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Events

Event Overview

  • Wed27May

    Econometrics Seminar - Federico Ciliberto (Virginia)

    2:00pm - 3:30pm, S0.13
  • Wed27May

    CRETA Seminar - Rohit Lamba (Cornell)

    4:00pm - 5:30pm, S2.79

    Title: Accountability without Saints

    Abstract: Can the power to replace leaders sustain good governance when no leader is intrinsically motivated? I study a dynamic accountability game in which an evaluator retains or replaces an incumbent based on public performance reports. When at least one type governs well by nature, Bayesian learning selects for good leaders. Without such "saints," accountability collapses: accumulated trust erodes the evaluator's willingness to replace; career incentives vanish, and no coherent equilibrium sustains effort. Committed periodic review, that is, a fixed rule that holds every incumbent to the same standard regardless of reputation, restores positive governance by preserving career incentives across terms. The governance frontier, the best achievable governance under such rules, falls short of what saints achieve and is characterized in closed form. The impossibility extends beyond the baseline finite-signal model to Gaussian signals, suggesting the trust trap is a general feature of Bayesian accountability.

  • Thu28May

    Political Economy Seminar - Apurav Bhatiya (Birmingham)

    11:15am - 12:30pm, S0.13

    Title to be advised.

  • Thu28May

    MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - PhD Mock Job Talk - Youngji Sohn (PGR)

    1:00pm - 2:30pm, S2.79

    Title: Refining Berk Nash Equilibrium (tentative)

  • Thu28May

    DR@W Forum: Davide Pace (LMU)

    2:30pm - 3:45pm, WBS 1.007

    The economic consequences of memory limitations (With Taisuke Imai)

  • Tue02Jun

    MIEW (Macro/International Economics Workshop) - to be advised

    12:00pm - 1:00pm, S0.08

    To be advised

  • Tue02Jun

    CWIP (CAGE Work in Progress) - Devesh Rustagi (Warwick)

    1:00pm - 2:00pm, S0.08

    Title to be advised.

  • Tue02Jun

    Applied & Development Economics Seminar - Zachary Bleemer (Princeton)

    2:15pm - 3:30pm,

    Title: Changes in the College Mobility Pipeline Since 1900 (joint with Sarah Quincy)

    Zachary will present an updated version of this study https://www.nber.org/papers/w33797

  • Tue05May

    MIEW (Macro/International Economics Workshop) - Emanuele Savini and Andrea Guerrieri D'Amati (PGRs)

    11:00am - 1:00pm, S2.79

    There will be two 1hr presentations, titles are as follows:

    i) Exchange Rates and the ‘Fed Information Effect - Emanuele Savini

    ii) An Emotional Mr. Market: Media Emotions and the Time-Varying Price of Risk - Andrea Guerrieri D'Amati

  • Tue05May

    CWIP (CAGE Work in Progress) Workshop - Damiano Turchet (Warwick)

    1:00pm - 2:00pm, S2.79

    Title: Disadvantage and Distorted Beliefs (joint with P Dalton and S Ghosal).

    Abstract: We develop a dynamic theory of how structural disadvantage shapes outcomes through the interaction of cognitive constraints and psychological determinants of efforts. We relate locus of control, self-efficacy, and grit to perceived returns to effort, and study aspirations in an extension. Individuals differ in exogenous circumstances, such as class, caste, race, gender, or inherited wealth, which affect the payoff or likelihood of success from effort. Beliefs about returns to effort evolve only through effort itself. Disadvantage raises the belief threshold required to justify effort, making disadvantaged individuals more likely to stop trying before learning their true returns. External locus of control, low self-efficacy, and weak grit can therefore emerge endogenously. We distinguish standard traps, which arise even for farsighted agents, from behavioral traps, which arise under partial myopia. Cash transfers, subsidies, and access policies lower effort thresholds; psychological, role-model, and grit interventions sustain beliefs.

  • Tue05May

    Applied & Development Economics Seminar - Siwan Anderson (UBC)

    2:15pm - 3:30pm, S2.79

    Title: The Persistence of Female Political Power in Africa (by Siwan Anderson, Sophia Du Plessis, Sahar Parsa, and James A. Robinson)

    Abstract: Research on female political representation has tended to overlook the traditional role of women as leaders across many societies. Our study aims to address this gap by investigating the enduring influence of historical female political leadership on contemporary formal political representation in Africa. We test for this persistence by compiling two original datasets: one detailing female political leadership in precolonial societies and another on current female representation in local elections. Our findings indicate that ethnic groups historically allowing women in leadership roles in politics do tend to have a higher proportion of elected female representatives in today's formal local political institutions. We also observe that institutional, rather than economic, factors significantly shape the traditional political influence of women. Moreover, in accordance with historical accounts, we uncover evidence of a reversal of female political power due to institutional changes enforced by colonial powers.

  • Wed06May

    Econometrics Seminar - Antonio Galvao (Michigan State)

    11:15am - 12:30pm, S0.18

    Title: Model Averaging in Semiparametric Estimation of Quantile Treatment Effects.

    Please find the paper here: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5274615

  • Wed06May

    CRETA Seminar - Xiaosheng Mu (Princeton)

    4:00pm - 5:30pm, S2.79

    Title: Privacy Preserving Auctions (with Ran Eilat and Kfir Eliaz)

    Abstract: In many acution settings the auctioneer must disclose the identity of the winner and the price he pays. We characterize the auction that minimizes the winner's privacy loss among those that maximize total surplus or the seller's revenue, and are strategy-proof. Privacy loss is measured with respect to what an outside observer learns from the disclosed price, and is quantified by the mutual information between the price and the winner's willingness to pay. When only interim individual-rationality is required, the most privacy preserving auction involves stochastic ex-post payments. Under ex-post individual rationality, and assuming the bidders' type distribution exhibits a monotone hazard rate, privacy loss is minimized by the second-price auction with deterministic payments.

  • Thu07May

    PEPE (Political Economy & Public Economics) Seminar - Gustavo Bobonis (Toronto)

    11:15am - 12:30pm, S2.79

    Title: Improving Judicial Protection in Intimate Partner Violence Cases: The Role of Specialized Courts and Judges (with Carolina Arteaga, Paola Salardi, and Dario Toman)

    Abstract: How does the design of a justice system affect protection in cases of intimate partner violence? We study the large-scale implementation of a system of specialized domestic violence courts (SDVCs), an innovation in access to justice programs for potential victims of intimate partner violence (IPV) and offenders. Using individual-level administrative data from the universe of civil domestic violence cases in Puerto Rico during the period 2014-2020, we leverage the staggered opening of SDVCs across judicial regions to examine the consequences for victims’ judicial protection and offender recidivism. Access to SDVCs leads to a considerable 8 percentage points increase in the probability that judges issue a protection order and a 1.7 percentage point (15 percent) decrease in victim and offender reappearance rates within one year of the start of the case. Effects are more pronounced for cases in which parties have children in common and in which access to SDVCs is more limited. Linking the case data to administrative and survey data on judges, we show that the priorities of judges assigned to SDVCs play a prominent role in explaining these outcomes.

    Here’s the URL to the paper: https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/gustavo.bobonis/SDVC_PR_Paper_25-09.pdf

  • Thu07May

    MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - Hayden Harris and Andy Lau (PGRs)

    1:00pm - 2:00pm, S2.79

    There will be two 30 minute presentations:

    Hayden Harris is presenting Learning by not Doing (Drugs)

    Andy Lau is presenting The Defensibility Trap: Why Experts Choose Not to Learn.

  • Thu07May

    Econometrics Seminar - Toru Kitagawa (Brown)

    2:00pm - 3:30pm, S2.79
  • Thu07May

    DR@W Forum: Erik Stuchly (Hamburg)

    2:30pm - 3:45pm, WBS 2.007

    Do people predict others’ decisions by repeated sampling of simulated outcomes?

  • Thu07May

    EBER Seminar - Etienne Le Rossignol (University de Namur)

    4:00pm - 5:15pm, S2.79

    Title: Scope of Trust: Origins and Consequences

  • Fri08May

    Computational History Workshop

    10:00am - 11:00am,
  • Mon11May

    Econometrics Seminar - Wendun Wang (EUR)

    2:00pm - 3:30pm, S2.79

    Title: Recovering latent time-varying network in panel models

  • Tue12May

    CWIP (CAGE Work in Progress) Workshop - Johannes Brinkmann (PGR)

    1:00pm - 2:00pm, S2.79

    Title: Public transport pricing and monopsony power

  • Tue12May

    Applied & Development Economics Seminar - Kelsey Jack (UC Berkeley)

    2:15pm - 3:30pm, S2.79

    Title: Health Insurance for Seasonal Savings: Evidence from Rural Côte d'Ivoire

    Authors: Günther Fink, B. Kelsey Jack, Renate Strobl, Dao Daouda

    Abstract: Households in low-income agricultural economies face large seasonal fluctuations in income and limited access to financial tools for smoothing consumption. In such settings, health insurance can serve not only as risk protection, but also as a state-contingent savings technology, transferring resources from high-income harvest periods to low-income lean periods. We study the rollout of Côte d'Ivoire's national health insurance scheme in a context with high morbidity, substantial out-of-pocket expenditures, and pronounced income seasonality---conditions under which the potential welfare gains from insurance are particularly large. Using a randomized subsidy design among 2,468 cocoa-farming households, we show that insurance demand is highly responsive to both price and cash-on-hand liquidity. Despite strong demand and actuarially favorable pricing, we find limited effects on health spending or consumption. We show that this disconnect arises from frictions in accessing benefits, including weak verification and reimbursement environments that limit providers' willingness to honor coverage without immediate proof. Our results highlight the importance of implementation, trust, and contract enforceability in determining the welfare impacts of social insurance.

  • Wed13May

    PEPE Reading Group - Jean Akpo (PGR)

    10:00am - 10:30am, S2.84

    Title: Land conflict in Africa: The role of descent (own project)

    Abstract: Africa experiences a significant proportion of global conflict, underscoring the importance of understanding its underlying drivers. Matrilineal societies induce less cooperation between spouses (Lowes, 2017) which ultimately impedes mobilization. I test that intrinsic norms of kinship in African societies, like the descent could reduce competition over real property. Using several empirical strategies, I find that matrilineal descent reduces conflict incidence and intensity. My evidence suggests that cultural beliefs about revengeful actions are transmitted from one generation to the next and affect participation in subsequent conflict events.

  • Wed13May

    CRETA Theory Seminar - Marilyn Pease (Indiana University)

    4:00pm - 5:30pm,

    Title: Follow the Leader? Coordination Motives in Sequential Information Acquisition (joint with Mark Whitmeyer)

  • Thu14May

    Political Economy & Public Economics Seminar - Francesco Trebbi (UoCalifornia, Berkeley)

    11:15am - 12:30pm, S2.79

    Title: Decoupling Taste-Based versus Statistical Discrimination in ElectionsLink opens in a new window (with Amanda de Albuquerque, Fred Finan, Anubhav Jha, and Laura Karpuska)

  • Thu14May

    MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - Maryam Saeedi (Carnegie Mellon)

    1:00pm - 2:00pm, S2.79

    Title: Getting the Agent to Wait (with Yikang Shen, Ali Shourideh)

  • Thu14May

    Macro/International Seminar - Olivia Bordeu (Berkeley)

    2:00pm - 3:30pm, S2.79

    Title: Bank Branches and the Allocation of Capital across Cities (with Gustavo Gonzalez, Marcos Sora).

  • Thu14May

    DR@W Forum - Slot Available

    2:30pm - 3:45pm, Wolfson Research Exchange (Library)
  • Mon18May

    Econometrics Seminar - Yuhao Wang (Tsinghua)

    2:00pm - 3:30pm, S0.13

    Title to be advised.

  • Tue19May

    MIEW (Macro/International Economics Workshop) - Daniel Jaar (EUI)

    12:00pm - 1:00pm, S0.08

    Daniel Jaar is visiting the department for one week.

    Title to be advised.

  • Tue19May

    CWIP (CAGE Work in Progress) Workshop - Desmond Fairall (PGR)

    1:00pm - 2:00pm, S0.08

    Title: Quasi-Bayesian Hierarchical Models: Aggregating evidence across studies.

    My co-author is Thomas Glinnan PHD LSE.

  • Tue19May

    Applied & Development Economics Seminar - David Lagakos (BU)

    2:15pm - 3:30pm, S0.13

    Title: Occupational Dynasties and Development (coauthored with Sid George and Martin Shu)

  • Wed20May

    CRETA Theory Seminar - Dilip Abreu (New York)

    4:00pm - 5:30pm, S0.13

    Title: Revisiting Shapley-Shubik (1971) via Nash (1953) . This work is joint with Mihai Manea.

    Abstract: The set of stable payoffs in assignment games is often large.

    We seek to refine this set in the spirit of the Nash (1953) program, where an idealized (or “cooperative”)

    solution is also supported by a non-cooperative mechanism whose Nash equilibria (possibly refined as in Nash (1953))

    yield outcomes that exactly mirror the idealized solution. These dual perspectives jointly reinforce and validate

    one another.

  • Thu21May

    MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) Workshop - Shantanu Chadha (PGR)

    1:00pm - 2:00pm, S0.08

    Title: Jobs, Workers, and Production Networks: A General Theory of Labour Market Shock Propagation 

  • Thu21May

    AMES Workshop - Matthias Endres

    1:00pm - 2:00pm, E0.23 (Social Sciences)

    The effects of emotion avoidance on scapegoating

  • Thu21May

    EBER Seminar - Andis Sofianos (Durham)

    2:30pm - 3:45pm, WBS2.007

    Title: Rationality and Cooperation

    Abstract: How does rationality shape cooperation in strategic settings? We study this question in a laboratory experiment that links individual rationality, measured by consistency with the generalized axiom of revealed preference, to behaviour in an indefinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Participants are grouped by pre-measured rationality before interacting repeatedly. We find that higher rationality substantially increases cooperation and payoffs. This effect operates through a novel mechanism: more rational individuals make fewer implementation errors when executing their intended strategies, thereby sustaining cooperative outcomes. By contrast, higher cognitive ability also promotes cooperation and higher payoffs, but through a distinct channel—reducing strategic errors in responding optimally to others’ actions. Our results provide the first experimental evidence linking rationality to cooperation via decision-making errors, and clarify the distinct roles of rationality and intelligence in shaping strategic behaviour. Together, the findings offer a unified account of how cognitive constraints affect cooperation in repeated games.

    Authors: Ali Moghaddasi Kelishomi, Daniel Sgroi, and Andis Sofianos

  • Thu21May

    DR@W/EBER Seminar: Andis Sofianos (Durham)

    2:30pm - 3:45pm, WBS 2.007

    Rationality and Cooperation

  • Tue26May

    CWIP (CAGE Work in Progress) - PhD Mock Job Talk - Lily Shevchenko (PGR)

    1:00pm - 2:00pm, S0.08

    Title: Can hate speech be banned online? The effects of shutting down toxic forums on Reddit

  • Tue26May

    Applied & Development Economics Seminar - Guy Pincus (Harvard)

    2:15pm - 3:30pm, S0.13

    Title: Wildlife and Conflict: The Cost of Protecting Biodiversity

    Abstract:

    Our planet is experiencing the first human-induced mass extinction of species. In response,

    policymakers have implemented international trade bans to preserve rare animals and forest

    species such as rhinos, elephants, and rosewood. Yet little research examines their consequences.

    Combining georeferenced habitat maps of wild animals and trees with armed conflict data, I

    uncover sizeable adverse effects of international trade ban treaties. First, event-study estimates

    reveal that bans raise the likelihood of conflict in habitat areas by about 40%. Two findings

    support a windfall-related conflict mechanism. For elephant ivory, a natural experiment shows

    that, in response to supply-side policies, prices change, which in turn changes the likelihood

    of conflict events in their habitat. Given the elephant’s broad habitat, the implied magnitude

    exceeds that of well-studied conflict minerals. For wild trees, satellite data show that harvesting

    shifts from high- to low-capacity states once bans are imposed, generating rents that spark

    violence. An analysis of battles’ locations before and after the policy reveals that militias and

    rebels expand into new, distant areas and are more likely to gain territorial control, consistent

    with a feasibility mechanism in which windfalls relax budget constraints. A quantitative model

    suggests that a targeted policy restricting trade in states with strong institutions and smaller

    wildlife stocks can conserve resources while limiting conflict. Given these spillovers, international

    trade bans, if maintained, should be accompanied by state-building support for low-income

    countries, which often lack enforcement capacity.

    Link: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1nyIPlpsm7AFibk5cBvQFmN_Osl8f8IC-/view

  • Wed27May

    Econometrics Seminar - Federico Ciliberto (Virginia)

    2:00pm - 3:30pm, S0.13
  • Wed27May

    CRETA Seminar - Rohit Lamba (Cornell)

    4:00pm - 5:30pm, S2.79

    Title: Accountability without Saints

    Abstract: Can the power to replace leaders sustain good governance when no leader is intrinsically motivated? I study a dynamic accountability game in which an evaluator retains or replaces an incumbent based on public performance reports. When at least one type governs well by nature, Bayesian learning selects for good leaders. Without such "saints," accountability collapses: accumulated trust erodes the evaluator's willingness to replace; career incentives vanish, and no coherent equilibrium sustains effort. Committed periodic review, that is, a fixed rule that holds every incumbent to the same standard regardless of reputation, restores positive governance by preserving career incentives across terms. The governance frontier, the best achievable governance under such rules, falls short of what saints achieve and is characterized in closed form. The impossibility extends beyond the baseline finite-signal model to Gaussian signals, suggesting the trust trap is a general feature of Bayesian accountability.

  • Thu28May

    Political Economy Seminar - Apurav Bhatiya (Birmingham)

    11:15am - 12:30pm, S0.13

    Title to be advised.

  • Thu28May

    MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - PhD Mock Job Talk - Youngji Sohn (PGR)

    1:00pm - 2:30pm, S2.79

    Title: Refining Berk Nash Equilibrium (tentative)

  • Thu28May

    DR@W Forum: Davide Pace (LMU)

    2:30pm - 3:45pm, WBS 1.007

    The economic consequences of memory limitations (With Taisuke Imai)

  • Tue02Jun

    MIEW (Macro/International Economics Workshop) - to be advised

    12:00pm - 1:00pm, S0.08

    To be advised

  • Tue02Jun

    CWIP (CAGE Work in Progress) - Devesh Rustagi (Warwick)

    1:00pm - 2:00pm, S0.08

    Title to be advised.

  • Tue02Jun

    Applied & Development Economics Seminar - Zachary Bleemer (Princeton)

    2:15pm - 3:30pm,

    Title: Changes in the College Mobility Pipeline Since 1900 (joint with Sarah Quincy)

    Zachary will present an updated version of this study https://www.nber.org/papers/w33797

  • Wed03Jun

    MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress)

    1:00pm - 2:00pm, S0.08

    To be advised

  • Thu04Jun

    MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress)

    1:00pm - 2:00pm, S0.08

    To be advised.

  • Thu04Jun

    AMRG (Applied Microeconomics Reading Group)

    2:00pm - 3:00pm, S1.50
  • Thu04Jun

    DR@W Forum: Loukas Balafoutas (Exeter)

    2:30pm - 3:45pm, WBS 1.007

    Networks in prison: An experiment with inmates

  • Mon08Jun

    Economic History Seminar - Ferdinand Rauch (St Gallen)

    1:00pm - 2:00pm, S0.18

    Title to be advised.

  • Tue09Jun

    MIEW (Macro/International Economics Workshop)

    12:00pm - 1:00pm, S0.08

    To be advised

  • Tue09Jun

    CWIP (CAGE Work in Progress) Workshop - Carole Gao (PGR)

    1:00pm - 2:00pm, S0.08

    Title to be advised.

  • Thu11Jun

    MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress)

    1:00pm - 2:00pm, S0.18

    To be advised

  • Thu11Jun

    DR@W: Slot Available

    2:30pm - 3:45pm,
  • Tue16Jun

    MIEW (Macro/International Economics Workhsop)

    12:00pm - 1:00pm, S0.09

    To be advised.

  • Tue16Jun

    CWIP (CAGE Work in Progress) - Adam Di Lizia (PGR)

    1:00pm - 2:00pm, S0.09

    Title to be advised.

  • Thu18Jun

    MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress)

    1:00pm - 2:00pm, S0.10

    To be advised

  • Thu18Jun

    AMRG (Applied Microeconomics Reading Group)

    2:00pm - 3:00pm, S1.50
  • Thu18Jun

    DR@W: Slot Available

    2:30pm - 3:45pm,
  • Tue23Jun

    MIEW (Macro/International Economics Workshop)

    12:00pm - 1:00pm, S0.09

    To be advised.

  • Thu25Jun

    MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress)

    1:00pm - 2:00pm, S0.10

    To be advised.

  • Thu25Jun

    DR@W: Slot Available

    2:30pm - 3:45pm,
  • Thu02Jul

    DR@W: Slot Available

    2:30pm - 3:45pm,
  • Tue02Jun

    MIEW (Macro/International Economics Workshop) - to be advised

    12:00pm - 1:00pm, S0.08

    To be advised

  • Tue02Jun

    CWIP (CAGE Work in Progress) - Devesh Rustagi (Warwick)

    1:00pm - 2:00pm, S0.08

    Title to be advised.

  • Wed03Jun

    MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress)

    1:00pm - 2:00pm, S0.08

    To be advised

  • Thu04Jun

    MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress)

    1:00pm - 2:00pm, S0.08

    To be advised.

  • Tue09Jun

    MIEW (Macro/International Economics Workshop)

    12:00pm - 1:00pm, S0.08

    To be advised

  • Tue09Jun

    CWIP (CAGE Work in Progress) Workshop - Carole Gao (PGR)

    1:00pm - 2:00pm, S0.08

    Title to be advised.

  • Tue16Jun

    MIEW (Macro/International Economics Workhsop)

    12:00pm - 1:00pm, S0.09

    To be advised.

  • Tue16Jun

    CWIP (CAGE Work in Progress) - Adam Di Lizia (PGR)

    1:00pm - 2:00pm, S0.09

    Title to be advised.

  • Tue23Jun

    MIEW (Macro/International Economics Workshop)

    12:00pm - 1:00pm, S0.09

    To be advised.

  • Wed27May

    Econometrics Seminar - Federico Ciliberto (Virginia)

    2:00pm - 3:30pm, S0.13
  • Wed27May

    CRETA Seminar - Rohit Lamba (Cornell)

    4:00pm - 5:30pm, S2.79

    Title: Accountability without Saints

    Abstract: Can the power to replace leaders sustain good governance when no leader is intrinsically motivated? I study a dynamic accountability game in which an evaluator retains or replaces an incumbent based on public performance reports. When at least one type governs well by nature, Bayesian learning selects for good leaders. Without such "saints," accountability collapses: accumulated trust erodes the evaluator's willingness to replace; career incentives vanish, and no coherent equilibrium sustains effort. Committed periodic review, that is, a fixed rule that holds every incumbent to the same standard regardless of reputation, restores positive governance by preserving career incentives across terms. The governance frontier, the best achievable governance under such rules, falls short of what saints achieve and is characterized in closed form. The impossibility extends beyond the baseline finite-signal model to Gaussian signals, suggesting the trust trap is a general feature of Bayesian accountability.

  • Mon08Jun

    Economic History Seminar - Ferdinand Rauch (St Gallen)

    1:00pm - 2:00pm, S0.18

    Title to be advised.

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