My research interests are in philosophy of mind and action, in epistemology, and – especially – in the intersection of these areas. I completed my PhD in Cambridge in 2015, and have previously held teaching positions at Oxford (2017-18) and in Edinburgh (2015-16), and an Analysis Studentship also based in Oxford (2016-17).
My PhD thesis, ‘Action, Intention, and Knowledge’ and subsequent publications develop accounts of our practical and psychological self-knowledge – the apparently epistemically groundless knowledge a person has of her own intentional actions and mental states. In both cases, I argued, self-knowledge is best understood as a species of knowledge that p which does not involve a belief that p: my practical knowledge that I am intentionally PHI-ing is a facet of my intentional PHI-ing, whereas my psychological self-knowledge that I am in mental state M is a facet of my being in M. Both accounts were delivered in the context of a forwards-looking understanding of the genus ‘knowledge’, one which views knowledge in terms of the capacities and abilities possessed by the knower, rather than viewing knowledge in terms of how one comes by it.
My Leverhulme Fellowship at Warwick develops a new approach to understanding propositional knowledge which I call ‘Epistemological Pluralism’. Epistemological Pluralism aims to explain both the commonalities and the differences between the various species of propositional knowledge (including practical and psychological self-knowledge, knowledge of other minds, testimonial, inferential and perceptual knowledge), and to do so in a way which is more in keeping with the workings of our common-sense epistemic concepts than the standard accounts of knowledge currently on offer in the literature. Again, the idea that knowledge should be understood in a forwards-looking way is crucial to this project.
Alongside this project in epistemology I am also developing my work in action-theory, especially in relation to Elizabeth Anscombe. I am also starting to think about how some of these issues connect to topics in ethics.
Campbell, L. ‘Propositionalism about Intention: Shifting the Burden of Proof’ in Canadian Journal of Philosophy;
published online 28th August 2018; forthcoming in print
Campbell, L. 2018. ‘Self-Knowledge, Belief, Ability (and Agency?)’ in Philosophical Explorations 21(3): 333-349
Campbell, L. 2018. ‘Two Notions of Intentional Action? Solving a Puzzle in Anscombe’s Intention’ in British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26(3): 578-602
Campbell, L. 2018. ‘An Epistemology for Practical Knowledge’ in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48(2): 159-177