Jennifer Smith's auction page

Office: +44 (0)24 7652 3469
Mobile: +44 (0)7711 288980
Fax: +44 (0)24 7652 3032
Email: jennifer.smith@warwick.ac.uk
Address:
Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Home page: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/faculty/jennifersmith/

Auction links

Auction specialists' web pages

UMTS auctions

IMT-2000 Licensing Conditions & Status: a selected regional overview
UMTS summary from cellular-news
UK (results) (6 Mar-27 Apr 2000)
Netherlands (results in English) (10-24 Jul 2000)
Germany (results) (31 Jul-17 Aug 2000)
Italy (results in English; click calendar for 19, 20, 23 Oct) (19-23 Oct 2000)
Austria (final result) (2-3 Nov 2000)
New Zealand (10 Jul 2000-21 Feb 2001)
Switzerland (results) (13 Nov 2000 not!; 6 Dec 2000)
Canada (results) (15 Jan-1 Feb 2001)
Belgium (due March 2001)
Australia (result summary; final result) (15-22 Mar 2001)
Singapore (due April 2001)
Hong Kong (due Apr 2001)
Israel (due second quarter 2001)
Denmark (sealed bid) (due Oct 2001)
Czech Republic (for 1/4 licenses; due 2001)
USA (due Sep 2002)

Other auctions

Nigeria (2G ascending clock auction; 17-19 Jan 2001) Results
The world's first ascending-clock-plus-sealed-bid-auction. 5 bidders for 3 licenses. Reservation price $100,000,000. Auction ended Day 3, Round 17, price $285,000,000. High bidders in final round: Communications Investment Ltd (CIL), Econet Wireless, MTN Communications (also bidding: MSI-Celtel, United Networks). 3 licenses were allocated, to Econet, MTN and Nitel. Auction organised by the Nigerian Communications Commission, advised by CRA London and RSI.

Telecoms information

Jennifer C Smith's work on Auction Strategy and Design

Jennifer C Smith has worked with bidders in telecommunications spectrum auctions in the UK, Italy, Switzerland and other countries. This work has been undertaken in collaboration with arguably the world's most eminent auction strategist, Peter Cramton, and/or the top economics consulting company Charles River Associates London (CRA). We apply game theory relating to auction strategy to the real-world problem facing bidders of acquiring a spectrum license without paying too much, in the context of particular auction rules and particular competing bidders. The work also involves developing sophisticated computer software incorporating these game theoretic ideas. This software combines three functions: tracking the bids during the auction, assessing and recommending optimal strategy in the light of competitors' bids, and simulating the future progress of the auction.

Jennifer Smith's lectures on auctions

EC331 Research in Applied Economics

(lecture notes downloadable only by Warwick users)

Consultancy

Consultant, Charles River Associates