Carlos Viché

Ph.D. 1st Year Student

Email: Carlos dot Viche at warwick dot ac dot uk
Advice and feedback hours:

Please email me or use this link to schedule an appointment during my weekly Advice & Feedback hours.

Optimal Subsidy Design: We study a principal–agent model with observable actions and private costs and introduce a constructive “constraint-ironing” method mapping primitives to optimal subsidies. It provides exact tests for pooling via an effective virtual marginal cost, implies zero subsidies/rents when the default is optimal, and shows that stronger diminishing returns shrink pooling and payments, while a default farther from the principal’s preferred action expands pooling and subsidies.
Epistemic Coalition Formation: We study coalition formation when players can merge only by sharing their knowledge; with actions conditioned on posterior knowledge structures within coalitions, equilibria are characterized by the initial knowledge profile.