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WMA Graduate Research Seminar, 2023/2024

Research seminar run in conjunction with the WMA Research Centre and open to all philosophy postgraduate students.
If you would like to receive email notifications about the seminar, please email h dot lerman at warwick dot ac dot uk
 
In Summer Term the seminar will take place on Wednesdays, weeks 4-7 and 9, at 14:00-16:00, in room S1.39. (WEek 8's session will be scheduled shortly)
 

In preparation for MindGrad we will dedicate the first 3 sessions to 3 papers by Matt Soteriou and the following 3 session to background reading for Lea Salje's talk.

Week 4: Matt Soteriou, ‘Determining the Future’ [pdf]

Week 5: Matt Soteriou, ‘The past made present: Mental time travel in episodic recollection’ [pdf]

Week 6: Matt Soteriou, ‘Waking Up and Being Conscious' [link]

Week 7: Eli Alshanetsky, Articulating a Thought, Introduction [link] and Chapter 2 'A Puzzle' [link]

Week 8: TBA

Week 9: Alex Byrne, TBA

 

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PG Work in Progress Seminar

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Location: S2.77/MS Teams

This week's PG WiP Seminar will be led by Chris Hall (MA)

 

Title: "Debunker or Global Skeptic: Considering the Distinctiveness of Evolutionary Debunking Arguments "

Thursday March 2nd 2023

5pm in S2.77 and on TeamsLink opens in a new window.

 

Everyone welcome!

 

Abstract:

For the moral realist, both evolutionary debunking arguments and global skepticism present a challenge to the possibility of moral knowledge. Debunkers typically see their challenge as distinct from broader forms of skepticism, the thought being that they target moral knowledge specifically and depend on a particular empirical claim about the evolutionary origins of our moral beliefs. The importance of this distinctiveness is illustrated by the fact that a common response to the debunker is to suggest that the argument leads to global skepticism. In this paper, I examine the relationship between evolutionary debunking arguments and global skepticism. I argue that it is essential to the debunker’s project to avoid committing to a broader skepticism, and consider various ways in which this commitment can occur. I claim that avoiding this requires formulating the debunking argument in a specific way. A number of evolutionary debunking arguments fall short on this front. To illustrate the problem, I consider a recent paper from Isserow (2019) which presents an evolutionary debunking argument based on our apparent ignorance of how evolution shaped our moral beliefs. On my account, Isserow’s argument leads to global skepticism. Moreover, Isserow’s argument is instructive when considering both whether other debunking arguments do the same and how the problem can be avoided.

Teams link:

https://teams.microsoft.com/l/meetup-join/19%3aa49e6af9675349fda02fee164134326a%40thread.tacv2/1677520801646?context=%7b%22Tid%22%3a%2209bacfbd-47ef-4465-9265-3546f2eaf6bc%22%2c%22Oid%22%3a%22863fe7ea-b111-4632-8afe-04f610ff4c1e%22%7d

 

 

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