Oscar North-Concar (PhD)

Title: Thick concepts and Objectivity; Assessing Vayrynen's Pragmatic view.

Thursday 26th in S2.77 and on teams. Everyone welcomed!

Abstract:

Moral and ethical concepts are sometimes divided into two categories, ‘thin’ and ‘thick’. The difference can be characterised in the following way: when we describe an action thinly as ‘wrong’, we evaluate it negatively. However, when we evaluate an action with a thick concept like ‘selfish’ or ‘cruel’, we also describe the way in which it is wrong. Bernard Williams uses the notion of thick concepts to challenge the idea that objectivity is possible in the domain of ethics through claiming that they are both central to ethics and constitutively linked with particular ethical outlooks. However, the notion of thick concepts has proven to be problematic. The coherency of any metaethical view that puts thick concepts front and centre stage has been challenged on the grounds that there might not be anything distinctively significant about them after all. In this paper I’ll explore this tension. Specifically, I’ll discuss an argument from Pekka Vayrynen (2013) that claims thick concepts do not have distinctive significance. I aim to argue that Vayrynen does not demonstrate that thick concepts have no bearing on questions surrounding objectivity in ethics.

Guest Speaker: Luciano Venezia (UNQ)

Addiction: 'Responsibility Without Blame for Addiction' by Hanna Pickard

https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/philosophy/research/researchcentres/wma/graduates/afflictionsofmind/

Guest Speaker: Will Gildea (Warwick)

Talks from Professor Eileen John and Dr Claire Anscomb. Drinks and nibbles!

Speaker: Ian James Kidd (Nottingham)

Talk: Philosophical Misanthropy

Abstract: This paper rejects the standard model of misanthropy as hatred of humankind and offers an alternative. I propose that misanthropy be understood as a negative, critical verdict on the collective moral condition and performance of humankind. The misanthrope sees humankind as suffused with a variety of failings that are entrenched and ubiquitous. Such a verdict can be expressed - emotionally, and practically - in a range of stances, of which four are prominent across the Western, Indian, and Chinese traditions. I describe this pluralistic conception of misanthropy, explain these four misanthropic stances, and conclude by noting a predicament in which certain misanthropes can find themselves.

Best,

Andrew

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Guest Speaker: Paul D’Ambrosio (East China Normal University)

Title: Confucian Contingency Model: Person, Agency, and Morality

There will be session on Writing MA/MPhil dissertations and a session (with Stephanie Reading, Careers Team) on Jobs beyond philosophy: Exploring All your Career Options.

Title: "Moral supervenience and non-naturalism: assessing Jackson’s challenge"

Thursday 16^th February 2023

5pm in S2.77 and on TeamsLink opens in a new window.

 Everyone welcome!

 Abstract:

Frank Jackson has argued that, given that every moral predicate is necessarily coextensive with a natural one, moral properties are identical to natural ones. Against this, Jussi Suikkanen has responded with an appeal to Leibniz’s Law, which states that any two identical entities share all of their properties. If moral properties were just natural properties, then moral properties would share all of their higher-order properties with natural ones. A moral non-naturalist – someone who thinks moral properties are not identical with natural properties – can then argue for distinctive higher-order properties that set the moral realm apart. Classically, non-naturalist moral epistemology has asserted that moral knowledge is obtained in a unique way: by reflection, rather than empirical investigation. The non-naturalist can then argue that moral properties have distinctive epistemic properties of their own. I will argue that this cannot be used as a reply against Jackson.

Schedule and Speakers:

11am-12.30pm: Christoph Hoerl and Teresa McCormack: "Remember when?’ Looking for an account of joint reminiscing"

12.30-1.30pm: Lunch break

1.30-3pm: Julian Bacharach: "Is There Such a Thing as Joint Attention to the Past?”

3-3.20pm: Tea and coffee break

3.20-4.50pm: Tony Marcel: “Phenomena raising questions about ‘Autobiographical Memory’ and ‘Episodic Memory’”

 Everyone is welcome. After the event, there will be drinks and food at Benugo restaurant and bar in the Warwick Arts Centre.

Conference Date: 18 February 2023

Location: The University of Warwick 

Plenary sessions:

Sophia Moreau (University of Toronto): Objectionable Obligations 

Emily McTernan (University College London): TBD

 The aim of the conference is to provide an opportunity for graduate students to receive useful feedback on work in progress. Papers may deal with any area of contemporary political theory, political philosophy, legal theory, or the history of political thought, and should take no more than twenty minutes to present.

Graduate students interested in presenting papers should send abstracts (no more than 500 words) to PLTGradConf@warwick.ac.uk by no later than 8 January 2023.

To help students needing our response to secure travel funding from their home departments, we shall reply promptly to early submissions with our decisions.

Those wanting to attend the conference should register by no later than 6 February 2023 via email. Attendance is free of charge. Lunch and refreshments will be provided.

For any enquiries, please feel free to contact the conference organisers using the email address: PLTGradConf@warwick.ac.uk.

Documentary on gay and transgender rights activists Marsha P. Johnson and Sylvia Rivera. Further info: wiki page and IMDB page.

Guest Speaker: Rowan Cruft (Stirling)

This week, Emily Bassett (PhD) will present "What do we mean by a moral emotion?: Responding to De Sousa". Everyone welcome!

 Abstract:

When it comes to morality and the emotions, we seem to be drawn to the idea that certain emotions are more salient to morality than others. Emotions such as guilt, shame and resentment appear to be more distinctly moral to us than sadness or joy. However, attempts to explain what makes some emotions more distinctly moral than others - to single out a coherent group of 'moral emotions - have largely been unsuccessful. In light of this, De Sousa has argued that our intuitions are mistaken. All emotions are equally relevant to morality. In this talk, I will argue that De Sousa's argument rests on two assumptions. First, on the assumption that emotions are on par with other intentional states such as belief in how they connect with morality. As beliefs are moral when they have moral content, emotions are moral when they have moral content. Second, on the assumption that this is the only salient connection that can be made between the emotions and morality. If we reject this second assumption, we leave open the possibility of distinguishing moral from non-moral emotions.

Symposium 'Adorno's "Sexual Taboos and Law Today" – Sixty Years On'

This Saturday, 25 February 2023, 10:00–18:00

Social Sciences, S0.20

Coffee, lunch, and snacks will be provided.

Please send an email to simon.gansinger@warwick.ac.uk if you would like to attend.

PROGRAMME

(Full programme here)

10.00–10.30 Registration and coffee

10.30–10.45 Introduction by the organisers (Antonia Hofstätter & Simon Gansinger)

10.45–12.15 Panel 1: Sex and Taboo

12.15–13.30 Lunch

13.30–15.00 Panel 2: Sex and Society

15.00–15.15 Coffee

15.15–16.45 Panel 3: Sex and Crime

16.45–17.00 Coffee

17.00–18.00 Roundtable with all speakers