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EC941: Game Theory

  • Sinem Hidir

    Module Leader
  • Jonathan Cave

    Module Lecturer
18 CATS - Department of Economics
Spring Module

Principal Aims

EC941-18 Game Theory

Principal Learning Outcomes

Subject Knowledge and Understanding: Demonstrate an understanding of concepts including Nash equilibrium, rationalizability, and apply them to a number of problems in industrial organisation and political economy. The teaching and learning methods that enable students to achieve this learning outcome are: Lectures, independent study. The summative assessment methods that measure the achievement of this learning outcome are: Examination and problem set.

Subject Knowledge and Understanding: Demonstrate solid knowledge in basic pure and applied Game Theory The teaching and learning methods that enable students to achieve this learning outcome are: Lectures and independent study The summative assessment methods that measure the achievement of this learning outcome are: Examination and problem set..

Subject Knowledge and Understanding: Understand the concept of mixed strategy and correlated equilibrium. The teaching and learning methods that enable students to achieve this learning outcome are: Lectures, independent study. The summative assessment methods that measure the achievement of this learning outcome are: Examination and problem sets.

Subject Knowledge and Understanding: Be able to apply the solution concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium to a number of problems in industrial organisation and political economy. The teaching and learning methods that enable students to achieve this learning outcome are: Lectures, independent study. The summative assessment methods that measure the achievement of this learning outcome are: Examination and problem set.

Subject Knowledge and Understanding: Demonstrate knowledge of the role of bargaining, from both an axiomatic and strategic perspective. The teaching and learning methods that enable students to achieve this learning outcome are: Lectures, independent study. The summative assessment methods that measure the achievement of this learning outcome are: Examination and problem set.

Subject Knowledge and Understanding: Understand the concept of form and repeated games and the role of dynamic aspects in analysis. The teaching and learning methods that enable students to achieve this learning outcome are: Lectures, independent study. The summative assessment methods that measure the achievement of this learning outcome are: Examination and problem set.

Syllabus

The module will typically cover the following topics: Games in Strategic Forms, Solution Concepts and Applications; Bayesian Games and Applications; Extensive Form Games and Repeated Games with Applications; Coalition Games and Applications.

Context

Optional Module
L1P6 - Year 1, L1P7 - Year 1
Pre or Co-requisites
The module demands knowledge of mathematics and statistics of the kind taught in advanced mathematics for economists (respectively, statistics for economists) type models in most undergraduate degrees in economics.

Assessment

Assessment Method
Coursework (10%) + Exam (90%)
Coursework Details
Problem sets (10%), Exam (90%)
Exam Timing
N/A

Exam Rubric

Time Allowed: 2 Hours

Read all instructions carefully- and read through the entire paper at least once before you start entering your answers.

There are TWO Sections in this paper. Answer the ONE question in Section A (50 marks) and ONE question in Section B (50 marks).

Approved pocket calculators are allowed.

You should not submit answers to more than the required number of questions. If you do, we will mark the questions in the order that they appear, up to the required number of questions in each section.

Previous exam papers can be found in the University’s past papers archive. Please note that previous exam papers may not have operated under the same exam rubric or assessment weightings as those for the current academic year. The content of past papers may also be different.

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