.
    [etchemendy_1988.pdf]
  • Etchemendy, John (1990), The Concept of Logical Consequence. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Chapters 1-3, 9) [etchemendy_1990part.pdf]
  • Etchemendy, John (199) 'Reflections on Consequence', in D. Patterson ed. New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy. Oxford: OUP. [etchemendy 2008.pdf]
  • Grandy, Richard (1993), "What do those 'Q's and 'R's stand for?" in R. I. G. Hughes (ed.) A Philosophical Companion to First Order Logic. Cambridge, Mass.: Hackett. [grandy_1993.pdf]
  • Patterson, D. (2012) Alfred Tarski: Philosophy of Language and Logic. [Patterson.pdf]
  • Prior, A. N. (1960), "The Runabout Inference-Ticket". Analysis, 21, pp. 38-9. [prior_1960.pdf]
  • Prawitz D., 1985, 'Remarks on some approaches to the concept of logical consequence', Synthese 62, pp.153?171.
    [prawitz_1985.pdf]
  • Prawitz, D. (2005), 'Logical Consequence: A Constructivist View', in S. Shapiro (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    [prawitz_2005.pdf]
  • Read, S., 'Formal and material consequence', Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (1994), pp.247-65.
    The first part of the paper - specifically, pp. 247-255 - contains a very helpful exposition of Etchemendy's criticism of Tarski. Reading these pages is highly recommended.
    [Read 1994.pdf]
  • Shapiro, S. (2007) ‘Logical Consequence, Proof Theory, and Model Theory’ in Shapiro ed. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, Oxford: OUP. [shapiro 2007.pdf]
  • Tarski, Alfred (1965), "On the Concept of Logical Consequence", in Logic, semantics, metamathematics: papers from 1923 to 1938. [tarski_1936.pdf]
  • Tarski, A. (1986), 'What are Logical Notions?', in Corcoran, J. (ed.), History and Philosophy of Logic, Vol. 7 (1986), 143-154.
    [tarski_1986.pdf]
  • Tarski, A. (1993) ‘Truth and Proof’ in R. I. G. Hughes ed. A Companion to First Order Logic, Cambridge, Mass.: Hackett. [tarski 1993.pdf]
 
Truth
  • Blackburn, S. and Simmons, K. (1999) 'Introduction', Blackburn and Simmons eds. (1999) Truth (Oxford Readings in Philosophy), Oxford: OUP. [BlackburnSimmons.pdf]
  • Cartwright, R. C. (1962/1987) 'Propositions', in his Philosophical Essays. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Originally published in R. J. Butler, ed., Analytical Philosophy, 1st series, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962. [cartwright 1987.pdf]
  • Grandy, Richard (1993), "What do those 'Q's and 'R's stand for?" in R. I. G. Hughes (ed.) A Philosophical Companion to First Order Logic. Cambridge, Mass.: Hackett. [grandy_1993.pdf]
  • Gupta, A. (1993) 'A Critique of Deflationism', reprinted in Blackburn and Simmons eds. (1999) Truth (Oxford Readings in Philosophy), Oxford: OUP. [Gupta.pdf]
  • Haack, S. (1978) Philosophy of Logics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Ch.7 'Sentences, Statements, Propositions'. [haack sentences.pdf]
  • Haack, S. (1978) Philosophy of Logics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Ch.7 'Theories of Truth'. [haack truth.pdf]
  • Horwich, P. (1999) 'The Minimalist Conception of Truth', Blackburn and Simmons eds. (1999) Truth (Oxford Readings in Philosophy), Oxford: OUP. [Horwich.pdf]
  • Patterson, D. (forthcoming) Alfred Tarski: Philosophy of Language and Logic. [Patterson.pdf]
  • Wettstein, H. (1976) 'Can what is asserted be a sentence' (Discussion of Cartwright), Philosophical Review. [Wettstein.pdf]
The Liar Paradox
  • Soames, S. (1999) 'Lessons of the Liar', ch.5 of his Understanding Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [SoamesTruth.pdf]
  • Barwise, J. and Etchemendy, J. (1987), The Liar: An Essay on Truth and Circularity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapters 1-3 and conclusion.
    [Etch&Bar.pdf]
  • Deltlefsen, Michael (1998), 'Godel's Theorems', in E. Craig (ed.) Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Retrieved October 26, 2005, from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/Y005SECT6
    [Deltlefsen.pdf]
  • McGee, V. (1998). 'Semantic paradoxes and theories of truth.' In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Retrieved September 11, 2005, from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/Y020SECT7
    [McGee.pdf]
  • Patterson, D. (forthcoming) Alfred Tarski: Philosophy of Language and Logic. [Patterson.pdf]
  • Quine, W. V. (1961) 'The Ways of Paradox', in Quine The Ways of Paradox and other essays, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. [QuineParadox.pdf]
Vagueness
  • Read, S. (1995), Thinking about Logic: an Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 7.
    [Read ch7]
  • Sainsbury, M. (1988) Paradoxes (2nd Edition), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.2.
    [Sainsbury ch2]
  • Sainsbury, R. M. and Williamson, T. (1998) 'Sorites' in B. Hale and C. Wright eds. (1998) Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Blackwell. [SainsburyWilliamson.pdf]
  • Williamson, T. (1994), Vagueness. London: Routledge. Ch. 7-9.
    [williamson ch7 to 9]
Modal Logic
  • Haack, S. (1978), Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 10.
    [Haack ch10]
  • Kripke, Saul (1963), Linsky, Leonard. Reference and Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971.
    [Kripke 1963]
  • Kripke, Saul (1971), 'Identity and Necessity', in M. Munitz, ed., Identity and Individuation. New York: New York University Press.
    [Kripke Identity]
  • Quine, W. V. O. (1953), 'Three grades of modal involvement'. In The Ways of Paradox .
    [Quine 3grades]
  • Quine, W. V. O. (1961) 'Reference and modality'. In: Linsky, Leonard. Reference and Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971.
    [Quine R&M]
  • Lewis, David (1979), "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic", in M. Loux (ed.) The Possible and the Actual. Ithica: Cornell University Press.
    [lewis_1979]
  • Lewis, David (1986) 'On the Plurality of Worlds'.
    [lewis_1986]
  • Loux, M. (1979) 'Introduction: Modality and Metaphysics' in Loux ed. (1979) The Possible and the Actual: readings in the metaphysics of modality (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP)
    [loux_1979]
  • Stalnaker, Robert. (1979) 'Possible Worlds' in Loux ed. (1979) The Possible and the Actual: readings in the metaphysics of modality (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP)
    [stalnaker_1979]
  • Forbes, G. (1999), 'Essentialism', in C. Wright and B. Hale (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language Oxford: Blackwell.
    [Forbes 1999]