Guest Speaker: Andrea Sangiovanni (KCL)

Guest Speaker: Robert Simpson (UCL)

Speaker: Robert Simpson (UCL)

Talk: The Chilling Effect and the Heating Effect

 Abstract: Chilling Effects occur when a restriction on speech deters lawful speech, because of people’s uncertainty about the risks of incurring costs related to the restriction. I propose that, contrary to an orthodox account of this phenomenon, individual-level deterrence of speech sometimes intensifies discourse, at the group-level, rather than suppressing or subduing it. The deterrence of lawful speech may, somewhat counterintuitively, trigger a Heating Effect. This hypothesis offers us a promising (partial) explanation of the relentlessness of public debate on topics for which there is, simultaneously, evidence of people self-censoring, for fear of running afoul of speech restrictions. It also helps to identify and rectify two shortcomings in existing theoretical accounts of the Chilling Effect – in how they (i) explain the relation between individual- and group-level discursive phenomena, and (ii) characterize the distinctive objectionability of inadvertent speech deterrence.

TBD

This week's PG WiP Seminar will be led by Will Gildea.

Title: "Humans and Animals: Identical Moral Status, Different Anti-Killing Rights"

Abstract:

Existing views of moral status and the rights not to be killed that they help to ground are inadequate for one of two reasons. Either they fail to accommodate the intuition that humans matter as much as each other regardless of whether they possess advanced psychological capacities, or they fail to imply that killing humans is always or almost always harder to justify than killing animals. I offer an account of moral status and anti-killing rights that, uniquely within the actualist literature, accommodates both intuitions, explaining why humans are equals and also why humans have more robust anti-killing rights than animals. I defend the egalitarian intuition about moral status by arguing that all humans and animals that matter at all matter equally. I defend the intuition about killing by offering a new account of the grounds of anti-killing rights, according to which an individual’s rights not to be killed don’t just stem from their moral status. They can also stem from some of their normal rights against interference and to the receipt of goods. Autonomous humans have special rights of non-interference. And deeply cognitively impaired humans have special rights to certain goods. So, whilst killing animals generally violates their rights, human lives are protected even more robustly against killing.

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Guest Speaker: Jingjing Li (Leiden University)

Title: Husserlian Phenomenology, Chinese Buddhism, and The Problem of Essence

Guest Speaker: Charlie Richards (Oxford)

Guest Speaker: Dean Moyar (Johns Hopkins University)

Title: TBC

Oscar North-Concar (PhD)

Title: Thick concepts and Objectivity; Assessing Vayrynen's Pragmatic view.

Thursday 26th in S2.77 and on teams. Everyone welcomed!

Abstract:

Moral and ethical concepts are sometimes divided into two categories, ‘thin’ and ‘thick’. The difference can be characterised in the following way: when we describe an action thinly as ‘wrong’, we evaluate it negatively. However, when we evaluate an action with a thick concept like ‘selfish’ or ‘cruel’, we also describe the way in which it is wrong. Bernard Williams uses the notion of thick concepts to challenge the idea that objectivity is possible in the domain of ethics through claiming that they are both central to ethics and constitutively linked with particular ethical outlooks. However, the notion of thick concepts has proven to be problematic. The coherency of any metaethical view that puts thick concepts front and centre stage has been challenged on the grounds that there might not be anything distinctively significant about them after all. In this paper I’ll explore this tension. Specifically, I’ll discuss an argument from Pekka Vayrynen (2013) that claims thick concepts do not have distinctive significance. I aim to argue that Vayrynen does not demonstrate that thick concepts have no bearing on questions surrounding objectivity in ethics.

Guest Speaker: Luciano Venezia (UNQ)

Guest Speaker: Will Gildea (Warwick)

Speaker: Ian James Kidd (Nottingham)

Talk: Philosophical Misanthropy

Abstract: This paper rejects the standard model of misanthropy as hatred of humankind and offers an alternative. I propose that misanthropy be understood as a negative, critical verdict on the collective moral condition and performance of humankind. The misanthrope sees humankind as suffused with a variety of failings that are entrenched and ubiquitous. Such a verdict can be expressed - emotionally, and practically - in a range of stances, of which four are prominent across the Western, Indian, and Chinese traditions. I describe this pluralistic conception of misanthropy, explain these four misanthropic stances, and conclude by noting a predicament in which certain misanthropes can find themselves.

Best,

Andrew

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Guest Speaker: Paul D’Ambrosio (East China Normal University)

Title: Confucian Contingency Model: Person, Agency, and Morality

There will be session on Writing MA/MPhil dissertations and a session (with Stephanie Reading, Careers Team) on Jobs beyond philosophy: Exploring All your Career Options.

Title: "Moral supervenience and non-naturalism: assessing Jackson’s challenge"

Thursday 16^th February 2023

5pm in S2.77 and on TeamsLink opens in a new window.

 Everyone welcome!

 Abstract:

Frank Jackson has argued that, given that every moral predicate is necessarily coextensive with a natural one, moral properties are identical to natural ones. Against this, Jussi Suikkanen has responded with an appeal to Leibniz’s Law, which states that any two identical entities share all of their properties. If moral properties were just natural properties, then moral properties would share all of their higher-order properties with natural ones. A moral non-naturalist – someone who thinks moral properties are not identical with natural properties – can then argue for distinctive higher-order properties that set the moral realm apart. Classically, non-naturalist moral epistemology has asserted that moral knowledge is obtained in a unique way: by reflection, rather than empirical investigation. The non-naturalist can then argue that moral properties have distinctive epistemic properties of their own. I will argue that this cannot be used as a reply against Jackson.

Schedule and Speakers:

11am-12.30pm: Christoph Hoerl and Teresa McCormack: "Remember when?’ Looking for an account of joint reminiscing"

12.30-1.30pm: Lunch break

1.30-3pm: Julian Bacharach: "Is There Such a Thing as Joint Attention to the Past?”

3-3.20pm: Tea and coffee break

3.20-4.50pm: Tony Marcel: “Phenomena raising questions about ‘Autobiographical Memory’ and ‘Episodic Memory’”

 Everyone is welcome. After the event, there will be drinks and food at Benugo restaurant and bar in the Warwick Arts Centre.

Conference Date: 18 February 2023

Location: The University of Warwick 

Plenary sessions:

Sophia Moreau (University of Toronto): Objectionable Obligations 

Emily McTernan (University College London): TBD

 The aim of the conference is to provide an opportunity for graduate students to receive useful feedback on work in progress. Papers may deal with any area of contemporary political theory, political philosophy, legal theory, or the history of political thought, and should take no more than twenty minutes to present.

Graduate students interested in presenting papers should send abstracts (no more than 500 words) to PLTGradConf@warwick.ac.uk by no later than 8 January 2023.

To help students needing our response to secure travel funding from their home departments, we shall reply promptly to early submissions with our decisions.

Those wanting to attend the conference should register by no later than 6 February 2023 via email. Attendance is free of charge. Lunch and refreshments will be provided.

For any enquiries, please feel free to contact the conference organisers using the email address: PLTGradConf@warwick.ac.uk.

Guest Speaker: Rowan Cruft (Stirling)