TRUTH AND NORMATIVITY
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY WORKSHOP ON THE FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE OF DISCOURSE
28 MAY 2009
SOCIAL STUDIES BUILDING, S0.18
A JOINT IAS-PHILOSOPHY EVENT
Truth is one kind of correctness, and as such is a normative concept: in essence, we should make true claims. It is within discourse that we attempt to fulfil this obligation, by making, challenging and justifying claims to truth. However, discourse is governed by more obligations than this: it has a complex normative structure. The normative character of truth cannot be properly grasped independently of its place within this framework. As such, a proper understanding of truth requires an inquiry into the fundamental norms governing discourse.
Questions to be discussed include:
- In what sense is truth a kind of correctness?
- What are fundamental norms, and how do they differ from other norms?
- What is the status of discourse about fundamental norms?
- In what sense are claims about norms themselves true?
- Do the norms of discourse have ethical or political implications?
- What is the relation between the ideal norms of discourse and real discursive practices?
- Alexander Davies (Linguistics and Philosophy, King’s College London)
- Simon Susen (Sociology, Newcastle)
- Daniel Whiting (Philosophy, Southampton)
- Pete Wolfendale (Philosophy, Warwick)
10.30-11.45 Pete Wolfendale, "Truth, Correctness and Normativity"
11.45-12.00 Coffee Break
12.00-13.15 Simon Susen, "The Transcendental Status of Validity Claims in Habermas' Universal Pragmatics"
14.15-15.30 Daniel Whiting, "Should I believe the truth?"
15.30-15.45 Coffee Break
15.45-17.00 Alexander Davies, "Objectivity and Openness"
* ORGANIZED BY: Ioannis Trisokkas (IAS, Philosophy) & Pete Wolfendale (Philosophy) *