Our Seminars & Workshops

Title: Expecting an Expressway, the paper is here.

Title: Bayesian Double Machine Learning for Causal Inference.

Here is a link to the pdf: https://laurayuliu.com/research/BDML_DL/BDML.pdf

Title: Credit Spreads across Firm Size and Development

Title: Kinship networks, local elections, and female representation: Evidence from voter registration data in Nepal

Title to be advised.

Two 30 minutes presentations.

Titles to be advised.

Title: We're writing what? A meta analysis on economics scholarship.

Joint work with Annika Johnson (Bristol)

Title: Quantifying the Internal Validity of Weighted Estimands (with Alexandre Poirier),

The paper is available at https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.14603.

Title: (Mis-)Matchmaker.

A current version is available at the following link: https://github.com/jgieselmann/jgie/blob/main/JMP_Mismatchmaker.pdf

Title: Learning, Fast and Slow

Abstract: As learning agents are increasingly deployed in strategic environments, the question of how to strategically choose a learning method becomes economically relevant. We introduce a meta-game in which decision makers select learning rates in continuous-time projected gradient dynamics and evaluate payoffs along the entire trajectory of the resulting inner game, not merely at its limit.

We use $2 \times 2$ games to map the strategic considerations that arise in choosing the speed of learning. Three game classes produce three qualitatively distinct phenomena. In dominance-solvable games, faster learning is unambiguously beneficial under strategic complementarity, but best responses become non-monotonic under strategic substitutability, so that both players may optimally moderate their speeds. In coordination games, the ratio of learning rates governs basins of attraction, enabling equilibrium selection but introducing payoff discontinuities that cause standard existence results to fail. In zero-sum games, each player has a strictly monotonic incentive to increase their learning rate, generating an arms race with no equilibrium when rates are unbounded. Finally, we show that near any convergent Nash equilibrium every player strictly prefers to learn faster, implying that the richer phenomena above are driven by behaviour away from equilibria.

Gender Differences in Self-Promotion and Career Advice

Title to be advised.

Title to be advised.

Title: to be advised.

Two 30minutes presentations.

Title to be advised.

Title to be advised.

Title: Signaling with Plausible Deniability joint with Andrew McClellan

This is a new paper so there is no draft yet.

Title to be advised.

Dynamics of belief networks

Title to be advised.

Title to be advised.

Title to be advised.

Title: The UK Economics Degree in 2026.

Joint with Ashley Lait (Bath)

Two 30 minutes presentations.

Titles to be advised.

Title: Prediction Intervals for Model Averaging

https://sites.bu.edu/qu/files/2025/10/Model_averaging.pdf

Details TBC

Title to be advised.

Title to be advised.

Title: An Emotional Mr Market

Title to be advised.