Title: Central Bank Account for All: Efficiency and Risk-Taking (joint with Cyril Monnet and Mariana Rojas-Breu)

Abstract: “ We analyze the effect that an interest-bearing central bank digital currency (CBDC), that competes with bank deposits as a medium of exchange, has on the banking sector. Monopolistic banks issue deposits to lend to productive investment projects. We show that CBDC leads to increased remuneration on bank deposits. CBDC promotes intermediation and increases bank profits for low to moderate interest rate levels. We characterize the optimal interest rate on CBDC and demonstrate that a higher rate leads to sub-optimal investment decisions and build-up of banking sector risk. Until investment efficiency is achieved, it is optimal for the central bank to offer the same remuneration on CBDC and reserves. If the CBDC rate is set higher than the optimal level, reserves become an important policy tool to crowd out sub-optimal investment and mitigate banking sector risk. ”

Via Zoom : Meeting ID - 858 6905 0241 Passcode: 983859