Political Economy, Labour and Development Economics
Office Hours: by email.
MRes in Economics (distinction), Warwick
MSc in Economics, TSE, France
BSc in Economics, IIT Kharagpur, India
Warwick Email: a dot bhatiya at warwick dot ac dot uk
Personal Email: apuravbhatiya at gmail dot com
1) Behavioral Voters in a Decentralized Democracy (with Vimal Balasubramaniam and Sabyasachi Das). (Submitted)
Abstract: Voters in decentralized democracies make voting decisions in multiple elections across tiers, often on the same day. Theories of decentralization implicitly presume that they have sufficient cognitive capacity to follow separate decision-making processes for different elections. We estimate the importance of cognitive constraints shaping voters’ decision-making processes, final decisions, and electoral outcomes across tiers. Consistent with the predictions of a model of behaviorally constrained voters, we show that simultaneous elections increase political parties’ salience among voters and increase straight-ticket voting without significantly affecting turnout or candidate selection. Consequently, the likelihood of the same political party winning constituencies in both tiers increases by 21.6%. We show evidence in favor of our mechanism and rule out information overload and choice fatigue as potential mechanisms. Our findings suggest that in the presence of behavioral voters, a sequential election design can facilitate more informed decision-making and consequently shape the degree of effective decentralization.
Work in Progress:
2) Do Enfranchised Immigrants Affect Political Behaviour?
Abstract: This paper analyses 3 million UK Parliament speeches between 1972 and 2011 to understand how enfranchised immigration affects the incumbent's behaviour towards existing and prospective immigrants. As a legacy of the British Empire, the immigrants in the UK from Commonwealth member countries and the Republic of Ireland have a right to vote in the national elections. In contrast, the remaining immigrants are not enfranchised. I find an increase in the share of enfranchised immigrants makes the incumbent spend more time in the Parliament talking about immigrants, address immigrants with positive emotion and vote to make future immigration more challenging. An increase in disenfranchised immigration leads to the opposite effect. The enfranchised immigrants undertake more socio-political actions (signing a petition, participating in protests, contacting a politician, etc.) than disenfranchised immigrants, which drives the incumbent's behaviour. Disenfranchised immigrants only catch up with the enfranchised immigrants after naturalisation.
3) Mobilisation for Skill Training: Experimental Evidence from India (with Bhaskar Chakravorty, Clément Imbert, and Roland Rathelot). AEA RCT Registry
4) Receptivity to Political Messages: The Role of Local Events (with Yatish Arya).