Introduction

Welcome to HMP II!
The core reading for this term will be selections from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, so you'll need to get hold of a copy of that work. (The Penguin version offers good value for money, and a (comparatively) readable translation; but it's not a problem if you use a different edition.)
In the reading list below the first few lines under each week give the core reading for each week. This is essential reading (ideally to be tackled before the relevant lecture). When doing the reading you might think about the questions I put under the core reading. If at all possible you should also try to look at some of the suggestions for further reading for each week (and they are obviously relevant when you're writing an essay and/or revising for the exam). Page references to the Critique are given in the usual way (A and B refer to the first and the second editions, both of which are produced in modern editions.)
If you're considering buying some books on Kant, my recommendation would be J. van Cleve, Problems from Kant, and P. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense.

Vacation reading: core reading for week 1 plus G.Dicker, Kant's Theory of Knowledge ch 1 (see link under week 1).

Handouts

Week 1
week 2
Week 3
Week 4
Week 5
Week 7
Week 8
Week 9
Week 10

Recordings

Recordings of the lectures are available here.

Assessment

This module will be assessed in the following way:
• Two 1,500-word essays (one per term, worth 15% of the module in total)
• 3 hour exam (worth 85% of the module)

Questions for the assessed essay for term 2:

1. Why does Kant find the possibility of a priori knowledge of the axioms of Euclidian geometry puzzling? How does his solution to the putative puzzle work?

2. How should we understand Kant’s claim that objects in space are ‘mere appearances’?

3. Explain the aim and the argument (or one of the arguments) of the ‘transcendental deduction of the categories'.

4. What does Kant mean by saying that ‘an object is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united’? (B 138)

5. Does C. I. Lewis’s question ‘Did the Sage of Königsberg have no dreams?’ point to a serious flaw in the argument of the 'transcendental deduction'?

6. Explain Kant’s account of self-awareness in the ‘transcendental deduction’.

Core Reading, Study Questions, and Further Reading

Week 1: Metaphysics
Preface to Second Edition (esp. B xiv – B xxxi) and Introduction to Second Edition B 1 – B 30

What are a priori synthetic judgements, and why does their possibility constitute a philosophical problem? What is the point of Kant’s allusion to the Copernican revolution in astronomy (B xvi)?

Further reading
G. Dicker, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge, ch. 1
Van Cleve, Problems from Kant ch. 2
Strawson, The Bounds of Sense part 1 (for a very helpful outline of the project of the Critique).
L. Anderson, 'Containment Analyticity and Kant's Problem of Synthetic Judgement' (ch. 1 of his The Poverty of Conceptual Truth)

Week 2: Space
Transcendental Aesthetic: A 19/B 33 – B 73 (esp. §§ 1-3, 8).
J. van Cleve, Problems from Kant, ch. 1 and 3 (sections A & B)

What does Kant mean by saying that space is ‘nothing but the form of all appearances of outer sense’ (A 26/B 42). How does he argue for this theory? How is the theory supposed to explain the possibility of geometrical knowledge?

Further reading
Dicker, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge, ch. 2
Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, part 2, ch. I D.
D. Warren, 'Kant and the Apriority of Space'

On Transcendental Idealism
Van Cleve, Problems from Kant, chs 1 & 10
H.Allison, 'Transcendental idealism: A retrospective', in his Idealism and Freedom, ch. 1
R.M.Adams, 'Things in Themselves', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997)
L. Allais, 'Kant's Idealism and the Secondary Quality Analogy', Journal of the History of Philosophy 45, 2007 Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, chs. 1 & 2
Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, Parts 1, 2 (chapter 1) and 4
R. Langton, Kantian Humility esp. chs 1-3

On the Argument from Geometry
*Strawson, Bounds of Sense part 2/I and part 5
*Van Cleve, Problems from Kant, ch 3

On the 'neglected alternative'
L. Falkenstein, 'Kant's argument for the non-spatiotemporality of things in themselves'
J. van Cleve, Problems from Kant, pp. 36-7

Week 3:The Categories
Introduction to the transcendental logic (esp. sections I and II) and ‘The clue to the discovery..’: A 50/B 74ff – A 82/B 108
On the project of the transcendental deduction: §§ 13 & 14 (A 84/B 116 – B 129)

How should we understand Kant’s remark that ‘intuitions without concepts are blind’ (A 51/B 75)? What does it mean for a concept to have an ‘a priori origin’ in pure understanding? Explain and assess Kant’s strategy for establishing that we have such concepts, and for identifying them.

Further reading
Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, pp. 72-89
Dicker, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge, ch. 3
Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, Part 2, ch. 2, sections 1-4
H. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, chs. 4 & 6
J. Bennett, Kant’s Analytic, chs. 6 & 7

Week 4: Objectivity
A 84/B 116 – A 106 [the A version is printed at the bottom of the page in the Penguin edition]
Lewis White Beck, 'Did the Sage of Königsberg have no dreams?'
See also Dicker, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge, ch. 4

What is the project of the transcendental deduction? How is the idea that the categories make experience possible (A 94/B 126) to be understood? How does this idea relate to the issue of whether the categories have ‘objective validity’?

Further reading
R. George, 'Kant's Sensationism'
H. GInsborg, 'Was Kant a NonConceptualist'?
J. Bennett, Kant’s Analytic, sections 28-30, 32-34
Van Cleve, Problems from Kant, ch. 7
H. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, ch. 7
Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, Part 2, ch. 2
K. Ameriks, ’Kant’s tr. ded. as a regressive argument’, in P. Kitcher (ed.), Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason
P. Guyer, ‘The transcendental deduction’, in P. Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Kant
Strawson, ‘Imagination and Perception’, in his Freedom and Resentment

Week 5: Self-Awareness
A 106 - A 130 B 130-138
What does Kant mean by the 'transcendental unity of apperception'? What is its role in the transcendental deduction?

Further reading
D. Pereboom, 'Kant's metaphysical and transcendental deductions', in G. Bird (ed.), A Companion to Kant
P. Kitcher, ‘Kant’s Cognitive Self’, in P. Kitcher (ed.), Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason
H. Allison, ‘Autonomy and Spontaneity in Kant’s Conception of the Self’, in his Idealism and Freedom
G. Hatfield, ‘Empirical, rational and transcendental psychology’, in P. Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Kant
J. Van Cleve, Problems from Kant, ch. 11

Week 7: Substance
Background: The schematism: A 137/B 176 – A 147/B 187
General discussion of the Analogies of experience: A 176/B 218 – A 181/B 224
Kant's discussion of substance in the First Analogy: A 182/B 224 – A 189/B 232

What is a schema, and why does Kant insist the categories need schemata? What's the significance of the 'principle of permanence of substance'? How does Kant argue for the principle?

Further reading
Bennett, Kant's Analytic ch. 13
Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, part 2, ch. III, sections 1 – 2 J.
Bennett, Kant’s Analytic ch. 10
Dicker, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge, ch. 5.1 – 5.5, ch. 6, and appendix
H. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, ch. 8 & 9 R.
Langton, Kantian Humility, ch. 3 J.
van Cleve, Problems from Kant, ch. 8

Week 8: Causation
Second Analogy: A 189/B 232 – A 211/B 256
Explain and assess Strawson’s charge that Kant’s argument in the Second Analogy involves a gross non-sequitur.

Further Reading 
Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, part 2, ch. III, sections 4 – 5
B. Longuenesse, 'Kant on Causality: What was he trying to prove?'
Dicker, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge, ch. 7
J. Bennett, Kant’s Analytic, ch. 15
M. Friedman, ‘Causal laws and the foundation of natural science‘, in P. Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Kant
H. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, ch. 10
J. Van Cleve, Problems from Kant, ch. 9

Week 9: Scepticism
The Refutation of Idealism: B 274 – B 279 (and B xxxix note)

How successful is the argument of the Refutation in putting an end to the ‘scandal to philosophy, and to human reason in general, that we should have to accept the existence of things outside us (..) merely on trust'? (B xxxix note)

Further reading:
Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, part 2, ch. III, sections 1 – 3
J. Bennett, Kant’s Analytic chs. 14
Dicker, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge, ch. 9
Ewing, A Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 176-186

Week 10: Freedom

The Antinomy of Pure Reason: A 405/B 423ff
We’ll focus on the Third Antinomy: A 444/B 472 – A 451/B 479
and its solution: A 532/B 560 – A 559/B 587

Does Kant take freedom to be compatible with determinism? What does he mean by the (‘empirical’ or ‘intelligible’) character of a cause? Does he think we do in fact have a free will?

Further reading
A. Wood, ‘Kant’s compatibilism’, in P. Kitcher (ed.), Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason
A. Reath, 'Kant's Critical Account of Freedom' 
J. Bennett, Kant’s Dialectic, ch. 10
H. Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, part 1 J. Schneewind, ‘Autonomy, obligation and virtue: an overview of Kant’s moral philosophy’, in P. Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Kant