EC220: Mathematical Economics 1A
Principal Aims
Mathematical Economics 1A, "Game Theory," is an introduction to the rigorous mathematical study of strategic interactions. Students will learn how game theorists model such interactions, and how those models can be analyzed. By the end of the module, they will have developed a formidable toolbox of game-theoretic techniques, and will be familiar with a variety of applications of these techniques to real-world situations, both economic and otherwise.
Principal Learning Outcomes
Subject Specific and Professional Skills: Demonstrate understanding of the tools of game theory, and the ability to apply them to wide classes of problems. The teaching and learning methods that enable students to achieve this learning outcome are: Lectures, seminars, guided reading and independent study The summative assessment methods that measure the achievement of this learning outcome are: Tests and examination
Syllabus
The module will typically cover the following topics:Games in strategic form: Nash equilibrium and its applications to voting games, oligopoly, provision of public goods.Games in extensive form: sub game perfect equilibrium and its applications to voting games, repeated games.Static games with incomplete information: Bayesian equilibrium and its applications to auctions, contracts and mechanism design.Dynamic games of incomplete information: Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, Sequential equilibrium and its application to signalling games.Bargaining theory: Nash bargaining, non-cooperative bargaining with alternating offers and applications to economic markets.Evolutionary Game TheoryEvolutionary game theory.
15 CATSThe module will typically cover the following topics:Games in strategic form: Nash equilibrium and its applications to voting games, oligopoly, provision of public goods.Games in extensive form: sub game perfect equilibrium and its applications to voting games, repeated games.Static games with incomplete information: Bayesian equilibrium and its applications to auctions, contracts and mechanism design.Dynamic games of incomplete information: Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, Sequential equilibrium and its application to signalling games.Bargaining theory: Nash bargaining, non-cooperative bargaining with alternating offers and applications to economic markets.Evolutionary Game Theory
Context
- Core Module
- Y602 - Year 2, G300 - Year 2
- Optional Core Module
- GL11 - Year 2, GL12 - Year 2
- Optional Module
- L100 - Year 2, L1P5 - Year 1, L1PA - Year 1, LM1D (LLD2) - Year 2, V7MP - Year 2, V7MP - Year 3, V7MR - Year 2, V7MR - Year 3, V7MM - Year 4, V7ML - Year 2, G100 - Year 2, G100 - Year 3, G103 - Year 2, G103 - Year 3, R9L1 - Year 4, R3L4 - Year 4, R4L1 - Year 4, R2L4 - Year 4, R1L4 - Year 4, L1L8 - Year 2, L1L8 - Year 3, LA99 - Year 2, LA99 - Year 3
- Pre or Co-requisites
- 12 CATS - Any of: EC106-24 Introduction to Economics EC106 for MORSE students 15 CATS - Any of: EC106-24 Introduction to Economics OR EC107-30 Economics 1 OR EC109-30 Microeconomics 1 OR EC137-15 Economics 1: Micro OR EC121-12 Mathematical Techniques A AND EC122-12 Statistical Techniques A AND EC125-6 Computing and Data Analysis OR EC123-12 Mathematical Techniques B AND EC124-12 Statistical Techniques B AND EC125-6 Computing and Data Analysis EC106 or EC107 for GL11 and other Maths students
- Part-year Availability for Visiting Students
- 12 CATS - Not available on a part-year basis 15 CATS - Available in the Autumn term only (1 x test – 12 CATS)
Assessment
- Assessment Method
- 12 CATS - 2 hour examination (summer (100%) 15 CATS - Coursework (20%) + 2 hour exam (summer) (80%)
- Coursework Details
- 12 CATS , 2 hour exam (summer) (80%)
- Exam Timing
- Summer
Exam Rubric
Time Allowed: 2 Hours
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Previous exam papers can be found in the University’s past papers archive. Please note that previous exam papers may not have operated under the same exam rubric or assessment weightings as those for the current academic year. The content of past papers may also be different.