Abstract:

In this talk Mert will examine two interpretations of Hegel in relation to the contemporary modal metaphysics. Firstly, Robert Brandom puts forward modal expressivism and modal realism in order to overcome modal scepticism. He places Hegelian term determinateness in the centre of his theories, as a non-modal explanatory tool, which makes explicit the implicit modal connotations in the empirical vocabulary. Brandom suggests considering Hegel on the same line with Lewis and Stalnaker whose approaches to modality require non-modal explanatory tools to define modal concepts, such as possible worlds for Lewis and propositions for Stalnaker. Secondly, Paul Redding proposes that since Hegel defines actuality as consisting possibility within itself, Hegel's position in modal metaphysics may be well taken similar to Stalnaker's vision of modal actualism, which defines possibilities as sets of consistent propositions contained within actuality. Mert argues that these two interpretations, reconciling Hegel with Lewis and Stalnaker, miss to illuminate Hegel's distinctive approach to modality, namely, the immanent derivation of modal concepts. By examining the formal elements of Hegel's treatment of modality, Mert demonstrates that Hegel's immanent critique of modality is capable of overcoming sceptical worries by deriving modal concepts from one to another without a need of modally unexplainable tools.