Skip to main content Skip to navigation

Francesco Squintani

Research Page

Working Papers

Persuasion in Networks, Coming soon.

Privacy Protection of Vulnerable Citizens, with Rossella Argenziano. Coming soon.

An Organizational Theory of Unionizations (2023), with Anja Prummer.

The Choice of Political Advisers (2023), with Hyungmin Park.

Political Competition and Strategic Voting in Multi-Candidate Elections (2024), with Dan Bernhardt and Stefan Krasa.

Optimal Overspecified Contracts (2019).

Information Transmission in Political Networks (2018).

Information Revelation and Pandering in Elections (2015), with Navin Kartik and Katrin Tinn, Review of Economic Studies, revision requested.

Signalling Quality by Delaying Sales (2011), with Giuseppe Lopomo.

Information Economics

The Design of Information Acquisition and Sharing (2023), with Dimitri Migrow, Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, 1(4): 710-745.

On the Direction of Innovation” (2021), with Hugo Hopenhayn, Journal of Political Economy, 129(7): 1991–2022.

Strategic Information Acquisition and Transmission” (2016), with Rossella Argenziano and Sergei Severinov, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8(3): 119-155.

Patent Rights and Innovation Disclosure” (2016), with Hugo Hopenhayn, Review of Economic Studies, 83(1): 199–230.

Strategic Information Transmission Networks” (2013), with Andrea Galeotti and Christian Ghiglino, Journal of Economic Theory, 148(5): 1751–1769; Extended Working Paper.

Overconfidence and Adverse Selection: The Case of Insurance” (2013), with Alvaro Sandroni, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 93(C): 149-165.

Preemption Games with Private Information” (2011), with Hugo Hopenhayn, Review of Economic Studies, 78(2): 667-692.

Competitive Experimentation with Private Information: The Survivor’s Curse” (2009), with Giuseppe Moscarini, Journal of Economic Theory, 145(1): 339-360; Extended Working Paper.

Individual Accountability in Teams” (2009), with Leslie Marx, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 72(1): 260-273.

Overconfidence, Insurance and Paternalism” (2007), with Alvaro Sandroni, American Economic Review, 97(5): 1994-2004.

Naive Audience and Communication Bias” (2006), with Marco Ottaviani, International Journal of Game Theory, 35(1): 129-150.

Credulity, Lies and Costly Talk” (2006), with Navin Kartik and Marco Ottaviani, Journal of Economic Theory, 134(1): 93-116.

Imitation and Experimentation in Changing Contests” (2002), with Juuso Valimaki, Journal of Economic Theory, 104(2): 376-404.

 Political Economy

Third Party Intervention and Strategic Militarization (2022), with Adam Meirowitz, Massimo Morelli and Kris Ramsay, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 17(1): 31–59.

Dispute Resolution Institutions and Strategic Militarization” (2019), with Adam Meirowitz, Massimo Morelli and Kris Ramsay, Journal of Political Economy, 127(1): 378-418.

Leadership with Trustworthy Associates” (2018), with Torun Dewan, American Political Science Review, 112(4): 844-859.

In Defence of Factions (2016), with Torun Dewan, American Journal of Political Science, 60:(4) 860–881.

Mediation and Peace” (2015), with Johannes Horner and Massimo Morelli, Review of Economic Studies, 82(4): 1483–1501.

Information Aggregation and Optimal Selection of the Executive” (2014), with Torun Dewan, Andrea Galeotti and Christian Ghiglino, American Journal of Political Science, 59(2): 475–494.

Competence and Ideology” (2011), with Dan Bernhardt and Odilon Camara, Review of Economic Studies, 78(2): 487-522.

The Case for Responsible Parties” (2009), with Dan Bernhardt and John Duggan, American Political Science Review, 103(4): 570–587.

On the Benefits of Party Competition” (2009), with Dan Bernhardt, Larissa Campuzano and Odilon Camara, Games and Economic Behavior, 66(2): 685-70.

 Private Polling in Elections and Voters Welfare” (2009), with Dan Bernhardt and John Duggan, Journal of Economic Theory, 144(5): 2021-2056.

Mediation, Arbitration and Negotiation” (2009), with Maria Goltsman, Johannes Horner, and Gregory Pavlov, Journal of Economic Theory, 144(4): 1397-1420.

Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Candidates” (2007), with Dan Bernhardt and John Duggan, Games and Economic Behavior, 58(1): 1-29.

Voting and Communication with Double-Sided Information” (2003), with Ulrich Doraszelski and Dino Gerardi, Contributions to Theoretical Economics: 3(1): Art. 6.

Game Theory

Equilibrium and Mistaken Self-Perception” (2006), Economic Theory, 27(3): 615-641.

Backward Induction and Model Forgetfulness” (2004), Advances in Theoretical Economics, 4(1): Article 2.

Moral Hazard, Renegotiation, and Forgetfulness” (2003), Games and Economic Behavior, 44(1): 98-113.

Survey Articles

Information Aggregation in Political Decision Making (2019), in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, David P. Redlawsk, Ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.

Introduction to a Symposium in Political Economy” (2011), Economic Theory, 49: 513–519.

A Survey on Polling in Elections” (2008), with Dan Bernhardt and John Duggan, in The Political Economy of Democracy, Enriqueta Aragones, Carmen Bevia, Humberto Llavador, and Norman Schofield, Eds., Fundacion BBVA, Madrid, Spain.

A Survey on Overconfidence” (2004), with Alvaro Sandroni.

Google Scholar Citations