This page contains only previous seminars. Details of current and forthcoming seminars are here.
Some readings listed below can be downloaded from the internal resources page (access restricted)
2017-2018 Graduate Research Seminar
Week 10: T. Crowther, 'In Touch with the Look of Solidity'.
Week 10: Discussion with Tom McClelland of Bruineberg, Chemero, Rietveld's ‘General ecological information supports engagement with affordances for ‘higher’ cognition’.
Week 10: Discussion with Wayne Christensen of his draft 'Memory systems and the control of skilled action'.
2016-2017 Graduate Research Seminar
Week 10: Discussion with Naomi Eilan of her 'Knowing and understanding other minds: on the role of communication'.
Week 10: Discussion with Johannes Roessler of his draft 'The manifest image of perceptual knowledge'.
Week 10: Discussion with Tom Crowther's draft 'Process, Endurance and the Structure of Perceptual Activity'.
2015-2016 Graduate Research Seminar
Week 10: Moran, R. 'Getting Told and Being Believed'
Week 10: Discussion with Guy of his draft chapter 'Learning from Theaetetus'
Week 10: Discussion with Tom of his 'Looking Solid and Feeling Solid'.
2014-2015 Graduate Research Seminar
Autumn Term 2014
Week 3: Discussion with Matt Soteriou of a draft chapter.
Week 4: H. Steward, A Metaphysics for Freedom, Ch.2 (reading Chs.1+2).
Week 5: A Metaphysics for Freedom, Ch.3: 3.1-3.3.
Week 6: A Metaphysics for Freedom, Ch.3: 3.4-3.6.
Week 7: Cancelled
Week 8: A Metaphysics for Freedom, Ch.6.
Week 9: A Metaphysics for Freedom, Ch.8.
Week 10: A Metaphysics for Freedom, Ch.8 continued.
Spring Term 2015
Week 2: Burge, T. Origins of Objectivity, Ch.9 until the end of the section ‘Perception as Objectification’ (pp.367-416).
Week 3: A CSCRC mini-workshop (2-6) on the Role of Consciousness.
Week 4: Discussion with Johannes of his 'Reason explanation and the second person perspective'. (Background reading on the second person: Eilan, 'The You Turn'.)
Week 5: Discussion with Naomi of her 'Joint Attention and the Second Person'.
Week 6: Discussion with Guy of his 'You and Me'.
Week 7: Discussion with Tom of his 'The Matter of Events'.
Week 10: Discussion with Tom of his 'The Perception of Activity'.
Summer Term 2015
Week 1: Block, N. 'Attention and Mental Paint'.
Week 2: Discussion with Hemdat of her 'Attention, Appearance, and the Relational View of Experience'.
Week 3: Discussion with Steve Butterfill of a draft of chapter 1 of his The Developing Mind
Week 4: Discussion with Steve Butterfill of a draft of chapter 2 of his The Developing Mind
Week 5: Peacocke 'Perceptual Content'
Week 6: Matthew Boyle’s 'Active Belief'
Week 7: Discussion with Steve Butterfill of a draft of chapter 3 of his The Developing Mind
Week 8: Discussion with Steve Butterfill of a draft of chapter 4 of his The Developing Mind
Week 9: Discussion with Matt Soteriou of a draft of chapter 5 of his The Disjunctive Theory of Perception.
Week 10: Discussion with Steve Butterfill of a draft of chapter 5 of his The Developing Mind
Week 11: Discussion with Matt Soteriou of a draft of chapter 6 of his The Disjunctive Theory of Perception.
2013-2014 Graduate Research Seminar
Autumn Term 2013
Week 2: P. F. Strawson, Analysis and Metaphysics, Ch. 2: 'Reduction or Connection?'
Week 3: J. Campbell, 'Berkeley’s Puzzle'
Week 4: Q. Cassam, 'Tackling Berkeley's Puzzle', in Roessler, Lerman & Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. OUP (2011)
Week 6: J. Campbell 'Relational vs. Kantian Responses to Berkeley's Puzzle' in Roessler, Lerman & Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. OUP (2011)
Week 7: Discussion with Christoph Hoerl. Reading: B. Martin & M. Deutscher, 'Remembering', Philosophical Review 75:161-96 (1966)
Weeks 8: Discussion with Christoph Hoerl. M.G.F. Martin, 'Out of the Past: Episodic Recall as Retained Acquaintance' in C. Hoerl & T. McCormack: Time and Memory. OUP (2001).
Week 9: J. Campbell, 'A Straightforward Solution to Berkeley’s Puzzle'
Week 10: Discussion with Christoph Hoerl. 'Remembering Events and Remembering Looks (Draft)'
Spring Term 2014
Week 2: Matthew Boyle, 'Additive Theories of Rationality: A Critique'
Week 3: Discussion with Johannes Roessler. J. Raz, 'The myth of instrumental rationality', in his From Normativity to Responsibility
Week 4: Discussion with Johannes Roessler of his paper 'The Silence of Self-Knowledge', Philosophical Explorations 2013
Week 5: Discussion with Matt Soteriou. Hinton, J.M., 1967, 'Visual Experiences', Mind, 76(April), 217–227
Week 7: Discussion with Matt Soteriou. Burge, Tyler. 2005, 'Disjunctivism and Perceptual Psychology', Philosophical Topics, 33, 1–78.
Weeks 8: Discussion with Matt Soteriou of drafts of his.
Week 9: Discussion with Tom Crowther. Gilbert Ryle, 1949 (2000). The Concept of Mind. Ch. V, in particular sections 3- 5 [pdf]. And ch. VII section 4.
Week 10: Discussion with Tom Crowther. Aristotle On Sleep and Sleeplessness.
Summer Term 2014
Week 1: Discussion with Tom Crowther 'Attention and the Norms of Wakeful Consciousness'
Week 2: H. Frankfurt, 'The Problem of Action'
Week 3: Discussion with Robert Cowan. S. Siegel (2013) 'The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience'
Week 4: Discussion with Robert Cowan. M. McGrath, 'Knowing what things look like'
Week 5: Discussion with Robert Cowan. J. Vance's 'Emotion and the New Epistemic Challenge from Cognitive Penetrability'
Week 6-7: Discussion with Matt Soteriou of his The Mind's Construction
Week 8: J. Campbell, 'A simple view of colour'
Week 9: Discussion with Matt Soteriou.
2012-2013 Graduate Research Seminar
Autumn Term 2012
Week 2: Frege, G. 'On Sense and Reference'
Week 3: Soteriou, M. 'Mental Agency, Conscious Thinking and Phenomenal Character', (2009), in L. O'Brien and M. Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions, OUP.
Week 4: Soteriou, M. 'The Perception of Absence, Space and Time', (2011) in J. Roessler, H. Lerman and N. Eilan, (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity, OUP.
Week 5: Soteriou, M. 'The Perception of Absence, Space and Time', continued.
Week 6: Martin. M.G.F., 'The Reality of Appearances'
Week 7: Martin. M.G.F., 'The Reality of Appearances', continued
Week 8: Williamson, T. The Philosophy of Philosophy, Ch.5, sections 1-3 (with emphasis on 3).
Week 9: Williamson, T. Knowledge and Its Limits Ch.1
Week 10: McDowell, J. Perception As a Capacity for Knowledge.
Spring Term 2013
Week 2: Pautz, A. 'Why explain visual experience in terms of content?'
Week 3: Soteriou, M. 'Perceiving Events', Philosophical Explorations (2010) 13(3): 223-241
Week 4: 'Perceiving Events', discussion with Matt Soteriou.
Week 5: ‘Perceptual experience and perceptual knowledge’ (Mind, 2009), discussion with Johannes Roessler
Week 6: Bratman, M. 'Agency, Time, and Sociality'.
Week 7: 'Shared Agency Involves Changing Perspective: A Counterexample to Bratman', discussion with Steve Butterfill.
Week 8: Phillips, I. 'Indiscriminability and experience of change', The Philosophical Quarterly (2011).
Week 9: Prosser, S. 'Why Does Time Seem to Pass?', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2012), 92-116.
Week 10: 'On the Paradox of Gestalt Switches: Wittgenstein’s Response to Kohler', discussion with Naomi Eilan.
Summer Term 2013
Week 1: 'Passage and Perception', discussion with Christoph Hoerl
Week 2: Evans, G. 'Understanding Demonstratives', in his Collected Papers.
Week 3: 'Sharing Thoughts about Oneself', discussion with Guy Longworth
Week 4: Cassam, Q. 'Homo Philosophicus' and 'The Disparity', Chs 1 and 2 of Self-Knowledge for Humans
Week 5: 'Psychological Rationalism' and 'Looking Outwards' (Chs 6 and 9 of Self-Knowledge for Humans), discussion with Quassim Cassam
Week 6: 'Auditory Perception' discussion with Matt Nudds
Week 8: Evans, G. The Varieties of Reference Ch.7
Week 10: Hornsby, J. 'Basic Activity' (2013) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
2011-2012 Graduate Research Seminar
Autumn Term 2011
Week 2: Quine, Word and Object, Ch.1
Week 4: Tom Crowther (Heythrop) will give a talk on 'Enduring Process'.
Week 5: Quine, Word and Object, Ch.2
Week 7: Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, Ch.1
Week 8: Martin. M.G.F., 'The Reality of Appearances'
Week 9: Martin. M.G.F., 'On Being Alienated'
Spring Term 2012
Weeks 1, 2, 4, 5: Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness Chs.1-4
Week 7: Dummett, 'Wang's Paradox'
Week 8: Dummett, 'Truth'
Week 10: Dummett, 'The Justification of Deduction'
Week 11: Dummett, 'The Justification of Deduction' continued.
Summer Term 2012
Week 2: Dummett, 'The Reality of the Past'
Week 3: Dummett, 'The Reality of the Past' continued.
further reading: 'The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic'
Weeks 4-10: Dummett, The Logical Basis of Metaphysics
2009-2010 Research Seminar: Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology and Metaphysics
This term we will be looking at some key papers in the philosophy of mind, epistemology and metaphysics. Each week, class discussion will focus on one paper, which will be introduced by a student presentation. Papers will be allocated at the seminar in the first week of term.
Davidson, D. (1971) ‘Agency’, in Essays on Actions and Events. Clarendon Press.
Velleman, J. D. (1992) ‘The Guise of the Good’, Nous 26(1) 3-26. Also in his The Possibility of Practical Reason. Clarendon Press.
Burge, T. (1986). ‘Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind’, Journal of Philosophy 83. Also in his Foundations of Mind: Philosophical Essays Vol. 2. Clarendon Press.
Martin, M.G.F. (2000). ‘Beyond Dispute: Sense Data, Intentionality and the Mind-Body Problem’, in Crane and Patterson eds. The History of the Mind-Body Problem. Routledge.
Clarke, T. (1965). ‘Seeing Surfaces and Physical Objects’, in Max Black ed. Philosophy in America. George Allen and Unwin.
Dennett, D. and Kinsbourne, M. (1992). ‘Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Consciousness in the Brain’, Behavioural and Brain Sciences 15.
Raffman, D. (2000). ‘Is Perceptual Indiscriminability Nontransitive?’, Philosophical Topics 28
Burnyeat, M. (1982). ‘Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes saw and Berkeley missed’, Philosophical Review 91
Rosen, G. (1994). ‘Objectivity and Modern Idealism: What is the question?’, in O’Leary’Hawthorne and Michaels eds. Philosophy in Mind. Kluwer
Williams, B. (1973) ‘Deciding to Believe’, in Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press.
Dummett, M. (1979). ‘Common Sense and Physics’, in MacDonald ed. Perception and Identity
Geach, P. (1969). ‘What do we think with?’, in his God and the Soul. Routledge
Ryle, G. (1968). ‘The Thinking of Thoughts: What is ‘Le Penseur’ doing?’, in his Collected Essays 1929-1968. Routledge
Matthew Soteriou (email@example.com)
2008-2009 Research Seminar: Frege and Russell on Elements and their Combination
Saturday Seminar 2009
6 June 2009
11am James Higginbotham (University of Southern California, Oxford University)
Title: 'Indexical Perspectives'
2.30pm Fraser MacBride (Birkbeck College)
Title: 'Unity of the Proposition and the Reference Principle'
1. Natural language appears to exhibit (or to express) at least two major forms, exemplified in the following sentences:
(1) Theatetus flies.
(2) Something flies.
Since the early Twentieth Century, orthodoxy has endorsed (specifications of) the following treatments. In (1), what appears to be a singular term combines with what appears to be a predicate in order to express something like: what ‘flies’ expresses applies to what ‘Theatetus’ applies to. In (2), what appears to be a second level predicate combines with what appears to be a first order predicate in order to express something like: what ‘something’ expresses applies to what ‘flies’ expresses. The aim of this seminar series is to explore some of the early work of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell that instigated and shaped current orthodoxy, culminating in ‘On Denoting’, which appears to develop a treatment of sentences like (3) as if they involves second level predication, so exhibited the second major form.
(3) The first enumerator of regular convex polyhedra flies.
2. The main philosophical questions to be pursued initially are:
Q1. How should we understand the functioning of the predicative elements involved in (1)–(3)? In particular, do these predicative elements have ‘meaning in isolation’?
Q2. How should we understand the combinatorics involved in (1)–(3), the way in which the elements compose.
Q3. How should we understand the functioning of the singular element and, more generally, the functioning of acquaintance in Russell’s thinking?
The main historical questions to be pursued are:
Q4. How did Frege and Russell understand the functioning of the predicative elements involved in (1)–(3), and in particular how and why did Russell’s view of this develop in the way that it did.
Q5. How did Frege and Russell explain the combinatorics involved in (1)–(3), and in particular how and why did Russell’s view of this develop in the way that it did.
Q6. What is really going on in ‘On Denoting’?
Q7. How did ‘On Denoting’ impact upon the development of Russell’s thinking about acquaintance?
3. It is often supposed that the primary aim of ‘On Denoting’ is to develop and defend a particular treatment of sentences like (3), those involving Definite Descriptions. And it is supposed that a secondary aim is to explain how empty Definite Descriptions can be used to express propositions. But the standard reading fail to engage with the following: (I) Russell already had a treatment of Definite Descriptions able to deal with empty instances; (II) One of Russell’s fundamental concerns in this period was the combinatorics involved in expression, and not simply the treatment of particular elements; (III) An equally fundamental aim in this period was provision of a treatment of the Inconsistency, Russell’s paradox, and this appears to have been a motivation for ‘On Denoting’; (IV) The standard reading offers no satisfactory account of the infamous ‘Gray’s Elegy’ passage.
4. Further issues that may be pursued are: (a) Russell’s thinking about acquaintance; (b) The reception of Russell’s work, in particular by Ludwig Wittgenstein and Frank Ramsey; (c) Contemporary treatments of combinatorics; (d) Contemporary treatments of predication; (e) Contemporary treatments of second level predication; (f) Contemporary treatments of Definite Descriptions and Names, e.g. as first level predicates.
alexander.kelly at warwick.ac.uk
Spring-Summer 2007-8: Topics in the Philosophy of Linguistics
1. Knowledge of Language
In which we explore the question how our standing with respect to language and its properties should be understood, with special reference to the way these issues are, or should be, understood in generative linguistics. Two particular questions here are: (1) To what extent, and in what ways, is linguistics a branch of psychology? (2) To what extent, and in what ways, should linguistics be understood as a chapter in epistemology? [‘*’ = main reading; all else is background or further discussion.]
23/1/08: *Chomsky, N. ‘Review of B. F. Skinner Verbal Behaviour’, Language, 1959
30/1/08: *Collins, J. ‘Meta-scientific eliminativism: a reconsideration of Chomsky’s Review of Skinner’s Verbal Behaviour’, British Journal of Philosophy of Science, 2007 (GL has copy).
6/2/08. *Chomsky, N. Rules and Representations, New York: Columbia University Press,1980, ch.1.
13/2/08. No meeting (Reading week).
20/2/08. *Chomsky, N. Rules and Representations, New York: Columbia University Press,1980, ch.2.
27/2/08. *Chomsky, N. Rules and Representations, New York: Columbia University Press,1980, ch.3. [postponed]
5/3/08. No meeting (GL away)
12/3/08 *Chomsky, N. Rules and Representations, New York: Columbia University Press,1980, ch.3.
18/4/08. 12-2pm: *Fodor, J. ‘Some notes on what linguistics is about’ - Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, 1981/Katz ed. Philosophy of Linguistics, 1985; *Devitt, M and Sterelny, K. ‘Linguistics: What's Wrong with "The Right View"’, Philosophical Perspectives, 1989; Laurence, S. ‘Is Linguistics a Branch of Psychology?’ in A. Barber ed. Epistemology of Language, 2003
2-4pm: Daniel Rothschild, Columbia, "Pragmatics and its Place in Linguistics".
23/4/08. *Matthews, R. J. (2006) ‘Knowledge of language and linguistic competence’, Philosophical Issues, Volume 16 Issue 1 Page 200-220, September 2006; Longworth, G. ‘Linguistic Understanding and Knowledge’ Nous/Online
2. The Nature of Language and Linguistic Properties
In which we reflect upon some disputes that have arisen concerning the nature of language and, in particular, the bearing of scientific linguistics on the proper understanding of that nature.
30/4/08. No meeting.
7/5/08. *Chomsky, N. ‘Language and Nature’, Mind, 1995, JSTOR.
14/5/08. *Wiggins, D. ‘Languages as Social Objects’, Philosophy, 1997, JSTOR.
21/5/08. John Collins, UEA, "Naturalism in the Philosophy of Language", paper available from GL.
28/5/08. Barry C. Smith, Birkbeck College, tba.
4/6/08. No meeting (reading week).
11/6/08. *Rey, G. ‘Externalism and inexistence in early content’; Rey, G. ‘In defense of folieism’ available from GL/online.
18/6/08. Georges Rey, Maryland, 4pm - 6pm, S0.19.
20/6/08. Gareth Fitzgerald, UCL, tba. *Longworth, G. ‘Conflicting grammatical appearances’, Croatian Journal of Philosophy/online. Longworth, G. ‘Confronting grammatical properties’, long ms available from GL.
14 December 2007:
Gold, Natalie and Robert Sugden (forthcoming 2007), 'Collective Intentions and Team Agency' Journal of Philosophy
7 December 2007:
Sugden, Robert (2000), "Team Preferences". Economics and Philosophy, 16, pp. 175-204.
30 November 2007:
No meeting (we're all preparing for MindGrad)
25 November 2007:
Kutz, Christopher (2000), "Acting Together". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61(1), pp. 1-31.
18 November 2007:
Searle, John R. (1990 ), "Collective Intentions and Actions", in Consciousness and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
9 November 2007:
Moll, Heinrike and Michael Tomasello, 'Cooperation and human cognition: the Vygotskian Intelligence Hypothesis' Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B. [pdf]
2 November 2007:
Bratman, Michael (1997), 'I Intend That We J', in Bratman, Michael (1999), Faces of Intention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
26 October 2007:
Velleman, David (1997), 'How to Share an Intention', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. 57, No. 1. pp. 29-50.
19 October 2007:
Bratman, Michael (1993), 'Shared Intention', Ethics 104, pp. 97-113
12 October 2007:
Mutual Knowledge -- Schiffer and Campbell
5 October 2007:
Bratman, Michael (1992), "Shared Cooperative Activity". The Philosophical Review, 101(2), pp. 327-341
some date t.b.c:
Bratman, Michael (1997), 'Shared Intention and Mutual Obligation' in Bratman, Michael (1999), Faces of Intention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Long series on Donald Davidson ...
13th January 2006
McGinn, Colin. 'The Structure of Content'
20th January 2006
McDowell, John. 'Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space' in Subject, Thought, and Context, Philip Pettit and John McDowell, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
Fodor, Jerry. 'Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology' in Behavioural and Brain Sciences 1980
Hornsby, Jennifer. 'Physicalist Thinking and Conceptions of Behaviour' in Subject, Thought, and Context, Philip Pettit and John McDowell, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
27th January 2006
Evans, Gareth. Excerpt from Ch7 of The Varieties of Reference
3rd February 2006
Noe Alva.(2004) Chapter 6 Action in Perception MIT
10th February 2006
Grice, Paul. 'Some Remarks about the Senses'. in Grice (1989), Studies in the Way of Words (SWW), Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press
17th February 2006
Travis, Charles. 'A Sense of Occasion' in Philosophical Quarterly April 2005, Vol.55
24th February 2006
Strawson, P.F.(1959) Chapter 3 from Individuals Routledge
10th March 2006
Campbell, John (2005) "Information-Processing, Phenomenal Consciousness and Molyneux's Question", In Jos? Bermudez (ed.), Thought, Reference and Experience: Themes from the Philosophy of Gareth Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005), 195-219.
22nd April 2005, Declan Smithies
29th April 2005, Rory Madden
6th May 2005, Gloria Ayob
20th May 2005, Keith Allen (UCL), 'In Defence of Natural Daylight'
10th June 2005, Ignacio Avila, 'The Third Dogma of Empiricism and the Non-Conceptual Content of Experience'
Autumn 2004-Spring 2005
11th March 2005, room S 0.08
Robert Hopkins (Sheffield) will present a paper on Molyneux's Question.
4th March 2005, room H 0.03
Hemdat Lerman (Wolfson College, Oxford) will present a paper, 'Attention and the way things are presented to us in experience.'.
25th February 2005, room S 0.08
Gareth Evans, 'Molyneux's Question', in his Collected Papers, Oxford University Press, 1985.
18th February 2005, room H 0.03
Richard Moran, "Anscombe on 'Practical Knowledge'", in Agency and Action, eds. J. Hyman & H. Steward, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p43-68 (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement: 55).
See excerpts from Anscombe, Intention for background.
11th February 2005, room S 0.08
Robert Brandom, 'Overcoming a Dualism of Concepts and Causes: The Basic Argument of "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind"' in R.M. Gale(ed.) The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics, Oxford:Blackwell, 2002.
Also, (for enthusiasts) Robert Brandom, 'Modality, Normativity, and Intentionality' in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXIII, No. 3, November 2001.
4th February 2005, room H 0.03
Sydney Shoemaker, 'Unity of consciousness and consciousness of unity' in The First Person Perspective and Other Essays, CUP
28th January 2005
Brian Ball (Oxford) will present his paper, 'Conceptual Realism and Psychological Nominalism'
21st January 2005
Richard Moran, 'Interpretation Theory and the First Person' in Philosophical Quarterly vol.44 No. 175 (April 1994)
14th January 2005
John Campbell, 'What is it to Know What 'I' Refers to?' in The Monist, Vol. 87 No. 2 (April 2004)
7th January 2005
Charles Travis, 'The Silence of the Senses' in Mind, Vol 113 (Jan 2004) p57-94
3rd December 2004
John McDowell, 'Functionalism and Anomalous Monism' in his Mind, Value and Reality, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1998
26th November 2004
We're busy organising the Warwick Graduate Conference in the Philosophy of Mind
19th November 2004
Discussion: Jen Hornsby, 'Bodily Movements, Actions and Epistemology' in her Simple Mindedness, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1997
12th November 2004
John Campbell, 'The Role of Demonstratives in Action-Explanation' in Roessler and Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness, Oxford University Press 2003, p150-164. See also Intro to Roessler and Eilan (2003).
5th November 2004
Discussion of three papers:
Bernard Williams, 'Imagination and the Self' in his Problems of the Self Christopher Peacocke, 'Imagination, Experience and Possibility: A Berkeleian View Defended' in Foster, J & Robinson, H. 1985 Essays on Berkeley, Oxford, OUP 1985 Michael Martin, 'The Transparency of Experience' Mind and Language, 17 (2002)
29th October 2004
22nd October 2004
John McDowell, 'Knowledge and the Internal' in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55, 1995, 877-893
15th October 2004
John Campbell, ‘Berkeley's Puzzle’ in Tamar Szabo Gendler and John O'Leary Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002, 127-143. Available from John Campbell's homepage (last checked 9/10/2004).
8th October 2004
Paul Snowdon, 'How to Interpret 'Direct Perception'' in Tim Crane (ed.) The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1992
October 14th, Gottlob Frege, "On Sense and Reference"
21th October , Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference, Ch 1.
October 28th, Evans, TVoR, Ch 2.
November 4th, Evans, TVoR, Ch 3.
November 11th, Evans, TVoR, Ch 4.
November 18th, Evans, TVoR, Ch 5.
November 25th, Evans, TVoR, Ch 6.