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Mon 23 Sep, '19
-
Talk: Primitive Promises

Alessandro Salice (University College Cork) Primitive Promises

Thu 26 Sep, '19 - Fri 27 Sep, '19
All-day
Self-knowledge and judgement in early modern philosophy
Cowling room (Social Sciences S2.77)

Runs from Thursday, September 26 to Friday, September 27.

Programme

Thursday 26th September

10.30 – 12.00

Maria Rosa Antognazza (KCL) ‘Knowledge and the first person’

12.00 – 1.30

Ioannis Evrigenis (Tufts) ‘The Fly on the axletree: Hobbes on self-knowledge and judgment’

2.30 – 4.00

Mark Philp (Warwick) ‘Godwin and Wollstonecraft: deliberation and self-knowledge '

4.30 – 6.00

Ursula Renz (Klagenfurt/Warwick) ‘Rousseau's solution to a Rousseauean problem’

7.15 Dinner (Radcliffe house)

Friday 27th September

9.00 – 10.30

Mario De Caro (Roma Tre/Tufts) ‘Machiavelli's naturalism’

10.30 – 12.00

Guy Longworth (Warwick) ‘Descartes on how the mind is better known than the body’

12.00 – 1.15

Johannes Roessler (Warwick) ‘Judgement and self-understanding in Montaigne’s Essays’

Fri 4 Oct, '19
Workshop on Expression and Self-Knowledge with Dorit Bar-On and Lucy Campbell

Expression and Self-knowledge

Warwick University, Friday 4th October 2019

Humanities H0.03

Programme

11.00 – 12.30
Lucy Campbell (Warwick)
‘Self-knowledge: expression without expressivism’

12.30 – 2.00

Dorit Bar-On (University of Connecticut)
‘No ‘How’ Privileged Self-Knowledge’

3.00 – 4.30

Cristina Borgoni (Bayreuth University)

‘Primitive forms of first-person authority and expressive capacities’

Mon 7 Oct, '19
-
WMA Graduate Research Seminar
H4.22/4

Reading: Soteriou, M. 'Cartesian Reflections on the Autonomy of the Mental'. [pdf]

Mon 14 Oct, '19
-
WMA Graduate Research Seminar
H4.22/4.

Readings:

Week 2: Soteriou, M. 'Cartesian Reflections on the Autonomy of the Mental'. [ pdf]

Week 3: Eilan, N. 'On the Paradox of Gestalt Switches: Wittgenstein’s Response to Kohler'. [ pdf]

Week 5: Roessler, J. 'The Silence of Self-Knowledge'. [pdf]

Week 7: Campbell, J. 'Sense, Reference and Selective Attention' [pdf]

Mon 28 Oct, '19
-
WMA Graduate Research Seminar
H4.22/4.

Readings:

Week 2: Soteriou, M. 'Cartesian Reflections on the Autonomy of the Mental'. [ pdf]

Week 3: Eilan, N. 'On the Paradox of Gestalt Switches: Wittgenstein’s Response to Kohler'. [ pdf]

Week 5: Roessler, J. 'The Silence of Self-Knowledge'. [pdf]

Week 7: Campbell, J. 'Sense, Reference and Selective Attention' [pdf]

Mon 11 Nov, '19
-
WMA Graduate Research Seminar
H4.22/4.

Readings:

Week 2: Soteriou, M. 'Cartesian Reflections on the Autonomy of the Mental'. [ pdf]

Week 3: Eilan, N. 'On the Paradox of Gestalt Switches: Wittgenstein’s Response to Kohler'. [ pdf]

Week 5: Roessler, J. 'The Silence of Self-Knowledge'. [pdf]

Week 7: Campbell, J. 'Sense, Reference and Selective Attention' [pdf]

Mon 25 Nov, '19
-
WMA graduate research seminar
S2.64
Thu 28 Nov, '19
London-Warwick Mind Forum: London

The forum will take place at LSE, London. The event is free and does not require registration.

CFA details and updates about the event will be published here: https://lwmindforum.wordpress.com/.

For further info, email: m.corrado@warwick.ac.uk

Sat 7 Dec, '19 - Sun 8 Dec, '19
10am - 11am
MindGrad 2019
MS.03

Runs from Saturday, December 07 to Sunday, December 08.

MINDGRAD 2019: OURSELVES AND OTHERS

Warwick Graduate Conference in the Philosophy of Mind

7th-8th December 2019, University of Warwick (UK)

Invited speakers:
Dr Stina Bäckström - Södertörn University
Professor Matthew Boyle - University of Chicago
Professor Jane Heal - University of Cambridge
Dr Joel Smith - University of Manchester

Wed 8 Jan, '20
-
WMA Graduate Research Seminar - Reading Michael Ayers' Knowing and Seeing
S1.39
Wed 29 Jan, '20
-
WMA Graduate Research Seminar - Reading Michael Ayers' Knowing and Seeing
S1.39
Wed 19 Feb, '20
-
CANCELLED: WMA Graduate Research Seminar - Reading Michael Ayers' Knowing and Seeing
S1.50.
Wed 4 Mar, '20
-
WMA Graduate Research Seminar - Reading Michael Ayers' Knowing and Seeing
S1.39
Mon 9 Mar, '20
Workshop with Richard Moore

Details TBC

Thu 12 Mar, '20
-
CANCELLED: Knowledge and Understanding Seminar

Speaker: M.M. McCabe (KCL)

Title: 'Knowing, Saying and the Value of Understanding: Plato's Account of Epistemic Virtue'

Wed 18 Mar, '20
-
CANCELLED: Bart Geurts: First saying, then believing
First saying, then believing: the pragmatic roots of folk psychology
Bart Geurts, Nijmegen
Cowling room, 18th March, 3 pm
Tue 24 Mar, '20
POSTPONED / Enquiry Workshop
S2.81
Mon 30 Mar, '20
CANCELLED: On being a Believer: Workshop with David Hunter

Workshop with David Hunter on his forthcoming book On being a believer.

Further info TBA

Contact: Johannes Roessler

Tue 14 Apr, '20 - Wed 15 Apr, '20
All-day
CANCELLED: Knowledge and Belief Conference
MS.04, Zeeman Building, University of Warwick

Runs from Tuesday, April 14 to Wednesday, April 15.

Philosophy and Empirical Perspectives

Interdisciplinary conference

Speakers:
Rachel Dudley, Kati Farkas, John Hyman (tbc), Guy Longworth, Eva Rafetseder, Paul Silva, and Simon Wimmer.

Thu 16 Apr, '20
-
CANCELLED: Katalin Farkas: The Unity of Knowledge

Katalin Farkas, CEU

16th April 2020, Cowling Room
Contact: Lucy Campbell
Thu 23 Apr, '20
-
Knowledge and Understanding Seminar
By Zoom

Speaker: Michael Hannon (Nottingham)

Title: 'Empathetic Understanding in Politics'

Mike will present his paper "Empathetic Understanding in Politics". ​
Abstract: ​
"Epistemic democracy is standardly characterized in terms of “aiming at truth”. This presupposes a veritistic conception of epistemic value, according to which truth is the fundamental epistemic goal. I will raise two objections to the standard (veritistic) account of epistemic democracy, focusing specifically on deliberative democracy. I then propose a version of deliberative democracy that is grounded in non-veritistic epistemic goals. In particular, I argue that deliberation is valuable because it facilitates empathetic understanding. I claim that empathetic understanding is an epistemic good that doesn’t have truth as its primary goal." ​
Mike will talk for around 30 minutes and will be followed by a Q&A session after a quick break. The whole session will probably run a bit shorter than usual, ending at approximately 4.30pm. ​
Mon 27 Apr, '20
-
CANCELLED: Conference: The Cultural Origins of Human Mind-Reading

The Cultural Origins of Human Mind-Reading
27th April 2020
Contact: Richard Moore
Speakers: Richard Moore, Cecilia Heyes, Paula Rubio Fernandez, Steve Butterfill.
Thu 30 Apr, '20
-
Knowledge and Understanding Seminar
By Zoom

Speaker: Naomi Eilan (Warwick)

Title: 'Knowing and Understanding Other People'

Abstract​
What is to know someone? The question is rarely considered as a separate issue in epistemology, though it arises in many guises in everyday life. Grammatically, it is a form of objectual or relational knowledge. But is this grammar just skin deep? In the first part of the talk I lay out what I take to be fairly common sense characterisations of our knowledge of people, all of which suggest that is has a sui generis form not shared with any other kinds of knowledge, including other kinds of objectual knowledge. In the second part I gesture very briefly at the potential implications of putting such knowledge centre stage when considering other issues, such as: the kind of understanding we employ when thinking about people; the relation between knowledge and the emotions, knowledge and ethics, and self-knowledge. ​
Wed 6 May, '20
-
Commitment lab meeting
Contact: Matt Chennels
Thu 7 May, '20
-
Knowledge and Understanding Seminar: All Students Welcome
By Zoom

Speaker: David Bather Woods (Warwick)

Title: 'The World as One: Learning from Solitude with Schopenhauer'

Abstract

Schopenhauer praises solitude and derides sociability. An active mind requires solitude, and tolerance of solitude requires an active mind, thus a capacity for solitude is an intellectual virtue, he reasons. The need for sociability, a sign of an inactive mind, is solitude’s opposite vice. Time has not been kind to this view. It is now widely accepted, and has scarcely been more apparent, that human beings are ineluctably social creatures, and better off that way. Worse still, Schopenhauer’s praise of solitude jars with his praise of worldliness as another intellectual virtue. Thinkers should learn from experience of the world, he believes; but can thinkers be both worldly and solitary? How can they know more about the world by getting out in it less? I propose a reading of Schopenhauer’s praise of the intellectual virtue of solitude which is neither insensitive to the patent human need for sociability, nor inconsistent with the intellectual virtue of worldliness.

Fri 8 May, '20
-
The Communicative Mind reading group
Contact: Richard Moore

 

Fri 8 May, '20
-
Truth and Truthfulness Webinar: Chapter 2: Geneology - All Students Welcome
By Zoom

Text: 'Truth and Truthfulness' by Bernard Williams (2002)

Mon 11 May, '20
-
WMA WIP Daniel Vanello "Moral understanding, moral individuality, and the irreplaceability of the individual” via Teams
Daniel Vanello: "Moral understanding, moral individuality, and the irreplaceability of the individual”

Abstract: The paper tackles a fundamental puzzle about our moral understanding. On the one hand, we take it as a requirement of our moral understanding that its content be generalisable. On the other hand, we give moral significance to particular relationships we enjoy only with a select few. The puzzle has been widely discussed in debates between impartialists and partialists, in particular regarding the status of special obligations. Although I tackle the puzzle of moral understanding by remaining within a framework familiar to the debate between impartialists and partialists, I focus on a less discussed topic: moral individuality and the irreplaceability of the individual. To this effect, I set up a debate between Bernard Williams, David Velleman and Raimond Gaita. I argue that both Williams and Velleman fail to give an account of the irreplaceability of the individual. I then argue that Gaita’s work allows us to diagnose both Williams’ and Velleman’s failure. I also argue that it provides us with an understanding of the irreplaceability of the individual and of moral individuality that explains both why we give special moral significance to our particular relationships and that at the same time is generalisable, thus furthering our understanding of the puzzle.

Contact: Lucy Campbell

Wed 13 May, '20
-
Commitment lab meeting
Contact: Matt Chennels

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