EC220: Mathematical Economics 1A
Costas Cavounidis
Module Leader
Principal Aims
Mathematical Economics 1A, "Game Theory," is an introduction to the rigorous mathematical study of strategic interactions. Students will learn how game theorists model such interactions, and how those models can be analyzed. By the end of the module, they will have developed a formidable toolbox of game-theoretic techniques, and will be familiar with a variety of applications of these techniques to real-world situations, both economic and otherwise.
Principal Learning Outcomes
Subject Specific and Professional Skills: Demonstrate understanding of the tools of game theory, and the ability to apply them to wide classes of problems. The teaching and learning methods that enable students to achieve this learning outcome are: Lectures, seminars, guided reading and independent study The summative assessment methods that measure the achievement of this learning outcome are: Tests and examination
Syllabus
12 CATS - The module will typically cover the following topics:Games in strategic form: Nash equilibrium and its applications to voting games, oligopoly, provision of public goods.Games in extensive form: sub game perfect equilibrium and its applications to voting games, repeated games.Static games with incomplete information: Bayesian equilibrium and its applications to auctions, contracts and mechanism design.Dynamic games of incomplete information: Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, Sequential equilibrium and its application to signalling games.Bargaining theory: Nash bargaining, non-cooperative bargaining with alternating offers and applications to economic markets.Evolutionary Game TheoryEvolutionary game theory.
15 CATS - The module will typically cover the following topics:Games in strategic form: Nash equilibrium and its applications to voting games, oligopoly, provision of public goods.Games in extensive form: sub game perfect equilibrium and its applications to voting games, repeated games.Static games with incomplete information: Bayesian equilibrium and its applications to auctions, contracts and mechanism design.Dynamic games of incomplete information: Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, Sequential equilibrium and its application to signalling games.Bargaining theory: Nash bargaining, non-cooperative bargaining with alternating offers and applications to economic markets.Evolutionary Game Theory
Context
- Core Module
- Y602 - Year 2, G300 - Year 2
- Optional Core Module
- GL11 - Year 2, GL12 - Year 2
- Optional Module
- L100 - Year 2, L1P5 - Year 1, L1PA - Year 1, LM1D (LLD2) - Year 2, V7MP - Year 2, V7MP - Year 3, V7MR - Year 2, V7MR - Year 3, V7MM - Year 4, V7ML - Year 2, G100 - Year 2, G100 - Year 3, G103 - Year 2, G103 - Year 3, R9L1 - Year 4, R3L4 - Year 4, R4L1 - Year 4, R2L4 - Year 4, R1L4 - Year 4, L1L8 - Year 2, L1L8 - Year 3, LA99 - Year 2, LA99 - Year 3
- Pre or Co-requisites
- EC120 or EC107 for GL11 students
- Pre-requisite for
- EC301, EC341
- Restrictions
- MORSE students must take 12 CAT version.
- Part-year Availability for Visiting Students
- 12 CATS - Not available on a part-year basis
15 CATS - Available in the Autumn term only (1 x test – 12 CATS)
Assessment
- Assessment Method
- 12 CATS - 2 hour examination (summer (100%)
15 CATS - Coursework (20%) + 2 hour exam (summer) (80%) - Coursework Details
- 12 CATS - 2 hour examination (summer (100%)
15 CATS - Test 1 (20%), 2 hour exam (summer) (80%) - Exam Timing
- Summer
Exam Rubric
Time Allowed: 2 hours.
Answer TWO questions ONLY. All questions carry equal weight (50 marks each). Answer each question in a separate booklet.
Approved pocket calculators are allowed.
Read carefully the instructions on the answer book provided and make sure that the particulars required are entered on each answer book. If you answer more questions than are required and do not indicate which answers should be ignored, we will mark the requisite number of answers in the order in which they appear in the answer book(s): answers beyond that number will not be considered.
Previous exam papers can be found in the University’s past papers archive. Please note that previous exam papers may not have operated under the same exam rubric or assessment weightings as those for the current academic year. The content of past papers may also be different.