Departmental Colloquium, 2019/2020
Colloquia take place from 4.15pm to 6:00pm in OC1.07 (Oculus Building) unless otherwise indicated. For further information, please contact Naomi Eilan (N.Eilan@warwick.ac.uk) or Barnaby Walker (B.J.Walker@warwick.ac.uk). Details of previous years’ colloquia can be found here.
Fri 4 Oct, '19 |
Workshop on Expression and Self-Knowledge with Dorit Bar-On and Lucy CampbellExpression and Self-knowledge Warwick University, Friday 4th October 2019 Humanities H0.03
Programme
11.00 – 12.30
12.30 – 2.00 Dorit Bar-On (University of Connecticut)
3.00 – 4.30 Cristina Borgoni (Bayreuth University) ‘Primitive forms of first-person authority and expressive capacities’
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Wed 16 Oct, '19- |
Philosophy Department ColloquiumRoom OC1.07. Oculus BuildngSpeaker: Ursula Renz (Klagenfurt) Title: 'Socratic Self-Knowledge and the Concept of the Human Self: From Phenomenology to Metaphysics and Back Again' |
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Wed 30 Oct, '19- |
Philosophy Department ColloquiumRoom OC1.07. Oculus BuildngSpeaker: Sameer Bajaj (Philosophy, Warwick) Title: TBC |
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Wed 20 Nov, '19- |
Philosophy Department ColloquiumRoom OC1.07. Oculus BuildngSpeaker: Sonia Sedivy (Toronto) Title: 'Aesthetic Properties and Philosophy of Perception' |
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Wed 5 Feb, '20- |
Philosophy Department ColloquiumRoom OC1.07. Oculus BuildngSpeaker: Sophia Connell (Birkbeck) Title: 'Aristotle on Animal Cognition: Contemporary Perspectives' Wednesday 5 February 2020, 4.15pm-6pm, Room OC1.07, Oculus |
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Wed 26 Feb, '20- |
CANCELLED: Philosophy Department ColloquiumRoom OC1.07. Oculus BuildngSpeaker: Chris Janaway (Southampton) Title: Schopenhauer |
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Wed 4 Mar, '20- |
CANCELLED: Philosophy Department ColloquiumRoom OC1.07, OculusSpeaker: Sameer Bajaj Title: TBC |
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Wed 11 Mar, '20- |
CANCELLED: Philosophy Department ColloquiumRoom OC1.07. Oculus BuildngSpeaker: Alan Millar (Stirling) Title: TBC |
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Wed 13 May, '20- |
Philosophy Department Colloquium: Richard Moore: 'The Communicative Foundations of Propositional Attitude Psychology'By ZoomSpeaker: Richard Moore The Communicative Foundations of Propositional Attitude Psychology |
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Wed 3 Jun, '20- |
Philosophy Department Colloquium: Carrie Figdor (University of Iowa)By ZoomSpeaker: Carrie Figdor (University of Iowa) Title: What could cognition be, if not human cognition?
Abstract: We have long thought about cognition from an anthropocentric perspective, where human cognition is treated as the standard for full-fledged capacities throughout the biological world. This makes no evolutionary sense. I will discuss the theoretical and methodological shifts away from this perspective in comparative research — shifts that lie behind recent discoveries of advanced cognition in many non-humans — and how these changes bear on the debate between those who see human and non-human cognition as continuous (a difference in degree) vs. those who see them as discontinuous (a difference in kind).
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Wed 17 Jun, '20- |
Philosophy Department ColloquiumBy ZoomSpeaker: Sameer Bajaj (Warwick) Title: "Democratic Mandates and the Ethics of Representation." Democratic Mandates and the Ethics of Representation A day after the Tories achieved a decisive victory in the December 2019 British general election, Prime Minister Boris Johnson declared that he had received a “huge great stonking mandate” to get Brexit done and implement his domestic policy agenda. Whether or not what Johnson received is appropriately described as huge, great, or stonking, his statement reflects a more general idea that has wide currency in conventional democratic thought—namely, that larger electoral victories give representatives greater mandates to govern. Despite its important role in the practice of democratic politics, democratic theorists have paid little attention to the questions of whether larger electoral victories actually give representatives greater mandates to govern and, if so, what the moral implications of having a greater or lesser mandate are. My aim in this essay is to answer these questions and, in doing so, lay the groundwork for a normative theory of democratic mandates. I suggest that the key to answering the questions lies in understanding the relationship between two functions of democratic votes. Votes have a metaphysical function: they authorise representatives to govern. And votes have an expressive function: they express attitudes about the representatives they authorise. I defend what I call the dependence thesis: the content, size, and moral implications of a representative’s mandate depend on the attitudes expressed by the votes that generate the mandate. I then argue that, given certain ineliminable features of large-scale democratic politics, real-world democratic representatives are rarely in a position to justifiably claim greater mandates based on the size of their electoral victories. |