Monday 1 June 2009
Reputational models in economics
Organiser: Amrita Dhillon (Economics)

Programme

All talks will be in Lecture Room B3.02, Mathematics Institute, Zeeman Building

• 13:00 – 13.30 Lunch
• 13:30 – 14:30 Johannes Horner (Yale) Belief-free Equilibria in repeated games with incomplete information: the N-player case
• 14.30 – 15:30 Martin Cripps TBA
• 15:30 – 16:00 Tea Break
  
• 16:00 – 17:00 Meg Myer (Oxford) Dynamic models of communication with self interested experts (with C.Avery)
• 17:00 – 18:00 Tomas Sjostrom (Rutgers) Leader Reputation and Default in Sovereign Debt (with A.Dhillon)
  
• 18:00 Drinks and snacks