Activities

Title: Keeping the agents in the dark: Competing Mechanisms, Private Disclosures, and the Revelation Principle (with Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, and Alessandro Pavan).

Abstract: We study the design of market information in competing-mechanism games. We identify a new dimension, private disclosures, whereby the principals asymmetrically inform the agents of how their mechanisms operate. We show that private disclosures have two important effects. First, they can raise a principal's payoff guarantee against her competitors' threats. Second, they can support equilibrium outcomes and payoffs that cannot be supported with standard mechanisms. These results call for a novel approach to competing mechanisms, which we develop to identify a canonical game and a canonical class of equilibria, thereby establishing a new revelation principle for this class of environments.

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Title: Signaling with Plausible Deniability joint with Andrew McClellan

This is a new paper so there is no draft yet.

Title to be advised.

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