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The Identification of Rationality in Markets and Games


Conference on

​"The Identification of Rationality in Markets and Games"

(Organized by Herakles Polemarchakis, ​Willemien Kets andAviad Heifetz)

Date Speaker

Friday, March 24th

 

15.00-15.45

Jayant Ganguli (University of Essex)
Title: "The pricing effects of ambiguous private information"

15.45-16.30

Spyros Galanis (Universityof Southampton)
Title: "Dynamic Consistency and Subjective Beliefs"

16.30-17.00

Coffee Break

17.00-17.45

Miguel Ballester (University of Oxford)
Title: "Separating predicted randomness from noise"

Saturday, March 25th

 

09.45-10.30

Xinxi Song (Capital University of Economics and Business)
Title: "Testing effciency and equilibrium hypotheses in economies with public goods, using comutationally efficient algorithms"

10.30-11.00

Coffee Break

11.00-11.45

John Quah (John Hopkins University)
Title: "A revealed preference theory of monotone choice and strategic complementarity"

11.45-12.30

Federico Echenique (Caltech)
Title: "Identication in decision theory"

​12.30-14.00

​Lunch

​14.00-14.45

​Marco Mariotti (Queen Mary University of London)
Title: "​Inferring Cognitive Heterogeneity from Aggregate Choicesy"

​14.45-15.30

​Siyang Xiong (University of Bristol)
Title: "​On Identifying Higher-Order Rationality"

​15.30-16.00

Coffee Break

​16.00-16.45

​Aviad Heifetz (Open University of Israel)
Title: "​Gratification and flourishing: well-being in interaction"

​16.45-17.30

​Martin Meier (Institute for Advanced Studies)
Title: "​Title: Perfect Quasi-Perfect Equilibrium"

Sunday, March 26th

 

​09.30-10.15

​Rahul Deb (University of Toronto)
Title: "​Revealed Price Preference: Theory and Stochastic Testing"

​10.15-11.00

​Willemien Kets (Northwestern University)
Title: "​Bounded Reasoning: Rationality or Cognition"

​11.00-11.30

Coffee Break

​11.30-12.15

​Indra Ray (Cardiff University)
Testable Restrictions in strategic market games Title: "Testing effciency and equilibrium hypotheses in economies with public goods, using comutationally efficient algorithms"