Our Seminars & Workshops

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Daniel Jaar is visiting the department for one week.

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Title: Quasi-Bayesian Hierarchical Models: Aggregating evidence across studies.

My co-author is Thomas Glinnan PHD LSE.

Title: Occupational Dynasties and Development (coauthored with Sid George and Martin Shu)

Title: Revisiting Shapley-Shubik (1971) via Nash (1953) . This work is joint with Mihai Manea.

 Abstract: The set of stable payoffs in assignment games is often large.

We seek to refine this set in the spirit of the Nash (1953) program, where an idealized (or “cooperative”)

solution is also supported by a non-cooperative mechanism whose Nash equilibria (possibly refined as in Nash (1953))

yield outcomes that exactly mirror the idealized solution. These dual perspectives jointly reinforce and validate

one another.

Title: Rationality and Cooperation

Abstract: How does rationality shape cooperation in strategic settings? We study this question in a laboratory experiment that links individual rationality, measured by consistency with the generalized axiom of revealed preference, to behaviour in an indefinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Participants are grouped by pre-measured rationality before interacting repeatedly. We find that higher rationality substantially increases cooperation and payoffs. This effect operates through a novel mechanism: more rational individuals make fewer implementation errors when executing their intended strategies, thereby sustaining cooperative outcomes. By contrast, higher cognitive ability also promotes cooperation and higher payoffs, but through a distinct channel—reducing strategic errors in responding optimally to others’ actions. Our results provide the first experimental evidence linking rationality to cooperation via decision-making errors, and clarify the distinct roles of rationality and intelligence in shaping strategic behaviour. Together, the findings offer a unified account of how cognitive constraints affect cooperation in repeated games.

Authors: Ali Moghaddasi Kelishomi, Daniel Sgroi, and Andis Sofianos

Details TBC

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Fairness views about the International Distribution of Climate Change Costs (With Johanna Kober)

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Networks in prison: An experiment with inmates

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