PG Work in Progress Seminar
About the WiPThe Postgraduate Work in Progress (WiP) Seminar is a student-organised session intended to provide all philosophy graduate students, and occasionally graduate students undertaking philosophy projects in other departments, with the platform to present and discuss their ongoing research. All philosophy PGs, whether MA, MPhil, or PhD, are encouraged to attend, and faculty members and visitors to the department are very welcome. No extensive knowledge of the week’s topic is necessary. The seminar offers an invaluable opportunity for graduates to present their work in a friendly, supportive, unassessed setting, and receive vital peer-review feedback and tips, allowing them to improve and practise defence of their work, as well as to get to know and socialise with fellow students and members of the wider department. Seminars normally take place on Thursdays, from 5:00pm until 6:15pm in S2.77, and can also be attended online on via Teams. The title and abstract for each talk along with a Teams link is circulated to all PG students on a Monday.The format will consist of a roughly 30-minute presentation of a paper, followed by a roughly 30-minute open discussion and Q&A. A trip to the pub reliably follows each seminar. Current term scheduleA list of seminars occurring in the current academic term can be found below. Term 1 (2024-2025) Schedule
Thursday 3rd October - Oscar North-Concar - 'The Meaning of Moral Terms: Is Wiggins' View Circular?' Thursday 10th October - John Hundley Thursday 17th October - TBC Thursday 24th October - TBC Thursday 31st October - TBC Thursday 7th November - TBC Thursday 14th November - TBC Thursday 21st November - TBC Thursday 28th November - Thursday 5th December - Notes for presentersThere is no strict minimum or maximum limit on paper length, and you may present an entire paper, a chapter of a thesis, an article, or outline the scope of a project, etc. The general recommendation is 3000-5000 words, as your work should be amenable to summation within 30 minutes. Please provide your title and abstract to the WiP organisers by the end of the Sunday on the week you are presenting.Please keep in mind that the seminar is best used to gather valuable suggestions with which to improve to your work, and to gain experience in presenting your work. As such, your work does not need to be a watertight, polished piece, but may be a draft or substantial set of notes. You are welcome to share work at all stages of the writing process. Contact the organisersIf you would like to present at the WiP or have any questions about it, please email Chris Hall (Chris.Hall.1@warwick.ac.uk). |
Next talk: Thursday 3rd October 2024, 5pm, S2.77Oscar North-Concar, 'The Meaning of Moral Terms: Is Wiggins' View Circular?'WiP Organisers 24/25: Chris Hall (Chris.Hall.1@warwick.ac.uk) We're recruiting new WiP Organisers to take over organisation of the seminars. Please contact Chris if you are interested. |
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Postgraduate Work in Progress Seminar: Giulia Luvisotto - 'First-Person Authority: The Prospects for a Hybrid Explanation and the Explanatory Role of Agency'
Abstract:
There is wide consensus amongst philosophers on the specialness of self-ascriptions as particularly authoritative, i.e. as usually taken by the audience to be true and non-evidentially justified to the point that questioning them would equate to charge the speaker of irrationality, granted his/her sincerity. However, it is still far from being as widely agreed what can elucidate the phenomenon. In particular, it is unclear whether we should prefer an epistemic or non-epistemic explanation of it, i.e. whether one is authoritative in that one knows one's own attitudes in a privileged way or for some other reason. After briefly presenting the two alternatives, the present paper considers Moran's account, whose attractiveness depends on the fact that both epistemic and non-epistemic (agential) elements are involved. Hence, it emerges that an adequate explanation should make reference to both. However, it is not straightforward how this combination could look like. The last part of the paper puts forth a weaker and a stronger reading: we can consider Moran as giving an epistemic, yet non-theoretical explanation of FPA, or as rejecting the dichotomy altogether by means of a hybrid explanation.
The talk will be followed by a response from Tristan Kreetz; discussion and drinks at The Dirty Duck.