Events
An event created in collaboration with the ifo Institute, ETH Zurich, CAGE, and the University of Warwick.
Friday 19 June 9:00am, 1 day 5 hours 30 minutesAs you start preparing for your career journey we invite you to look beyond the graduation.
Thursday 30 October 3:00pm - 4:00pmEvent Overview
- Wed27May
Econometrics Seminar - Federico Ciliberto (Virginia)
Title: Bridging Quasi-Experimental and Structural Approaches for Robust Evaluation of US Airline Mergers (with Gaurab Aryal and Anirban Chattopadhyaya).
- Wed27May
CRETA Seminar - Rohit Lamba (Cornell)
Title: Accountability without Saints
Abstract: Can the power to replace leaders sustain good governance when no leader is intrinsically motivated? I study a dynamic accountability game in which an evaluator retains or replaces an incumbent based on public performance reports. When at least one type governs well by nature, Bayesian learning selects for good leaders. Without such "saints," accountability collapses: accumulated trust erodes the evaluator's willingness to replace; career incentives vanish, and no coherent equilibrium sustains effort. Committed periodic review, that is, a fixed rule that holds every incumbent to the same standard regardless of reputation, restores positive governance by preserving career incentives across terms. The governance frontier, the best achievable governance under such rules, falls short of what saints achieve and is characterized in closed form. The impossibility extends beyond the baseline finite-signal model to Gaussian signals, suggesting the trust trap is a general feature of Bayesian accountability.
- Thu28May
Political Economy Seminar - Apurav Bhatiya (Birmingham)
Title to be advised.
- Thu28May
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - PhD Mock Job Talk - Youngji Sohn (PGR)
Title: Refining Berk Nash Equilibrium (tentative)
- Thu28May
DR@W Forum: Davide Pace (LMU)
The economic consequences of memory limitations (With Taisuke Imai)
- Tue02Jun
MIEW (Macro/International Economics Workshop) - to be advised
To be advised
- Tue02Jun
CWIP (CAGE Work in Progress) - Devesh Rustagi (Warwick)
Title to be advised.
- Tue02Jun
Applied & Development Economics Seminar - Zachary Bleemer (Princeton)
Title: Changes in the College Mobility Pipeline Since 1900 (joint with Sarah Quincy)
Zachary will present an updated version of this study https://www.nber.org/papers/w33797
- Tue05May
MIEW (Macro/International Economics Workshop) - Emanuele Savini and Andrea Guerrieri D'Amati (PGRs)
There will be two 1hr presentations, titles are as follows:
i) Exchange Rates and the ‘Fed Information Effect - Emanuele Savini
ii) An Emotional Mr. Market: Media Emotions and the Time-Varying Price of Risk - Andrea Guerrieri D'Amati
- Tue05May
CWIP (CAGE Work in Progress) Workshop - Damiano Turchet (Warwick)
Title: Disadvantage and Distorted Beliefs (joint with P Dalton and S Ghosal).
Abstract: We develop a dynamic theory of how structural disadvantage shapes outcomes through the interaction of cognitive constraints and psychological determinants of efforts. We relate locus of control, self-efficacy, and grit to perceived returns to effort, and study aspirations in an extension. Individuals differ in exogenous circumstances, such as class, caste, race, gender, or inherited wealth, which affect the payoff or likelihood of success from effort. Beliefs about returns to effort evolve only through effort itself. Disadvantage raises the belief threshold required to justify effort, making disadvantaged individuals more likely to stop trying before learning their true returns. External locus of control, low self-efficacy, and weak grit can therefore emerge endogenously. We distinguish standard traps, which arise even for farsighted agents, from behavioral traps, which arise under partial myopia. Cash transfers, subsidies, and access policies lower effort thresholds; psychological, role-model, and grit interventions sustain beliefs.
- Tue05May
Applied & Development Economics Seminar - Siwan Anderson (UBC)
Title: The Persistence of Female Political Power in Africa (by Siwan Anderson, Sophia Du Plessis, Sahar Parsa, and James A. Robinson)
Abstract: Research on female political representation has tended to overlook the traditional role of women as leaders across many societies. Our study aims to address this gap by investigating the enduring influence of historical female political leadership on contemporary formal political representation in Africa. We test for this persistence by compiling two original datasets: one detailing female political leadership in precolonial societies and another on current female representation in local elections. Our findings indicate that ethnic groups historically allowing women in leadership roles in politics do tend to have a higher proportion of elected female representatives in today's formal local political institutions. We also observe that institutional, rather than economic, factors significantly shape the traditional political influence of women. Moreover, in accordance with historical accounts, we uncover evidence of a reversal of female political power due to institutional changes enforced by colonial powers.
- Wed06May
Econometrics Seminar - Antonio Galvao (Michigan State)
Title: Model Averaging in Semiparametric Estimation of Quantile Treatment Effects.
Please find the paper here: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5274615
- Wed06May
CRETA Seminar - Xiaosheng Mu (Princeton)
Title: Privacy Preserving Auctions (with Ran Eilat and Kfir Eliaz)
Abstract: In many acution settings the auctioneer must disclose the identity of the winner and the price he pays. We characterize the auction that minimizes the winner's privacy loss among those that maximize total surplus or the seller's revenue, and are strategy-proof. Privacy loss is measured with respect to what an outside observer learns from the disclosed price, and is quantified by the mutual information between the price and the winner's willingness to pay. When only interim individual-rationality is required, the most privacy preserving auction involves stochastic ex-post payments. Under ex-post individual rationality, and assuming the bidders' type distribution exhibits a monotone hazard rate, privacy loss is minimized by the second-price auction with deterministic payments.
- Thu07May
PEPE (Political Economy & Public Economics) Seminar - Gustavo Bobonis (Toronto)
Title: Improving Judicial Protection in Intimate Partner Violence Cases: The Role of Specialized Courts and Judges (with Carolina Arteaga, Paola Salardi, and Dario Toman)
Abstract: How does the design of a justice system affect protection in cases of intimate partner violence? We study the large-scale implementation of a system of specialized domestic violence courts (SDVCs), an innovation in access to justice programs for potential victims of intimate partner violence (IPV) and offenders. Using individual-level administrative data from the universe of civil domestic violence cases in Puerto Rico during the period 2014-2020, we leverage the staggered opening of SDVCs across judicial regions to examine the consequences for victims’ judicial protection and offender recidivism. Access to SDVCs leads to a considerable 8 percentage points increase in the probability that judges issue a protection order and a 1.7 percentage point (15 percent) decrease in victim and offender reappearance rates within one year of the start of the case. Effects are more pronounced for cases in which parties have children in common and in which access to SDVCs is more limited. Linking the case data to administrative and survey data on judges, we show that the priorities of judges assigned to SDVCs play a prominent role in explaining these outcomes.
Here’s the URL to the paper: https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/gustavo.bobonis/SDVC_PR_Paper_25-09.pdf
- Thu07May
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - Hayden Harris and Andy Lau (PGRs)
There will be two 30 minute presentations:
Hayden Harris is presenting Learning by not Doing (Drugs)
Andy Lau is presenting The Defensibility Trap: Why Experts Choose Not to Learn.
- Thu07May
Econometrics Seminar - Toru Kitagawa (Brown)
- Thu07May
DR@W Forum: Erik Stuchly (Hamburg)
Do people predict others’ decisions by repeated sampling of simulated outcomes?
- Thu07May
EBER Seminar - Etienne Le Rossignol (University de Namur)
Title: Scope of Trust: Origins and Consequences
- Fri08May
Computational History Workshop
- Mon11May
Econometrics Seminar - Wendun Wang (EUR)
Title: Recovering latent time-varying network in panel models
- Tue12May
CWIP (CAGE Work in Progress) Workshop - Johannes Brinkmann (PGR)
Title: Public transport pricing and monopsony power
- Tue12May
Applied & Development Economics Seminar - Kelsey Jack (UC Berkeley)
Title: Health Insurance for Seasonal Savings: Evidence from Rural Côte d'Ivoire
Authors: Günther Fink, B. Kelsey Jack, Renate Strobl, Dao Daouda
Abstract: Households in low-income agricultural economies face large seasonal fluctuations in income and limited access to financial tools for smoothing consumption. In such settings, health insurance can serve not only as risk protection, but also as a state-contingent savings technology, transferring resources from high-income harvest periods to low-income lean periods. We study the rollout of Côte d'Ivoire's national health insurance scheme in a context with high morbidity, substantial out-of-pocket expenditures, and pronounced income seasonality---conditions under which the potential welfare gains from insurance are particularly large. Using a randomized subsidy design among 2,468 cocoa-farming households, we show that insurance demand is highly responsive to both price and cash-on-hand liquidity. Despite strong demand and actuarially favorable pricing, we find limited effects on health spending or consumption. We show that this disconnect arises from frictions in accessing benefits, including weak verification and reimbursement environments that limit providers' willingness to honor coverage without immediate proof. Our results highlight the importance of implementation, trust, and contract enforceability in determining the welfare impacts of social insurance.
- Wed13May
PEPE Reading Group - Jean Akpo (PGR)
Title: Land conflict in Africa: The role of descent (own project)
Abstract: Africa experiences a significant proportion of global conflict, underscoring the importance of understanding its underlying drivers. Matrilineal societies induce less cooperation between spouses (Lowes, 2017) which ultimately impedes mobilization. I test that intrinsic norms of kinship in African societies, like the descent could reduce competition over real property. Using several empirical strategies, I find that matrilineal descent reduces conflict incidence and intensity. My evidence suggests that cultural beliefs about revengeful actions are transmitted from one generation to the next and affect participation in subsequent conflict events.
- Wed13May
CRETA Theory Seminar - Marilyn Pease (Indiana University)
Title: Follow the Leader? Coordination Motives in Sequential Information Acquisition (joint with Mark Whitmeyer)
- Thu14May
Political Economy & Public Economics Seminar - Francesco Trebbi (UoCalifornia, Berkeley)
Title: Decoupling Taste-Based versus Statistical Discrimination in ElectionsLink opens in a new window (with Amanda de Albuquerque, Fred Finan, Anubhav Jha, and Laura Karpuska)
- Thu14May
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - Maryam Saeedi (Carnegie Mellon)
Title: Getting the Agent to Wait (with Yikang Shen, Ali Shourideh)
- Thu14May
Macro/International Seminar - Olivia Bordeu (Berkeley)
Title: Bank Branches and the Allocation of Capital across Cities (with Gustavo Gonzalez, Marcos Sora).
- Thu14May
DR@W Forum - Slot Available
- Mon18May
Econometrics Seminar - Yuhao Wang (Tsinghua)
Title to be advised.
- Tue19May
MIEW (Macro/International Economics Workshop) - Daniel Jaar (EUI)
Daniel Jaar is visiting the department for one week.
Title to be advised.
- Tue19May
CWIP (CAGE Work in Progress) Workshop - Desmond Fairall (PGR)
Title: Quasi-Bayesian Hierarchical Models: Aggregating evidence across studies.
My co-author is Thomas Glinnan PHD LSE.
- Tue19May
Applied & Development Economics Seminar - David Lagakos (BU)
Title: Occupational Dynasties and Development (coauthored with Sid George and Martin Shu)
- Wed20May
CRETA Theory Seminar - Dilip Abreu (New York)
Title: Revisiting Shapley-Shubik (1971) via Nash (1953) . This work is joint with Mihai Manea.
Abstract: The set of stable payoffs in assignment games is often large.
We seek to refine this set in the spirit of the Nash (1953) program, where an idealized (or “cooperative”)
solution is also supported by a non-cooperative mechanism whose Nash equilibria (possibly refined as in Nash (1953))
yield outcomes that exactly mirror the idealized solution. These dual perspectives jointly reinforce and validate
one another.
- Thu21May
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) Workshop - Shantanu Chadha (PGR)
Title: Jobs, Workers, and Production Networks: A General Theory of Labour Market Shock Propagation
- Thu21May
AMES Workshop - Matthias Endres
The effects of emotion avoidance on scapegoating
- Thu21May
EBER Seminar - Andis Sofianos (Durham)
Title: Rationality and Cooperation
Abstract: How does rationality shape cooperation in strategic settings? We study this question in a laboratory experiment that links individual rationality, measured by consistency with the generalized axiom of revealed preference, to behaviour in an indefinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Participants are grouped by pre-measured rationality before interacting repeatedly. We find that higher rationality substantially increases cooperation and payoffs. This effect operates through a novel mechanism: more rational individuals make fewer implementation errors when executing their intended strategies, thereby sustaining cooperative outcomes. By contrast, higher cognitive ability also promotes cooperation and higher payoffs, but through a distinct channel—reducing strategic errors in responding optimally to others’ actions. Our results provide the first experimental evidence linking rationality to cooperation via decision-making errors, and clarify the distinct roles of rationality and intelligence in shaping strategic behaviour. Together, the findings offer a unified account of how cognitive constraints affect cooperation in repeated games.
Authors: Ali Moghaddasi Kelishomi, Daniel Sgroi, and Andis Sofianos
- Thu21May
DR@W/EBER Seminar: Andis Sofianos (Durham)
Rationality and Cooperation
- Tue26May
CWIP (CAGE Work in Progress) - PhD Mock Job Talk - Lily Shevchenko (PGR)
Title: Can hate speech be banned online? The effects of shutting down toxic forums on Reddit
- Tue26May
Applied & Development Economics Seminar - Guy Pincus (Harvard)
Title: Wildlife and Conflict: The Cost of Protecting Biodiversity
Abstract:
Our planet is experiencing the first human-induced mass extinction of species. In response,
policymakers have implemented international trade bans to preserve rare animals and forest
species such as rhinos, elephants, and rosewood. Yet little research examines their consequences.
Combining georeferenced habitat maps of wild animals and trees with armed conflict data, I
uncover sizeable adverse effects of international trade ban treaties. First, event-study estimates
reveal that bans raise the likelihood of conflict in habitat areas by about 40%. Two findings
support a windfall-related conflict mechanism. For elephant ivory, a natural experiment shows
that, in response to supply-side policies, prices change, which in turn changes the likelihood
of conflict events in their habitat. Given the elephant’s broad habitat, the implied magnitude
exceeds that of well-studied conflict minerals. For wild trees, satellite data show that harvesting
shifts from high- to low-capacity states once bans are imposed, generating rents that spark
violence. An analysis of battles’ locations before and after the policy reveals that militias and
rebels expand into new, distant areas and are more likely to gain territorial control, consistent
with a feasibility mechanism in which windfalls relax budget constraints. A quantitative model
suggests that a targeted policy restricting trade in states with strong institutions and smaller
wildlife stocks can conserve resources while limiting conflict. Given these spillovers, international
trade bans, if maintained, should be accompanied by state-building support for low-income
countries, which often lack enforcement capacity.
Link: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1nyIPlpsm7AFibk5cBvQFmN_Osl8f8IC-/view
- Wed27May
Econometrics Seminar - Federico Ciliberto (Virginia)
Title: Bridging Quasi-Experimental and Structural Approaches for Robust Evaluation of US Airline Mergers (with Gaurab Aryal and Anirban Chattopadhyaya).
- Wed27May
CRETA Seminar - Rohit Lamba (Cornell)
Title: Accountability without Saints
Abstract: Can the power to replace leaders sustain good governance when no leader is intrinsically motivated? I study a dynamic accountability game in which an evaluator retains or replaces an incumbent based on public performance reports. When at least one type governs well by nature, Bayesian learning selects for good leaders. Without such "saints," accountability collapses: accumulated trust erodes the evaluator's willingness to replace; career incentives vanish, and no coherent equilibrium sustains effort. Committed periodic review, that is, a fixed rule that holds every incumbent to the same standard regardless of reputation, restores positive governance by preserving career incentives across terms. The governance frontier, the best achievable governance under such rules, falls short of what saints achieve and is characterized in closed form. The impossibility extends beyond the baseline finite-signal model to Gaussian signals, suggesting the trust trap is a general feature of Bayesian accountability.
- Thu28May
Political Economy Seminar - Apurav Bhatiya (Birmingham)
Title to be advised.
- Thu28May
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - PhD Mock Job Talk - Youngji Sohn (PGR)
Title: Refining Berk Nash Equilibrium (tentative)
- Thu28May
DR@W Forum: Davide Pace (LMU)
The economic consequences of memory limitations (With Taisuke Imai)
- Tue02Jun
MIEW (Macro/International Economics Workshop) - to be advised
To be advised
- Tue02Jun
CWIP (CAGE Work in Progress) - Devesh Rustagi (Warwick)
Title to be advised.
- Tue02Jun
Applied & Development Economics Seminar - Zachary Bleemer (Princeton)
Title: Changes in the College Mobility Pipeline Since 1900 (joint with Sarah Quincy)
Zachary will present an updated version of this study https://www.nber.org/papers/w33797
- Wed03Jun
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress)
To be advised
- Thu04Jun
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress)
To be advised.
- Thu04Jun
AMRG (Applied Microeconomics Reading Group)
- Thu04Jun
DR@W Forum: Loukas Balafoutas (Exeter)
Networks in prison: An experiment with inmates
- Mon08Jun
Economic History Seminar - Ferdinand Rauch (St Gallen)
Title to be advised.
- Tue09Jun
Unlocking UK-wide growth workshop
- Tue09Jun
MIEW (Macro/International Economics Workshop)
To be advised
- Tue09Jun
CWIP (CAGE Work in Progress) Workshop - Carole Gao (PGR)
Title to be advised.
- Thu11Jun
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress)
To be advised
- Thu11Jun
DR@W: Slot Available
- Tue16Jun
MIEW (Macro/International Economics Workhsop)
To be advised.
- Tue16Jun
CWIP (CAGE Work in Progress) - Adam Di Lizia (PGR)
Title to be advised.
- Thu18Jun
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress)
To be advised
- Thu18Jun
AMRG (Applied Microeconomics Reading Group)
- Thu18Jun
DR@W: Slot Available
- Fri19Jun
CESifo Workshop: Digital Platforms - Methods, Policy and Politics
An event created in collaboration with the ifo Institute, ETH Zurich, CAGE, and the University of Warwick.
The trade-offs between freedom of choice, speech, and political expression on one side, and societal welfare on the other, continue to challenge policymakers seeking to regulate digital platforms. This workshop focuses on recent advances in research on the design, regulation, and user benefits of digital platforms, as well as their broader societal implications. It will examine a wide range of platforms—including social media, streaming services, dating apps, digital marketplaces, and AI‑powered tools—and aims to inform policy debates across multiple contexts, with particular attention to the intersection of platform regulation and politics. The workshop also seeks to advance research methodologies for studying digital platforms, especially the role of AI tools.
Organisers: Annalí Casanueva Artís; Mateusz Stalinski
Sponsors: CESifo; ETH Zurich; CAGE
Keynote: Ruben Enikolopov
Please note, participation in this event is limited to invited delegates.

Date: Friday 19 – Saturday 20 June 2026
For external speakers staying overnight at Scarman, dinner will be hosted at the Lakeview Restaurant on 18 June from 7:00 pm to 9:00 pm.
Location: Scarman, Space 11, University Of Warwick Scarman Rd, Coventry CV4 7SH
Friday 19 June
09:00 - 09:35
Marita Freimane (University of Zurich), Gender Bias, Feedback, and Productivity
09:35 - 10:10 Lily Shevchenko (University of Warwick), Can Hate Speech be Banned Online? The Effects of Shutting Down Toxic Forums on Reddit 10:10 - 10:45 Elliot Motte (UPF), Insult Politics in the Age of Social Media
10:45 - 11:15 Coffee break 11:15 - 11:50 Carolina Prado (Insper), Candidate Behavior in Local Elections: Campaigning in the Digital Age 11:50 - 12:25 Lehan Zhang (ETH Zurich), Adding Fuel to the (Gun)Fire: How Politicians Polarize the Public Debate 12:25 - 13:00 Mateusz Stalinski (University of Warwick), The Prosocial Ranking Challenge: Reducing Polarization on Social Media without Sacrificing Engagement 13:00 - 14:30 Lunch, Lakeview Restaurant 14:30 - 15:05 Rafael Jiménez-Durán (Bocconi University), The Supply and Demand of AI Sycophancy 15:05 - 15:40 Kazimier Smith (MIT), Birth, Life, and Death of AI Models 15:40 - 16:15 Jaime Marques-Pereira (University of Lancaster), The Joe Rogan Podcast "by Night": Public Health and the Dimming Reach of Influence 16:15 - 16:50 George Beknazar-Yuzbashev (University of Chicago), Social Media Toxicity and Mental Health 16:50 - 17:30 Coffee break 17:30 - 18:30 Ruben Enikolopov, Keynote Address 19:00 - 21:00 Dinner, Lakeview Restaurant Saturday 20 June
07:00 - 08:30 Breakfast, Lakeview Restaurant - External delegates only 09:30 - 10:05 Agustina Martinez (University of Leicester), The Power of Words: Economic Conditions, Political Discourse, and Support for Populism 10:05 - 10:40 Francesco Capozza (University of Barcelona), AI Images, Trust and News Demand 10:40 - 11:10 Coffee break 11:10 -11:45 Gísli Gylfason (Paris School of Economics), Doomscrolling: TikTok Use and News Consumption 11:45 - 12:20 Felix Schleef (HEC Paris), Consumer Choice between Recommendation Algorithms – Experimental Evidence 13:00 - 14:30 Lunch, Lakeview Restaurant - Sun21Jun
CAGE Summer School 2026
- Tue23Jun
MIEW (Macro/International Economics Workshop)
To be advised.
- Thu25Jun
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress)
To be advised.
- Thu25Jun
DR@W: Slot Available
- Thu02Jul
DR@W: Slot Available
- Tue02Jun
MIEW (Macro/International Economics Workshop) - to be advised
To be advised
- Tue02Jun
CWIP (CAGE Work in Progress) - Devesh Rustagi (Warwick)
Title to be advised.
- Wed03Jun
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress)
To be advised
- Thu04Jun
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress)
To be advised.
- Tue09Jun
MIEW (Macro/International Economics Workshop)
To be advised
- Tue09Jun
CWIP (CAGE Work in Progress) Workshop - Carole Gao (PGR)
Title to be advised.
- Tue16Jun
MIEW (Macro/International Economics Workhsop)
To be advised.
- Tue16Jun
CWIP (CAGE Work in Progress) - Adam Di Lizia (PGR)
Title to be advised.
- Tue23Jun
MIEW (Macro/International Economics Workshop)
To be advised.
- Wed27May
Econometrics Seminar - Federico Ciliberto (Virginia)
Title: Bridging Quasi-Experimental and Structural Approaches for Robust Evaluation of US Airline Mergers (with Gaurab Aryal and Anirban Chattopadhyaya).
- Wed27May
CRETA Seminar - Rohit Lamba (Cornell)
Title: Accountability without Saints
Abstract: Can the power to replace leaders sustain good governance when no leader is intrinsically motivated? I study a dynamic accountability game in which an evaluator retains or replaces an incumbent based on public performance reports. When at least one type governs well by nature, Bayesian learning selects for good leaders. Without such "saints," accountability collapses: accumulated trust erodes the evaluator's willingness to replace; career incentives vanish, and no coherent equilibrium sustains effort. Committed periodic review, that is, a fixed rule that holds every incumbent to the same standard regardless of reputation, restores positive governance by preserving career incentives across terms. The governance frontier, the best achievable governance under such rules, falls short of what saints achieve and is characterized in closed form. The impossibility extends beyond the baseline finite-signal model to Gaussian signals, suggesting the trust trap is a general feature of Bayesian accountability.
- Mon08Jun
Economic History Seminar - Ferdinand Rauch (St Gallen)
Title to be advised.
About our events
Find out more about a selection of our events that take place each year: