Alessandro Salice (University College Cork) Primitive Promises

Programme

Thursday 26^th September

10.30 – 12.00

Maria Rosa Antognazza (KCL) ‘Knowledge and the first person’

12.00 – 1.30

Ioannis Evrigenis (Tufts) ‘The Fly on the axletree: Hobbes on self-knowledge and judgment’

2.30 – 4.00

Mark Philp (Warwick) ‘Godwin and Wollstonecraft: deliberation and self-knowledge '

4.30 – 6.00

Ursula Renz (Klagenfurt/Warwick) ‘Rousseau's solution to a Rousseauean problem’

7.15 Dinner (Radcliffe house)

Friday 27^th September

9.00 – 10.30

Mario De Caro (Roma Tre/Tufts) ‘Machiavelli's naturalism’

10.30 – 12.00

Guy Longworth (Warwick) ‘Descartes on how the mind is better known than the body’

12.00 – 1.15

Johannes Roessler (Warwick) ‘Judgement and self-understanding in Montaigne’s Essays’

Expression and Self-knowledge

Warwick University, Friday 4^th October 2019

Humanities H0.03

Programme

11.00 – 12.30
Lucy Campbell (Warwick)
‘Self-knowledge: expression without expressivism’

12.30 – 2.00

Dorit Bar-On (University of Connecticut)
‘No ‘How’ Privileged Self-Knowledge’

3.00 – 4.30

Cristina Borgoni (Bayreuth University)

‘Primitive forms of first-person authority and expressive capacities’

Reading: Soteriou, M. 'Cartesian Reflections on the Autonomy of the Mental'. [pdf]

Readings:

Week 2: Soteriou, M. 'Cartesian Reflections on the Autonomy of the Mental'. [ pdf]

Week 3: Eilan, N. 'On the Paradox of Gestalt Switches: Wittgenstein’s Response to Kohler'. [ pdf]

Week 5: Roessler, J. 'The Silence of Self-Knowledge'. [pdf]

Week 7: Campbell, J. 'Sense, Reference and Selective Attention' [pdf]

Readings:

Week 2: Soteriou, M. 'Cartesian Reflections on the Autonomy of the Mental'. [ pdf]

Week 3: Eilan, N. 'On the Paradox of Gestalt Switches: Wittgenstein’s Response to Kohler'. [ pdf]

Week 5: Roessler, J. 'The Silence of Self-Knowledge'. [pdf]

Week 7: Campbell, J. 'Sense, Reference and Selective Attention' [pdf]

Readings:

Week 2: Soteriou, M. 'Cartesian Reflections on the Autonomy of the Mental'. [ pdf]

Week 3: Eilan, N. 'On the Paradox of Gestalt Switches: Wittgenstein’s Response to Kohler'. [ pdf]

Week 5: Roessler, J. 'The Silence of Self-Knowledge'. [pdf]

Week 7: Campbell, J. 'Sense, Reference and Selective Attention' [pdf]

The forum will take place at LSE, London. The event is free and does not require registration.

CFA details and updates about the event will be published here: https://lwmindforum.wordpress.com/.

For further info, email: m.corrado@warwick.ac.uk

MINDGRAD 2019: OURSELVES AND OTHERS

Warwick Graduate Conference in the Philosophy of Mind

7th-8th December 2019, University of Warwick (UK)

Invited speakers:
Dr Stina Bäckström - Södertörn University
Professor Matthew Boyle - University of Chicago
Professor Jane Heal - University of Cambridge
Dr Joel Smith - University of Manchester

Details TBC

First saying, then believing: the pragmatic roots of folk psychology

Workshop with David Hunter on his forthcoming book On being a believer.

Further info TBA

Contact: Johannes Roessler

Philosophy and Empirical Perspectives

Interdisciplinary conference

Speakers:
Rachel Dudley, Kati Farkas, John Hyman (tbc), Guy Longworth, Eva Rafetseder, Paul Silva, and Simon Wimmer.

Katalin Farkas, CEU

The Cultural Origins of Human Mind-Reading

Text: 'Truth and Truthfulness' by Bernard Williams (2002)

Speaker: Richard Moore

The Communicative Foundations of Propositional Attitude Psychology

Abstract:

According to a widely held dogma, a developed propositional attitude psychology is a prerequisite of attributing communicative intent, and so a developmental prerequisite of natural language acquisition. This view is difficult to reconcile with developmental evidence, which shows not only that children do not develop propositional attitudes until they are four years old (e.g. Rakoczy 2017), but also that this development is parasitic upon natural language acquisition (de Villiers & de Villers 2000; Lohmann & Tomasello 2003; Low 2010), and that it recruits brain regions that do not exist in infancy (Grosse-Wiesmann et al. 2017). Against the received view, and building on my work on minimally Gricean communication (Moore 2017a), I sketch a developmental trajectory to show how propositional attitude psychology could be both invented and learned through communicative interaction. I finish by considering the conditions in which cultural tools for mental state representation might first have been developed in human history; and the extent to which our early human ancestors might have lacked propositional attitudes. The goal of the paper will not be to show that strong nativism about human mindreading must be false, but that there is no reason to take it for granted in considering the origins of the modern human mind.

Text: 'Truth and Truthfulness' by Bernard Williams (2002)