Abstract:

We find two contrasting approaches to the role of emotions in human cognition in both everyday life and philosophical tradition. On the one hand, emotions (and other affective states such as moods) are often portrayed as tendentiously and surreptitiously biasing our thinking. Dispassionatereflection is equated with impartiality and objectivity. On the other, it is frequently argued, especially with regard to normative distinctions and valuations, that reason is blind without the emotions. Citing recent empirical discoveries (e.g., Damasio 1994), many even conclude that the epistemology of moral, aesthetic, prudential and other values and norms is crucially dependent on emotions. Emotions, it is said, are a special source of information about value (Tappolet 2000, Johnston 2001, Döring 2010, Prinz 2011). This claim is typically understood to mean both that emotions provide privileged access to value (e.g., “a person who has never been afraid cannot reallyunderstand what it is for something to be dangerous or threatening”), and that our emotional reactions are our final court appeal when it comes to questions of value (e.g., “an action is wrong iff it warrants guilt”).

By presenting a model of emotions as sui generis heuristics, this paper argues for a compromise position regarding the epistemic significance of emotions. The model seeks to steer clear of the excesses of both approaches sketched above, while hoping to incorporate their insights.

Heuristics are mental shortcuts or rules of thumb. What makes heuristics special from an epistemic point of view is that they work by substitution. The “target attribute” is substituted by a “heuristic attribute” which is easier to handle for the human mind (Kahneman and Frederick 2002). The epistemic task is carried out using this heuristic attribute rather than the original target attribute. In this paper I will focus on what are traditionally called moral sentiments and argue that the basic epistemic function of such emotions is heuristical. That is, characteristic emotional responses—fear, anger, guilt, blame, indignation, etc.—are used in moral cognition as mental shortcuts.

If emotions function as heuristics, then emotions do indeed often constitute an important and useful source of information. In fact, similarly to non-affective heuristics, it can be predicted that in certain situations emotional heuristics will significantly outperform reflective thinking. Moreover, emotional heuristics will also be special as to how they deliver the relevant kind of information, i.e., in terms of speed, salience, motivating potential, etc. However, it also follows from the heuristics model that moral sentiments will not be epistemically superior in the sense of being the highest court of appeal for the justification of evaluative beliefs. As all heuristics, affective heuristics work well in some situations and break down in others. The paper also demonstrates the empirical plausibility of the heuristics-model using evidence from experimental psychology, evolutionary anthropology and neuroscience.