Abstract:

There is wide consensus amongst philosophers on the specialness of self-ascriptions as particularly authoritative, i.e. as usually taken by the audience to be true and non-evidentially justified to the point that questioning them would equate to charge the speaker of irrationality, granted his/her sincerity. However, it is still far from being as widely agreed what can elucidate the phenomenon. In particular, it is unclear whether we should prefer an epistemic or non-epistemic explanation of it, i.e. whether one is authoritative in that one knows one's own attitudes in a privileged way or for some other reason. After briefly presenting the two alternatives, the present paper considers Moran's account, whose attractiveness depends on the fact that both epistemic and non-epistemic (agential) elements are involved. Hence, it emerges that an adequate explanation should make reference to both. However, it is not straightforward how this combination could look like. The last part of the paper puts forth a weaker and a stronger reading: we can consider Moran as giving an epistemic, yet non-theoretical explanation of FPA, or as rejecting the dichotomy altogether by means of a hybrid explanation.

The talk will be followed by a response from Tristan Kreetz; discussion and drinks at The Dirty Duck.