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Xueying Zhao

Contact details

Email: Xueying dot Zhao at warwick dot ac dot uk

Office: S0.78

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Xueying Zhao


Contracting with Heterogeneous Biases

I study the optimal contract where the principal and agent have heterogeneous beliefs and both may be biased.

Conferences & Seminars: Annual Conference of the Israel Chapter of the Game Theory Society (Tel Aviv), RES & SES Annual Conference (Glasgow), Annual Conference "Contests: Theory and Evidence" (Reading), Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications (Lisbon)

    When to Go Negative in Campaigns (joint with Sinem Hidir)

    We consider the problem of an incumbent politician who decides whether to use negative advertising against a competitor to persuade voters.

    Conferences & Seminars (*co-author): MWIP (Warwick), MET* (Manchester)